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Overview 
Self-esteem is a widely assessed personality construct in clinical-health 
settings although its application in health psychology research has been 
substantially less developed. This research is aimed, in part, to examine the 
moderating influence of self-esteem in somatic health processes and psychological 
well-being. This research also seeks to test the inter-relationship between self- 
esteem and emotion control processes, particularly the tendency to mentally 
rehearse or ruminate over emotional upsetting experiences. Further, the 
independent and interactive effects of self-esteem and emotion-control processes 
are tested in survey, clinical, and experimental conditions. 
The first chapter sets out to establish the emerging trend in personality and 
health research to implicate self-esteem and self-processes, albeit indirectly, and 
in a piecemeal fashion in most instances. After reviewing the most prominent 
personality models in health, including the effects of locus of control, learned 
helplessness, hardiness, and the Type A behaviour pattern, but to mention a few, 
each section concludes with the recent trend linking self-esteem to that particular 
model. Next, the chapter becomes increasingly focused on reviewing and 
critically discussing the extant literature on self-esteem in health. The chapter 
concludes with unresolved issues and a programme of empirical study to follow. 
The second chapter consists of a review of existing self-report measures 
of self-esteem and lays the foundation for a new scale for the assessment of self- 
esteem. The construction and validation of the new scale titled the 'York Self- 
esteem Inventory' follows. The scale attempts to be broad in scope (in contrast 
XIV 
to the restricted construct tapped in the Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory) and 
more relevant to clinical and health contexts. 
In chapters three and four, examination of the psychological correlates of 
self-esteem are examined. Further, the independent and cumulative effects of 
personality on health are tested in prospective examinations; in chapter three a 
two-phase study over eight weeks; in chapter four, a four-phase study over 16 
weeks. In chapter five, three experimental studies are undertaken to address 
candidate physiological mechanisms underlying the poor health patterns reported 
in the two preceding chapters. In this way, the 'buffering' role of self-esteem is 
tested in stress reactivity. In each study self-esteem is manipulated situationally 
and group differences are observed with respect to psychophysiological arousal 
and state rumination tendencies. 
In chapter six, the inter-relationship between self-esteem and emotion- 
control processes are further tested in depressed and anxiety-disordered 
populations; populations that, by definition, are expected to show vulnerabilities 
across these dimensions. The final chapter, chapter seven, provides a summary 
of the findings and outlines a tentative working model for self-esteem in illness and 
psychological well-being. Research issues are brought to bear on the 
accumulated findings in this project and suggestions for future research are 
outlined. 
xv 
Abstrac t 
The initial phase of the research was concerned with the construction and 
validation of a new self-report scale for the assessment of self-esteem. Principal 
Axis Factoring resulted in a 30-item, unidimensional self-esteem factor 
possessing good internal and test-retest reliability over an 8-week inter-test 
interval. A replication study provided further support for the psychometric 
properties of the York Self-esteem Inventory (YSEI), which was shown to 
converge with the Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory (RSE). Finally, the YSEI was 
examined in relation to the Tennessee Self-concept Scale to highlight the 
distinction between self-esteem (self-evaluations) and self-concept (self-structure). 
Self-concept actually showed greater similarity to self-esteem than was expected, 
but the discussion will focus on the proper use of self-definitions in the theoretical 
and empirical literatures. 
Two prospective studies were undertaken, examining the relationship 
between self-esteem and selected personality variables in relation to somatic 
health and psychological well-being were undertaken. In both studies self-esteem 
was shown to relate to emotion control processes and coping strategies. Subjects 
with high self-esteem reported less cognitive rumination, inhibiting of emotion, and 
greater reliance on problem-focused coping and the ability to detach when under 
stress. These inter-relationships were also shown to influence health outcomes. 
In the first study conducted over an eight week period, self-esteem was shown to 
moderate the degree to which students experienced somatic complaints and 
psychological distress. This effect was greater than other models previously 
tested, including those pertaining to locus of control and tolerance of ambiguity. 
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Furthermore, depending on the nature of the outcome, interactive effects were 
observed between self-esteem, coping, and rumination. These results were 
replicated and extended in a subsequent prospective study conducted over a 16 
week period. In addition to exercising a moderating influence on health, distress, 
and social and academic adjustment over this period, self-esteem was also found 
to relate to state coping processes. Combined, the results from these two studies 
link self-esteem to cognitive, affective, and behavioural concomitants of stress as 
well as directly influencing health and other outcomes over time. While the results 
point to the moderating effect of self-esteem on physical health and psychological 
distress, the studies do not provide support for a 'buffering effect'. 
In the next series of experiments in chapter five, three studies were 
conducted to systematically test the moderating influence of self-esteem in 
laboratory-induced stress. In the first study, manipulation of positive self-esteem 
led to greater task performance, less subjective stress and reduced state 
cognitive rumination. In the second study, the experimental manipulation failed 
to successfully enhance self-esteem in male subjects although post-hoc analyses 
demonstrated the effects of baseline and state self-esteem on stress outcome 
measures. The final study showed that manipulation of self-esteem successfully 
led to greater task involvement and lower heart-rate arousal. Collectively these 
results highlight the physiological concomitants of self-esteem and the comparative 
advantage of high self-esteem in stress reactivity. 
The role of self-esteem and emotion control processes was tested in 25 
depressed and 25 anxiety-disorder patients in the final experimental chapter, 
chapter 6. The results from this study suggest that self-esteem is significantly 
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impaired in both disorders, and particularly so in the depressed group. Further, 
rumination and inhibition of emotion are elevated in depressed but not anxiety 
disorders when compared with student controls. Finally, differential correlation 
patterns were observed between self-esteem and cognitive rumination for the two 
clinical groups; self-esteem appears to be a vulnerability factor for rumination in 
anxiety disorders, whereas it may be a pathognomic, and independent feature of 
clinical depression. 
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Chapter 1 
1.0 Literature Review 
The tendency in the experimental paradigm to treat self-esteem as a dependent 
outcome variable is increasingly replaced with models articulating the causal 
relationship of self-esteem in human cognition, emotion, and behaviour. While 
one commentator has estimated that over 10,000 empirical reports exist 
(Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski et al., 1992) on the study of self-esteem, 
there is surprisingly little direct application of self-esteem in health psychology. 
Personality mechanisms are increasingly seen to be part of the stress-illness 
relationship (e. g. Lazarus, 1966; Costa & McCrae, 1987; Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994) although existing models seem to account for only part of the story. 
This review introduces the most widely-researched personality variables purporting 
to moderate the stress-illness relationship with special attention given to the 
inherent conceptual and methodological limitations within these approaches. 
The review will aim, in part, to demonstrate the convergence on self- 
processes and self-esteem within these existing frameworks. After prominent 
personality models have been introduced and the relevant methodological 
problems discussed, each section will conclude with a brief review of how self- 
esteem has been shown to relate to aspects of that particular model. 
The review will conclude with an examination of the few empirical attempts 
to directly link self-esteem with stress appraisal, stress reactivity, coping 
behaviour, and a variety of illness-related outcomes. Finally, this chapter will 
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conclude with a framework for empirical study of the role of self-esteem in mental 
and physical well-being. 
This introduction will not attempt to provide an exhaustive review of the role 
of personality in the stress-illness relationship as the literatures are extremely vast 
and multiple reviews already exist for most personality theories. In this way, to 
limit the amount of referencing the aim has been to reference either seminal 
research reports, the most recent research, or recent reviews. Before examining 
the role of personality in stress and health, a brief introduction to biological, 
stimulus-based theories are reviewed. 
1.1 Biological Models of Stress 
The term stress has come to denote a multiplicity of meanings in the 
scientific community. This variation in definition has, at times, made it difficult to 
condense findings and draw meaningful conclusions from studies because of the 
different operationalizations of stress. This was first raised as an issue in the 
1960's but is still echoed by prominent researchers in the area in the 1990's (e. g. 
Monat & Lazarus, 1991). The confusion comes from stress being defined as a 
stimulus (as something external to the organism), a response (stress as 'inside' 
the person, such as a mental or physical response) and/or an interaction of the 
two. Given the complexities in the study of stress Lazarus has stated that "stress 
is not any one of these things; nor is it stimulus, response, or intervening variable, 
but rather a collective term for study. (Lazarus, 1966, cited in Monat & Lazarus, 
1991, p. 3). 
The term stress initially emerged from a biologically-based model with an 
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emphasis on physical stressors triggering a pattern of bodily responses. Selye 
(1982) described how as a medical student he was interested in the 'syndrome 
of just being sick'; the many signs of bodily distress that appeared to be common 
to most diseases: loss of weight, decreased muscular strength and impairment of 
motivation. In experimental examination, Selye (1936, cited in Selye, 1982) 
injected extracts of cattle ovaries into rats to determine if organs would display 
changes that could not be attributed to any specific hormone. He observed three 
widespread changes: a) the adrenal glands became enlarged and hyperactive, 
b) the thymus, spleen, lymph nodes and all other lymphatic structures shrank and 
c) ulceration of the stomach and upper intestines occurred (Selye, 1982). This 
three-stage syndrome was observed in response to other toxic substances, as well 
as cold, heat, infection, trauma, or haemorrhage as the endocrine changes helped 
the organism to cope physiologically with the threat. Selye, concluded that the 
syndrome of adrenal enlargement, gastrointestinal ulcers and thymico-lymphatic 
shrinkage were signs of damage to a body faced with fighting off a disease and 
was titled the 'biological stress syndrome' and later as the 'General Adaptation 
Syndrome (GAS). The GAS stipulates the endocrine changes over time as the 
organism faces chronic stress. First, is the alarm stage where the organism 
becomes mobilized to meet threat. Second, over time the organism adapts to the 
stressor and the heightened activation initiated in the alarm stage begins to 
subside. Finally, in the third stage, if there is extended exposure the organism 
eventually falls to "exhaustion" where the adaptive energy of the body is fully 
depleted leading to immobility and even death. The GAS model then, emphasized 
the non-specificity of bodily responses to a stressor and the cumulative effects of 
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stress, where accumulated stressors exceed the power of adaptation and the 
disease process ensues. In this way, disease is the price the organism must pay 
for a defense against chronic exposure to threatening agents (Stroebe & Stroebe, 
1995). 
The physiological mechanisms implicated in Selye's research were twofold. 
Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) arousal with the releasing of catecholamines, 
adrenalin and noradrenalin, serves to mobilize the organism for 'fight or flight' and 
had been discussed previously in Walter Cannon's theory of emergency motivation 
(Phillips, 1991). Second, Selye discussed the contribution of the pituitary- 
adrenocortical axis whose activation via the hypothalamus causes ACTH to be 
circulated to the adrenal cortex which then, in turn, produces corticosteroids, thus 
providing muscles with long-term access to the body's energy stores. Long-term 
activation of either system, accordingly, led to exhaustion, immunosupression and 
illness complication. 
These two classic neuroendocrine pathways, following from Cannon (1929) 
and Selye (1950), have received considerable support in experimental studies on 
stress. For instance early work by Mason (1975) on animals showed that acute 
stressors increase plasma and ACTH. There is also the suggestion by Rose 
(1984) of high cortisol secretion rates during stress. Moreover, catecholamine 
output is increased during stress as is adrenalin noradrenalin (See Jemmott and 
Locke, 1984 for a review). Animal studies have shown that exposure to electric 
shock, maternal separation, immersion in cold water, intraperitoneal injection of 
saline, and loud noise have been shown to suppress aspects of immunity (see 
Maier, Watkins, and Fleshner, 1994 for a review). A more updated approach on 
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the (psycho) biological mechanisms in stress can be seen in Frankenhauser's 
(1980) work on stress and catecholamine production. 
As animals were shown to produce 'diseases of adaptation' to chronic 
stressors human beings might be expected to produce bodily reactions to stressful 
environments. The first extension of Selye's model in humans examined the role 
of psychosocial stress, in terms of accumulated stressful life events, on disease 
incidence and risk for mortality. 
1.2 Life Events 
Holmes and Rahe (1967) first devised a scale, the Social Readjustment 
Rating Scale (SRRS), (and later the SRE) that included a listing of 43 major'life 
change events'such as'divorce of spouse' or'loss of job. ' Events included in the 
scale were not just negatively toned but it was assumed that positive experiences 
would still require change and could be potentially stressful. Each event 
measured was seen to require social adaptation and therefore could contribute to 
stress and 'diseases of adaptation' (Stroebe & Stroebe, 1995). Early studies 
generally supported the role of psychosocial stress on illness where greater 
frequency of major life events were found to relate to upper respiratory-related 
illness (Belfer, Shader, Mascio, Harmatz, & Nahum, 1968), sudden cardiac death 
(Rahe & Lind, 1971), myocardial infarction (Rahe, Romo, Bennett & Siltananen, 
1974) and chronic illness (Wyler, Masuda, & Holmes, 1971). For instance, Rahe 
(1968) examined the reported life events of 2500 naval officers 6 months prior to 
departure for tour of duty and then followed their reported health difficulties over 
a6 month time frame whilst they were at sea. Those officers who scored in the 
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top 30%, that is, experienced considerable life events prior to disembarking 
showed a 90% greater incidence rate of illness in the first three months as well 
increased frequency and severity of illnesses month to month. 
The early literature on life events suffered from many conceptual and 
methodological difficulties, however, some of which have been addressed in more 
recent research while others remain irremediable. For instance, the early 
retrospective studies were potentially contaminated by the reporting of prior life 
events after the onset of illness (e. g. Rahe & Lind, 1971). If life events ratings 
follow after the onset of illness it is possible, if not probable, that people who are 
ill will report experiencing more (dis)stress. Second, while the implementation of 
prospective studies may potentially nullify problems associated with retrospective 
reports, it may still be the case that individuals who report more illness symptoms 
may also be those who are more likely to report experiencing negative life events. 
Hence, the relationship between reported life events and illness may reflect 
response tendencies rather than actual stress and illness behaviours. Third, it 
has been argued (Delongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988) that employing large time 
frames between the measurement of life stress and health makes it difficult to 
unravel the psychobiological and conventional processes. By assessing how 
stress accumulates across multiple stressors it becomes difficult to know what 
specific stressors were responsible. For instance, Singer and Davidson (1991) 
have argued that research on life events has failed to address, and would have 
difficulties incorporating, evidence on the role of periodic stressors. Fourth, both 
first generation and subsequent life event scales suffer from reliability and validity 
shortcomings. For example, Shroeder and Costa (1984) point to the confounding 
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nature in life event and illness reports where items reported, as life events may 
reflect illness status (e. g. 'experienced personal injury or loss'). In this way, the 
life event score is contaminated with concurrent physical health. ' In their study 
Shroeder and Costa (1984) found that the observed correlation between measured 
life events and physical illness evaporated when the contaminated items were 
removed from the life events scale. Life event scales also lack 
comprehensiveness and fail to account for the negative consequences of events 
that failed to occur, such as securing marriage or obtaining a job promotion 
(Phillips, 1991)., Finally, the direct effects of life events on illness have only been 
demonstrated for negative events and not positive valenced events (e. g. Vinokur 
and Selzer, 1975). In light of the inherent difficulties in addressing the cumulative 
impact of major life events, a fair amount of research has operationalized 
psychosocial stress in terms of the more day-to-day grind of life and includes 
scale items that tap experiences of general irritation, frustration, and excessive 
demands (e. g., Kanner, Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981 include 117 hassles 
with 3-point severity rating). Studies (DeLongis, Coyne, Dakof, Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1982; Weinberger, Hiner, & Tierney, 1987) have shown how hassles in 
daily life may be a) stressful and b) significantly impact on health above and 
beyond major life events. For instance, Kanner et al. (1981) followed 100 middle- 
aged adults over nine months and found that daily hassles were more strongly 
related to reported depression and anxiety than were major life events. However, 
just as the major life events approach appears to suffer from multiple 
shortcomings a number of methodological difficulties have been noted with the 
study of the micro-stressor approach of hassles research. Hassle scales tend to 
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contain many items that may reflect psychological symptoms so that the scale is 
contaminated with measures of psychological distress (Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, 
Dodson, & Shrout, 1984) thus obfuscating the causal direction of life events and 
distress. 
Collectively, research on psychosocial stress as operationalized by the 
occurrence of major life events and/or daily hassles has demonstrated a link between 
life strain and a variety of health difficulties although many results have failed to 
predict this relationship. In attempting to overcome reporting biases associated with 
the reporting of life events and illness a number of studies have been conducted by 
including biological markers that verify illness. For instance, Meyer & Haggerty (1962) 
followed 100 members of 16 families for 12 months. Stressful life events were 
recorded via diary completion by family members and throat cultures were made every 
three weeks and during acute illness. Blood samples were also assayed every four 
months for antibodies. The results indicated that daily life events that proved 
distressing for the individual were four times more likely to -precede new throat 
infections. In addition, family stress was associated with greater number of new 
infections and greater severity. In a more recent study (Graham, Douglas, & Ryan, 
1986) of verified upper respiratory symptoms, 235 subjects completed daily diary 
records of experienced life events over a six month period. In addition, major life 
events were assessed both before the six month -trial period and then again six 
months later. Illness episodes were validated by viral cultures of nose and throat 
swabs. A high stress group was created comprising those who scored in the upper 
median based on major life events; daily hassles; and a measure of psychological 
distress. The findings indicated that those subjects who scored in 
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the upper median, that is experienced comparatively more stress, were likely to 
demonstrate more verified episodes and more symptom days of respiratory illness. 
Interestingly, this study found differential effects for major life events and daily 
hassles with the former being associated with chronicity of illness episodes and 
the later with verified new episodes in the study period. Additional prospective 
studies on verified illnesses have offered further support for life events on such 
illnesses as influenza, upper respiratory illnesses, herpevirus infections and 
bacterial infections (see Cohen and Williamson, 1991, for a review). Cohen and 
Williamson (1991) appear to support the growing acceptance that people exposed 
to considerable life stress are at greater risk for all of the above mentioned 
illnesses even though the precise pathways and mechanisms involved in this 
relationship are not well understood. 
The effects of acute stressors on human immune function have generated 
many reviews (Ader, Felton, & Cohen, 1991; Cohen & Williamson, 1991). The 
effects of these neuroendocrine sequelae on immunologic functioning include 
reduced development of cellular immunity such as the development of cytotoxic 
T cells to an antigen, effectors of humoral immunity, such as the development of 
antibody to an antigen, and to nonspecific measures such as stimulation of 
lymphocyte proliferation (Maier, Watkins, & Fleshner, 1994), In short, there is 
ample support to suggest that psychosocial stress, through sympathetic nervous 
system activation and hormonal secretions from the pituitary and adrenal cortex, 
can elicit immunosuppression and increased risk for a) developing a 
predisposition for infection to a pathogen, b) triggering a process that allows a 
pathogen that is already in the body to reproduce, and c) maintaining an ongoing 
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pathogenic process (see updated review by Cohen & Williamson, 1991). 
Beyond the limitations already discussed in association with the life events 
and daily hassles literature several observations suggest that the stimulus- 
response model, while demonstrating the important effects of threatening 
situations on organisms, is an imperfect one for explaining the relationship 
between stress and health. First, in field studies of life events and daily hassles, 
a considerable number of studies have shown no relationship between reported 
or objectively verified life stress and reported or verified illness complications. 
Even when a relationship is found between life events and illness, the variance 
explained is typically less than 5%. Second, in experimental studies where 
viruses and bacterial infections have been induced in otherwise healthy subjects, 
only a fraction of the sample actually become ill. In short, there appears to be 
a central limitation on the stimulus-response model that fails to accommodate the 
bulk of recent evidence pointing to the role of inter (not all people respond in the 
same way to identical stress sources) and intra (same individual may respond to 
the same stressor differently on different occasions) in perceived stress, 
subsequent distress and health complications. 
1.3 Interactional Model of Stress 
There are a number of models that take into account the role of cognitions in 
stress appraisal (Cox, 1978; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) although some models 
have been developed mostly, if not exclusively, for occupational contexts, for 
instance Cox's interactional model of stress. While these models have made 
important contributions to the stress field, the interactional model emphasized in 
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this review and the research to follow, focuses on an American model (Lazarus 
& Folkman, 1984) because of its emphasis on personality theory and stress 
independent of specific contexts. 
The interactional view of stress (e. g, Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984) focuses on the moderating cognitive factors that lead to the perception and 
evaluation of threat, that is, the role of individual differences in stress. In the 
interactional model of stress (also referred to as transactional model of stress) 
stress refers to any event in which environmental demands, internal demands, 
or both tax or exceed the adaptive resources of an individual, social system, or 
tissue system" (Monat and Lazarus, 1991, p. 3). Hence while Selye defined stress 
as Na state manifested by a syndrome which consists of all nonspecifically induced 
changes in a biologic system" the interactional perspective views stress not simply 
within the person, nor elicited from the situation but by the interaction of 
perceptual (perceived demands of the situation; cognitive appraisal) and one's 
perceived inner resources to meet the demands (i. e., ability to cope). Nothing is 
considered to be inherently stressful but rather the degree to which an event is 
experienced as stressful depends on one's perception of the event, any stimulus, 
no matter how noxious or how unpleasant, can be viewed as either desired, 
interesting, non-threatening, or non-harmful and, if it is so appraised, it will not be 
considered a stressor (Lazarus, 1991, p. 3). In distinction to Selye and the life- 
events perspective, physical stressors only produce stress responses after they 
have been defined as threatening. The key issue then in the interactional model 
is the two-stage appraisal process where first, a stressor is evaluated in terms of 
its ability to do harm and second, the perceived ability to manage the stress. The 
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perception of control has been implicated as an important individual difference 
measure in stress appraisal. 
1.4 Control Models: 
Studies examining the role of controllability in animal response contingencies have 
demonstrated very similar physiological consequences to those observed in the 
exposure to physical stressors. In an early study Mowrer and Vick (1948; cited 
in Jemmott and Locke, 1984) demonstrated that rats who were exposed to 
uncontrollable shocks developed more fear than did rats exposed to the same 
amount of controllable shocks. This finding was replicated with dogs by 
Overmeier and Seligman (1967) where uncontrollable shock in dogs led to 
increased fear and passivity. While a great number of studies over the next two 
decades revealed the role of altering control via classical conditioning and 
punishment on behaviour, more recent animal work has shown the same 
physiological mechanisms implicated in loss of control in animals that were shown 
by Selye with physical stressors. In a study by Hanson and colleagues (Hanson, 
Larson, & Snowden, 1976), rhesus monkeys were trained to terminate an intense 
noise by, pressing a lever and it was shown that monkeys who were denied a 
control response reacted with greater plasma cortisol elevation than monkeys who 
were able to maintain control. A number of studies have also shown that the 
absence of control in animal-based laboratory studies produces elevations in 
plasma catecholamines, immunosuppression, increased rate of tumour growth, 
and increased rate of stomach ulceration (see Phillips, 1989 for a review). 
In laboratory based research with human subjects the perception that one 
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can avoid, reduce, or stop a noxious stimulation has been shown to reduce 
anticipatory distress, increase tolerance or endurance of pain, and enhances 
actual performance. In a review of 17 studies on instrumental control Arntz and 
Schmidt (1989) concluded that overall, studies support the buffering role of 
control. Human subjects appear to seek control to reduce anticipatory anxiety as 
well as to reduce the impact of aversive events. Substantial evidence from 
experimental and field studies suggest that the need for the belief in perceived 
control is central to human motivation and that the exercise of control, in situations 
that provide this opportunity, tend to be constructive and adaptive. Moreover, 
when this control is threatened individuals will engage in desperate efforts to 
regain it. Subsequently, many trait personality constructs emphasize the 
importance of perceived control in the primary appraisal process including the 
locus of control construct, learned helplessness, (and the revised learned 
helplessness model) as well as the 'hardiness' construct. Each will be considered 
in turn. 
1.4.1 Locus of Control (LOC) 
Rotter (1966) argued that individuals maintain a characteristic attitude toward the 
world which serves to influence their perception and behaviours in various life 
situations. The characteristic attitude is a general expectancy of reinforcement 
contingencies where some individuals typically perceive consequences of their 
behaviour as contingent upon their behaviour. Those with an internal LOC are 
likely to perceive an event as contingent upon her own behaviour or on relatively 
permanent characteristic. Those individuals who are said to maintain an external 
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LOC perceive reinforcement as following some action of their own but are not 
entirely contingent upon their action. Rather, outcomes are seen to be due more 
to luck, chance, fate, or the result of powerful others and are seen to be 
unpredictable. The initial measure constructed to assess LOC was the Rotter I-E 
Locus of Control Scale. As constructed, the scale had low specificity and aimed 
towards high generality in predicting behaviour across a wide range of situations. 
The LOC construct has been examined in hundreds of studies since being 
introduced (Coombs and Schroeder, 1988). While it was introduced as a general 
personality construct, it was expected that subjects who had an internal LOC 
would be less vulnerable to stress because of their general expectancy to consider 
various stressors as controllable. Conversely, externals with their low 
expectations for control of stressors, would be likely to meet stress with passivity 
and feelings of hopelessness. In a review of the role of LOC across many 
different stressful situations Houston (1988) concluded that the model has typically 
been supported, with externals reporting more stress than internals. Further, in 
the limited number of studies that have examined the relationship between LOC 
and underlying psychophysiological mechanisms have found that subjects with a 
moderate internal orientation cope most effectively with stress (Krause & Stryker, 
1984). However, a recent study (Walsh, Wilding, & Eysenck, 1994) examining 
the role of LOC (and other individual difference measures) in relation to self- 
reported and psychophysiological stress as well as task performance found no 
main effect for LOC on either heart rate or skin resistance, reported stress or 
arousal, or task performance. 
Despite the growing interest in control as a seminal personality variable in 
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health and well-being, a number of studies have failed to find a positive 
relationship between LOC and outcome variables. Further, there has been 
mounting criticism against the reliability and validity of the original Rotter I-E scale. 
First, the preponderance of supportive studies have been cross-sectional in nature 
where LOC has been found to correlate with stress indices at one temporal 
location. A few well-designed prospective studies have failed to find modifier 
effects of LOC in adversity situations (Ormel & Sanderman, 1989). McFarlane 
and colleagues (McFarlane, Norman, Streiner, & Roy, 1983) found that while LOC 
was associated with distress at baseline there was no observed relationship to 
change in distress at subsequent points in time. It appears that cross-sectional 
studies have inflated estimates of the relationship of LOC to stress. 
Second, the failure of many studies to relate LOC to health and well-being 
may be the result of weakness in the Rotter I-E scale. A number of early reviews 
(Phares, 1976) raised doubt over the construct validity of the t-E scale; suggesting 
that LOC was inherently multidimensional. Subsequent factor analyses of the I-E 
scale have resulted in a multiplicity of factors ranging from 2 factors to 18 factors 
with little consistency (Paulhus, 1983). Moreover, LOC as a general expectancy 
variable has typically failed to predict health behaviours or outcomes in specific- 
situations. For example, Ormel (1980; cited in Ormel and Sanderman, 1989) 
undertook an examination of the role of controllability over the occurrence of life 
events and their consequences. The analysis revealed that the lack of agreement 
was due to the mültifacetedness of events, which seemed to have their own 
unique level of controllability. This finding, in light of the other life-events studies 
addressed, suggest that perhaps life events cannot be aggregated and then 
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examined in relation to LOC as it may predict a favourable outcome with one 
event while not predicting another. Relatedly, while it was initially assumed that 
internals coped better with stress independent of situational aspects, more recent 
studies have suggested that in some situations, particularly where control is not 
available, or where control is available but the skilled response is absent, internals 
may actually fare worse. Moreover, some individuals who endorse items 
representing externality on the I-E scale may be doing so defensively, when, in 
fact, they are internals. The latter, referred to as 'defensives' or incongruent 
externals, have been shown to be most susceptible to stress (Evans, 1980). In 
short, scale construction limitations and the multifacetedness of the control 
construct has resulted in many additional models of control and psychometric 
measures. 
A number of authors have created multidimensional domain-specific 
scales. For instance, the Multidimensional Health Locus of Control Scale (MHLC; 
Wallston & Wallston, 1981) is a popular LOC measure in research on health 
behaviour. This scale measures health-specific LOC beliefs across three 
dimensions: a) the degree to which individuals believe their health is a 
consequence of their own actions, b) the extent to which they perceive their health 
to be determined externally, by powerful others and c) the extent to which 
individuals believe their health is determined by chance and fate. Consistent with 
Rotter's I-E framework, the assumption has been that internals will take greater 
responsibility for their health. However, evidence has been inconsistent on this 
account with studies finding only a weak relationship between internality and 
health behaviour (e. g. Waller and Bates, 1992) or no relationship (e. g. Dean 
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1991). Subsequently, Wallston (1989) has claimed that the relationship between 
external health LOC beliefs and health behaviour is at best a weak one. Despite 
continued efforts of those working within the framework of Rotter's formulations 
a number of other models have been developed that also locate control at the 
centre but diverge conceptually and psychometrically from Rotter. 
1.4.2 Learned Helplessness 
Seligman's learned helplessness model more closely situated perceived 
control in depression. Following Rotter's framework, Seligman argued that the 
absence or loss of control leads to expectations for lack of control in those similar 
situations. In a series of experimental studies, first with animals and then with 
human subjects (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975), it was demonstrated that as the 
su ject learns that escape from the aversive stimulus occurs independent of their 
responses, they subsequently fail to try in similar situations where the escape (i. e., 
control) response is available and similarly fail to learn new responses. Learned 
helplessness (and its associated sequel, the revised learned helplessness model) 
has become a leading explanatory model for the passivity and loss of hope seen 
in people suffering from depression. 
The model, however, has recently been tested for its predictive utility in 
health outcomes. Seligman (Seligman, 1975) demonstrated a moderate 
relationship between an individuals characteristic style of attributions following 
either uncontrollable aversive or positive events. Those who make internal, stable, 
and global attributions for negative events may be at risk for physical illness in 
early and late adulthood and suffer early mortality. While learned helplessness 
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and attribution theory have been perceived as models of depression their 
importance in stress and health research may become even more important as a 
number of large scale research projects have suggested that depression and 
negative affect are the seminal precipitants to physical illness, disease and 
mortality (see further discussion below). In short, while Rotter and those working 
with the LOC paradigm determine general expectancy for control to be important, 
especially in ambiguous situations, learned helplessness and attribution theory 
more closely link perception of control to stable personality processes. 
Self-esteem and Control 
As reviewed, perceived control or the belief in control appear to be 
important cognitive mechanisms in the stress-appraisal process. That is, in many 
instances the belief in control is more important than whether actual control is 
available. Linked with belief in control is the possibility that individuals maintain 
an unrealistic or illusory sense of control even when no control actually exists. 
The importance of illusion in normal human cognition has been well documented 
(see Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and more recent argument states that illusions typically 
involve, and are motivated by central aspects of the self (Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
In an important, yet controversial review, Taylor and Brown (1988) argued that 
illusion may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. They further argued 
that central to illusion is the role of unrealistically high positive self-evaluations or 
self-esteem (and exaggerated perceptions of control as well as unrealistic 
optimism). In a review of the experimental literature they demonstrated that 
individuals with low self-esteem and dysphoria appear to be less vulnerable to the 
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illusion of control (Abramson & Alloy, 1981). Hence, there is support for the inter- 
dependence of self-esteem and perceived control in health. Further, in 
disentangling the unique and combined effects of self-processes and control 
factors, Wallston (1989) concluded that self-processes appear to be much stronger 
predictors of behaviour than measures of LOC beliefs. This has been supported 
in empirical examination (Epstein & Katz, 1992) where LOC, attribution style and 
self-related cognitions and emotions were assessed in relation to a number of 
'success in living' variables among 181 undergraduates. The results indicated that 
a global measure of the cognitive-experiential self best correlated with (positively) 
satisfaction in social relationships, psychological symptoms, physical symptoms, 
self-discipline problems, and substance abuse. In a number of hierarchial 
regression analyses measures of the self were the sole significant predictors of 
the above outcome measures. 
Further, a recent study examining the unique effects of helplessness and 
self-esteem in dysphoria (Whisman & Kwon, 1993) demonstrated the superior role 
of self-esteem in generating long-term dysphoria whereas it was concluded that 
helplessness was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for subsequent 
dysphoria. In this study (n=80) subjects completed the following measures: self- 
esteem, hopelessness scale, depression scale, life stress scale, and the hassles 
and uplifts scale and then the depression scale again three months later. In a 
series of regression analyses both life stress and self-esteem predicted time two 
depression scores but a life stress by self-esteem interaction superseded the main 
effects in predicting time two depression scores. The interaction term 
demonstrated the greater moderating influence of self-esteem under conditions of 
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low (vs. high) life stress. In this way, high self-esteem buffers against stress in 
times of low stress, but those low in self-esteem are more likely to experience 
depression even in times of low stress. Helplessness was related to dysphoria but 
not independently of self-esteem. 
1.4.3 Hardiness 
In contrast to LOC which was developed as a general personality measure 
and learned helplessness theory which was developed within the context of 
depression, the hardiness construct (Kobasa, 1979) represents a model of 
personality comprising perceived control (as assessed by Rotter's 1-E Scale) as 
well as two other related factors, commitment and challenge (comprising newly 
generated items plus some borrowing of items from the Self-alienation Test). As 
such the hardiness construct represents a composite of these three dimensions 
and it was developed specifically for health-related applications. 
Following Rotter, control reflects the degree to which individuals typically 
believe and act as if experiences were predictable and controllable. Commitment 
reflects the tendency for individuals to get involved in activities and view these 
activities as interesting, purposeful, and meaningful. Finally, challenge refers to 
the disposition of an individual to perceive potentially stressful events as an 
opportunity for growth and development, opposed to a threat (Wiebe & Williams, 
1992). There are two hypothesized routes by which hardiness can buffer the 
stress-illness relationship: by reducing the likelihood that a given event is 
appraised as stressful (primary appraisal) and thus likely to reduce physiological 
arousal in aversive situations and second, by influencing the cognitive, emotional 
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and behavioural coping strategies employed to respond to the perceived stressor 
(secondary appraisal). In the early study on male executives, Kobasa (1979) 
found that individuals identified as high on hardiness (n=86) were less likely to 
report either physical or mental distress than were individuals (n=75) identified as 
low on hardiness. High hardy individuals appear to report experiencing the same 
types of life events as low hardy individuals but they rate these experiences more 
positively and controllable than do low hardy individuals (see Wiebe & Williams, 
1992 for a review). Further, in terms of appraisal of potentially stressful situations, 
Wiebe (1991) found that high hardy males perceived an evaluative threat task as 
less threatening and more controllable than low hardy individuals. In terms of 
psychosocial stress as measured by life events, a number of studies have shown 
that high hardiness is negatively correlated with appraisal of hassles: ' Banks and 
Gammon (1988) found that hardiness interacted with daily hassles but failed to 
moderate the relationship with major life events. In terms of hardiness 
moderating health coping behaviours, consistent with the previous findings from 
research on LOC and learned helplessness theory, high hardy individuals utilize 
more problem-focused coping approaches to potentially ý stressful situations 
whereas subjects identified as low in hardiness are more likely to engage in denial 
and avoidance. In a review of the literature on hardiness, coping and health 
Wiebe and Williams (1992) point to the superiority of high hardy individuals in a) 
choosing and practising better health behaviours in general, e. g. more exercise, 
b) the less likelihood of departing from their healthy routine during periods of 
increased stress, c) greater participation in education programmes to improve 
health practices, particularly after the onset of illness, and d) greater perseverance 
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when faced with alleviating, changing, or escaping potential stressors and appear 
to be more sensitive to contextual features when they develop a particular coping 
response (see Wiebe and Williams, 1992 for a review). 
Finally, hardiness has been assessed directly in laboratory studies to 
determine its influence on psychophysiological reactivity. This avenue of 
research is important, not only in terms of demonstrating that hardiness and health 
are not just subjective response biases (i. e., high hardy individuals as less likely 
to report a) appraised stress, b) symptom complaints, c) poor coping practices), 
but to directly support Kobasa's (Kobasa, Maddi, Puccetti, & Zola, 1985) model 
that hardiness influences long-term health status via the tendency of low hardy 
individuals to experience chronic sympathetic arousal. Several studies, in fact, 
support this claim. In a study by Wiebe (1991) main effects for hardiness were 
observed for perception of threat and psychophysical responding for males 
although no relationship between hardiness and health was observed for females. 
High hardy males were more likely to perceive stressful stimuli as controllable, and 
were typically more likely to respond to the stressor with greater arousal. In the 
second study published in this report, Wiebe (1991) manipulated conditions so that 
the three hardiness components were more or less congruent with the situational 
demands and therefore made hardiness appraisals more or less likely. Subjects 
exposed to situations where high hardiness appraisals were more likely, displayed 
diminished arousal, lower heart rate and skin conductance, and smaller decreases 
in finger pulse volume. This pattern, however, was again only observed in male 
subjects. More recently, Wiebe (1991) argued that the failure of hardiness to 
show the predicted results in females is due to the nature of the laboratory tasks 
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which tend to be achievement-based and less relevant for female subjects. In this 
latter study she utilized an achievement task, mental arithmetic, and a more 
socially oriented condition (i. e., dating behaviour), and found the expected main 
effects for perceived stress and subsequent arousal in both conditions, for males 
and females. 
Despite the supporting evidence for the hardiness construct in health and 
illness, there are studies that have not observed a relationship between hardiness 
and health outcomes and, moreover, failed to demonstrate the buffering 
hypothesis where hardiness effects should increase in stressful situations and be 
relatively absent in non-stressful situations. Finally, separate components of the 
hardiness construct have been found to have differential predictive validity in 
relation to health outcomes. For instance, six studies reviewed in Wiebe and 
Williams (1992) point to some effect for the control and commitment components 
but no influence of the challenge component. While Kobasa (1979) argue that the 
three components comprise a single construct and should not be assessed for 
their individual variance, a number of factor analytic reports on the original 
hardiness construct have not supported this empirically. Subsequently, the field 
has been further confused with new measures of hardiness (see Maddi, 1990 for 
review) of which the majority of studies have not reported reliability estimates or 
construct validity (Carver, 1989). Wiebe and Williams (1992), in their well 
balanced review of the hardiness literature concluded that support for the model 
is, at best, inconsistent and highlights the methodological shortcomings 
suggesting that research is plagued with poor construct validation and by "weak 
and ambiguous tests of the hypothesized model. ' (p. 257). 
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Self-esteem and Hardiness 
In addition to the operationalization of control with Rotter's I-E scale which is 
problematic for reasons discussed, many items comprising the challenge and 
commitment components were borrowed from the Self Alienation Test. Borrowed 
items include 'I think my participation is important', 'I feel threatened by this task' 
and 'life is empty and has no meaning in it for me'. These items appear related 
to items tapping state and trait self-esteem (see chapter two for self-esteem scale 
items) and suggests that a more robust, higher order factor such as self-esteem 
may underlie the commitment and challenge components. In addition to the 
possibility that the failure of commitment and challenge components to consistently 
predict health outcomes is due to the fact they represent poor measures of self- 
esteem, it may still be that the sensitivity of self-evaluative items embedded within 
these factors allow these dimensions to account for some of the personal meaning 
of stress appraisal (e. g. Wiebe, 1991). 
While control appears related to the primary appraisal process there is 
converging evidence pointing to the inter-dependence of perceived control with 
self-esteem and the superior role of self-processes in determining whether or not 
a situation is perceived as benign, a challenge, or threatening and stressful. 
Research on self-perception has demonstrated that the individual is an active, 
constructive information processor. Markus (1977) has argued that self-schemata 
which are cognitive generalizations about the self derived from past experience, 
organize and guide the processing of self-related information in social experience. 
In this way, self-schemas function as a selective mechanism, filtering out 
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information, determining what information is attended to and how it is structured 
and how much importance is given to it and what decisions and judgments are 
made regarding behavioural action. Thus research on the role of the self in 
perception is consistent with the belief that self-processes would be fundamental 
to the primary appraisal process. 
In addition to control as a candidate psychological factor in stress, two 
global individual difference constructs have been implicated in the stress-illness 
relationship: the Type A Behaviour Pattern and Neuroticism. 
1.5 The Type A Behaviour Pattern 
In contrast to the personality models of control previously discussed, the 
Type A Behaviour Pattern (TARP) was not conceptualized as a personality trait, 
but rather as a pattern of behaviour evoked by certain environmental demands in 
susceptible individuals (Dembroski & Costa, 1987). While control is not directly 
implicated in the TABP construct it is believed to be a concomitant, with Type A 
individuals tending to be inappropriately controlling of others across various 
interpersonal contexts such as work, family, and social situations. 
TABP has been defined as an action-emotion complex that can be 
observed in any person who is aggressively involved in a chronic, incessant 
struggle to achieve more and more in less and less time, and if required to do so, 
against the opposing efforts of other things and other persons' (Friedman & 
Rosenman, 1974, p. 67). In a landmark study, Friedman and Rosenman (1959) 
assessed 3400 healthy men living in the San Francisco Bay area in California for 
the incidence, prevalence and mortality for Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) in an 
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eight-and-half year follow-up study. In addition to the classic risk factors of CHD, 
including cholesterol, blood pressure, diet, medical history, and smoking 
behaviour, the TABP was assessed. Those men identified as Type A (high on the 
above dimensions) versus those who were identified as Type B (low on the above 
dimensions) were twice as likely to develop symptoms of CHD; to have a first 
heart attack; to have second heart attack and to have died from CHD. Hence, 
they concluded that they had identified a behaviour pattern that was considered 
coronary prone and introduced a method for its assessment. 
In a later study, Haynes and colleagues (Haynes, Feinleib, & Kannel, 1980), 
in the Framingham heart study, sought to determine whether TABP is a good 
predictor of cardiovascular diseases over an 8-year period. Consistent with 
Friedman and Rosenman's findings, they observed a higher incidence of CHD and 
myocardial infarctions in white-collar men who had been identified as Type A. 
However, this study also demonstrated for the first time that Type A women were 
twice as likely to suffer from CHD and angina when compared to Type B women 
over this time period. These early epidemiological studies led the National, Heart, 
Lung and Blood Institute in the United States to conclude that Type A behaviour 
was as important a risk factor for CHD as were high blood pressure, high blood 
cholesterol and smoking. Despite the promising beginnings for the TABP as a risk 
factor for CHD, more rigorous studies that included appropriate comparison 
groups and better separated the causes and consequences of CHD have failed 
to demonstrate the expected relationship between TABP and CHD. For instance, 
in a well controlled prospective study with over three-thousand subjects across 
eight different health centres in the U. S., it was observed that global TABP was 
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not related to any clinical signs of CHD (Schekelle, Hulley, Neaton, Billings et al., 
1985, reported in Dembroski and Costa, 1987). 
The preponderance of recent research has shown that whereas global 
TABP fails to predict CHD status the sub-dimension 'potential for hostility' is 
significantly related to CHD severity (Dembroski, MacDougall, Williams, Haney, et 
al., 1985; MacDougall, Dembroski, Dimsdale, & Hackett, 1985; Arrowood, Uhrich, 
Gomillion, Patterson et al., 1982). Dembroski and colleagues (e. g. Dembroski et 
al., 1985) have subsequently argued that 'potential for hostility' is the principal 
'toxic' factor of TABP so that individuals who demonstrate facets of the TABP may 
only be at increased risk for CHD if they are elevated on hostility as well. And 
past studies may have failed to demonstrate this seminal role for hostility because 
the primary scale for assessing TABP is the Jenkins Activity Scale (JAS: Jenkins, 
1978) which fails to adequately measure the hostility component (Dembroski & 
Costa, 1987). More recent attempts to assess TABP have moved away from 
self-reports and towards structured interviews where observation of vigorous voice 
characteristics (e. g. loud, explosive and rapid) proves to be the best marker. 
While the veracity of the TABP in predicting CHD has been suspect, more 
recent attempts in the study of TABP have focused on its impact on general 
quality of life and its broader role as a personality style in moderating stress. The 
Type A pattern has been found to covary with marital dissatisfaction, work 
performance, and typically more dissatisfaction in interpersonal relationships. In 
general, the life style of the Type A person leads to higher levels of reported 
stress (Rosenberger & Strube, 1986). A number of other studies have also 
shown physiological effects with Type A opposed to Type 8 individuals showing 
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increases in systolic blood pressure and pulse rate when exposed to a potentially 
stressful situation (e. g. Pitner & Houston, 1980; Contrada, Glass, Krakoff, Krantz 
et al., 1982) although some other studies have found no physiological differences 
(e. g. Walsh, Wilding, & Eysenck, 1994). ýý 
Self-esteem and Type A 
As interest has shifted to TABP as a maladaptive personality orientation, 
the focus of study has shifted to determine the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
that may predispose individuals to Type A behaviour. Frameworks from Price 
(1982), Strube and colleagues (e. g. Strube, Bolan, Manfredo, &Y Al-Falaij, 1987) 
and Kuiper and colleagues (e. g. Kuiper & Martin, 1989) all converge on the central 
role of self-evaluative tendencies in promoting TABP. Type A individuals are said 
to have dysfunctional attitudes that centre on unrealistic and rigid contingencies 
for evaluating self-worth where one must constantly prove oneself by personal 
accomplishments. The focus on achievement is likely to lead to excessively high 
performance standards for self-evaluation and it is this unrealistic quality of the 
goals that increase the probability of failed expectations and associated negative 
affect. Consequently, the individual is ever constantly driving hard, competitive 
and aggressive in attempts to reach unrealistic goals (Yuen & Kuiper, 1992). 
Consistent with the findings that hostility may be the toxic factor of TABP, because 
Type A's have an underlying fear of negative evaluation, social criticism often 
leads to self-directed and other-directed hostile feelings and behaviour (Williams, 
Davison, Nezami, & DeQuattro, 1992). Further, Type A individuals are more 
likely to engage in maladaptive coping such as denial and avoidance and, in 
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general, have difficulty managing affect. In a recent commentary on coping 
behaviour in Type A individuals Williams and colleagues (1992) stated "while 
these types of coping statements may be hypothesized to help protect Type B 
individuals from illness, the coping style here may be the result of a third variable, 
self-esteem, which both attenuates Type B's responses to criticism and protects 
them from heart disease" (p. 26) Kuiper and Martin (1989) in their self-worth 
contingency model of TABP found that TABP correlates negatively with self- 
esteem and positively with depressive affect. In short, self-esteem is increasingly 
seen as the underlying mechanism both motivating the health-risk behaviours of 
TABP and mediating interpersonal behaviour and emotion regulation, that 
collectively lead to stress and the higher incidence of illness. 
1.6 Neuroticism 
In contrast to the personality models discussed which are hypothesized to 
moderate the stress illness relationship via cognitive appraisal and health 
behaviours, neuroticism has been a candidate variable that is directly implicated 
in stress and illness in light of the underlying autonomic nervous system arousal 
and reactivity associated with individuals scoring on high on this personality trait. 
Neuroticism is a well-established personality trait that can be defined simply as 
individual differences in the tendency to experience emotional distress. 
Neuroticism (N) is measured by numerous scales but the two most popular have 
been the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI; Eysenck, 1964) and its successor 
the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and the 
NEO-PI inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1985). N is arguably multidimensional (Roger 
32 
& Nesshoever, 1987; Epstein & Katz, 1992; Scheier et al., 1994) and includes a 
wide range of aversive mood states, such as anxiety, hostility, and depression that 
collectively form a general distress factor. While N has been most directly 
connected as a risk factor for psychopathology, both conceptually and empirically, 
individuals who score high on measures of neuroticism are also likely to report a 
host of health complaints at any given time, and particularly when under stress 
(e. g. see Friedman & Booth-Kewly, 1987; Costa & McCrae, 1987; Watson & 
Pennebaker, 1989 for reviews). In a recent study, Ormel and Wohfarth (1991) 
reported that high N individuals were more likely to experience distress than low 
N individuals over a six year period and the influence of N was greater on 
psychological distress within this period than either specific long-term problems or 
life event changes. Further, a recent study has suggested that high N individuals 
are more likely to create negative events for themselves, especially negative 
interpersonal events (Magnus, Diener, Fujita, & Pavot, 1993). The authors 
concluded that negative life events are not always exogenous shocks but are in 
part endogenous variables related to stable personality constructs. 
It is argued that high N individuals are more likely to suffer from physical 
illness, disease and early mortality because of the pernicious consequences of 
prolonged physiological activation associated with negative affectivity (as 
reviewed). A review by Herbert and Cohen (1993) points to the effects of negative 
affective states on T -lymphocytes, natural killer cells, and B-cell production of 
antibody--where all are significantly reduced during averse emotional states. 
Despite the demonstrated relationship between N and somatic complaints 
and between N and physiological reactivity, surprisingly there is little evidence to 
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link N with actual physical illness and disease (Costa & McCrae, 1987; Watson & 
Pennebaker, 1989). Hence, N now appears to be recognized as a pervasive 
contaminator of the relationship between personality and self-reported 
psychological distress and somatic complaints. In perhaps the best controlled 
study conducted on the influence of N on health, Cohen and colleagues have just 
recently (Cohen, Doyle, Skoner, Fireman, et al., 1995) studied the independent 
effects of trait negative affect (N) and more state, situationally-dependent negative 
affectivity. While N is seen to be a reporting bias in somatic complaints, state 
negative affect has been found to mediate actual illness as in an early study by 
Cohen and colleagues (1993) where increases in state affect just before viral 
exposure was found to provide greater risk for developing upper respiratory 
infections. In this most recent study by Cohen (Cohen et at., 1995) healthy adult 
subjects were exposed to either a rhinovirus or influenza virus and then followed 
daily for reported symptoms and actual virus markers via mucus samples. The 
findings pointed to the independent effects of trait and state N, where trait N was 
related to greater complaints (not disease specific either) but not objective illness 
markers and state N was observed to be related to objective markers for both 
rhinovirus and influenza. 
The findings suggest that while negative affectivity is related to 
physiological arousal and illness, reported trait N appears to be related to the 
perception of physical problems but is independent of illness process. Larson 
(1992) has argued that the problem in the literature is that studies have used 
retrospective reports of illness where it is well-established that negative emotional 
states are known to facilitate access to memories- about negative experiences 
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such as illness. The confounding effects of N, therefore, could be minimized in 
health research by utilizing concurrent health reports (Larson, 1992; Cohen et al., 
1995). For instance, Larson (1992) collected concurrent and retrospective health 
reports and found that N was related only to the retrospective reports and the 
concurrent reports were uncontaminated. 
It has become customary to control statistically for N in personality and 
health research that utilizes self-reported health complaints to rule out the'general 
distress factor of N' as a potential third variable confound. However, a number of 
criticisms have been launched at the conceptual and methodological 
developments of N that raise some doubt as to the meaning of correlations 
obtained between N and health outcomes. For instance, Carver (1989) and 
Scheier et al. (1994) argue that N is multifaceted and the forcing of various 
concepts into a unitary measure clouds the meaning of results obtained: when N 
predicts health outcomes, it is unclear which dimension of N may be accounting 
for the observed correlation. For instance, in the Cohen study (1995) reported 
above N was operationalized by items tapping six different dimensions including 
anxiety, hostility, depression, vulnerability, impulsiveness and self-consciousness. 
Likewise, even though EPI (and EPQ) N are treated as unidimensional measures, 
Roger and Nesshoever (1987) found in a factor analysis that a two-factor solution 
best accounted for the scale items with 10 items representing 'emotional 
sensitivity' and 9 items representing hypochondriasis. In light of the fact that N 
measures typically contain items tapping hypochondriasis and perceived health it 
may well be that observed correlations between N and health are exaggerated 
because of the shared similarity in the items. Costa and McCrae (1987) have 
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acknowledged this problem and removed hypochondriacal components when 
studying the relationship between N and health, although the preponderance of 
research utilizing N has not done so to date. The same problem may occur for 
items of N that tap distress which are associated with non-personality measures 
of distress but where there is considerable variance shared in the supposed cause 
and consequence. Finally, despite these difficulties in measuring N with self- 
report scales, there does appear to substantive evidence pointing to the role of 
negative emotions in health. Recent theory and research has emphasized the 
role of cognition in the origin and maintenance of negative mood states. This is 
particularly true for self-related thoughts where the cognitive content (e. g. habitual 
self-evaluative thoughts; self-schemas) directly impacts on emotional experience, 
and second, indirectly on influencing stress appraisal and coping behaviours. With 
respect to the later Epstein and Katz (1992) have argued that "because a major 
path through which coping ability influences symptoms is negative emotions, the 
widely recommended practice of partialling self-reported negative affect out of 
relations among coping, stress, and symptoms is often inappropriate... what should 
be partialled out, of course, is the negative reporting bias independent of the 
negative affect' (p. 823). 
In contrast to the shortcomings associated with the trait neuroticism 
approach to the study of emotion on health, a parallel literature focusing on 
individual differences in emotional experiencing and emotional expression, such 
as the effects of, emotional inhibition and rumination over past emotionally 
upsetting events may offer a viable alternative to the study of individual differences 
in emotions and health. 
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1.7 Emotion Control 
In parallel to global, multifaceted trait measures of emotionality (N) another 
approach has been to study more unidimensional facets of stimulus intensity 
control. A growing literature points to individual differences in the degree to which 
emotion is expressed or inhibited and it has been suggested (e. g. Roger & 
Nesshoever, 1987) that the tendency to inhibit the expression of emotional 
responses may serve to prolong the arousal associated with the emotion and this 
process may place the individual at greater risk of illness and disease due to the 
pernicious consequences of persistent physiological arousal. In a recent study 
by Gross & Levenson (1993) emotional suppression was found to produce a 
mixed pattern of physiological changes, including widespread sympathetic nervous 
system activation. They concluded that suppressors (or internalizers, inhibitors) 
habitually use emotion-regulation strategies that place them at risk for health 
complications. From the clinical context, Pennebaker and colleagues (see 
Pennebaker, 1993 for review) have shown that writing about upsetting emotions 
or traumas has significant health benefits particularly for those who use a higher 
proportion of negative emotion words than positive emotion words. In a series of 
studies it has been shown that writing brings about a) enhanced immune function, 
b) improved liver enzyme function, c) reduced physician visits for students and 
reduced health centre visits for adults and d) fewer absentee days. 
In addition to the role of emotion inhibition as an emotion control 
mechanism implicated in the stress-illness relationship, recent work by Roger and 
colleagues (Roger, 1988; Roger & Jamieson, 1988) have pointed to the important 
role of additional emotion-control pattern in stress, namely the tendency to 
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ruminate or rehearse emotional events. In a newly created personality measure 
to assess emotion-control styles in health research (cognitive rehearsal, emotion- 
inhibition, aggression control and benign control) (ECQ; Roger & Najarian, 1989; 
see chapter three for discussion of scale properties) significant patterns have 
been found in experimental applications linking cognitive rehearsal to delayed 
recovery from emotional arousal. For instance, in a study investigating the 
differential role of neuroticism and emotion control in a laboratory-induced 
stressor (Roger & Jamieson, 1988) heart rate recovery following the stressful task 
was associated with cognitive rehearsal whereas there was no observed 
relationship with N. In addition to the demonstrated neuroendocrine concomitant 
of cognitive rehearsal, Roger (1988) implicates adrenocortical hormones as well. 
In this study student nurses (n=34) gave urine samples on two occasions, 
immediately following a challenging exam and then again two weeks later. The 
samples were assayed for free cortisol and an index of the difference in cortisol 
levels from time one to time two was derived. The results demonstrated that 
nurses scoring higher on rehearsal were more likely to have cortisol elevations. 
In addition to the potential superior role of emotion-control measures 
versus N in predicting arousal associated with emotional experiencing, 
correlational studies between N and cognitive rumination and emotion-inhibition 
point to the relatedness of the constructs but also to their empirical discriminability 
(Roger & Nesshoever, 1987; Roger & Najarian, 1989; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). 
For instance Roger has found that rehearsal correlates with N in the moderate 
range (roughly 25% of the variance explained) but only for non-hypochondriacal 
items. That is, while cognitive rumination may relate to items tapping 
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psychological distress it is relatively independent (less than 5% of shared 
variance) of the items typically associated with the confounding of the stress- 
illness relationship. Nolen-Hoeksema and her colleagues (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Parker, & Larson, 1994) have constructed a measure of ruminative coping that 
assesses the degree to which people respond to the negative emotions aroused 
by stressful events by focusing passively and ruminatively on those emotions and 
is thus conceptually similar to Roger's emotion-control factor rehearsal. Nolen- 
Hoeksema (1993) has found that ruminative coping is not significantly correlated 
with negative affectivity scores and only moderately with N (less than 10% of 
shared variance). Moreover, similar to Roger's findings in the health context, 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) found that ruminative coping was a significant predictor 
of changes in depression scores over a three-week period after controlling for N. 
However, when the partialling was reversed, N was not found to be a significant 
predictor after controlling for rumination. 
Self-esteem and Emotion 
Self-esteem is increasingly seen to be an important mediator in the 
experience of negative mood. The definition of self-esteem itself as a general 
sense of self-worth and the degree to which positive self-evaluations are 
maintained almost by necessity implicates positive and negative feelings. In this 
way, some construe global self-esteem as a global feeling state (e. g. Pelham & 
Swann, 1989). In a study directly linking self-esteem to chronic mood states, 
Pelham & Swann (1989) had 486 subjects complete measures of self-esteem, 
positive and negative affectivity, self-attribute questionnaire, and a self-ideal 
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discrepancy test. The correlations were robust, with self-esteem correlating 
inversely with negative affectivity (-. 49) and positively with positive affectivity (. 47) 
and these correlations' were greater than correlations with the other self-indices. 
Further, emotions of anger and hostility are often instigated by threats to 
self-esteem. The resulting anger displayed may be attempts to ward off negative 
self-feelings and restore diminished self-esteem. Kemis, Grammernan & Barclay 
(1989) attempted to examine the role of self-esteem in hostility and anger and a 
range of positive and negative emotions. They hypothesized that individuals with 
low self-esteem and unstable self-esteem would be more likely to show high 
levels of anger and hostility. Forty-five undergraduates were tested for self- 
esteem and trait anger and hostility, and then one month later they were followed 
daily for one week where twice daily they were paged randomly and asked to rate 
their emotions. The emotion questionnaire consisted of 20 positive (e. g. confident, 
happy, free) and 20 negative (e. g. unsure, frustrated, useless) emotions. The 
highest correlation observed in the study was between level of self-esteem and 
the expressiveness of anger over the one week period. Second, amongst 
high/low, stable/unstable self-esteem groups, unstable high self-esteem individuals 
reported the most anger and hostility. This relationship between self-esteem and 
hostility would appear to be important especially when considered in relation to the 
Type A pattern, with the hostility/anger dimension best predicting CHD and other 
health outcomes (Dembroski & Costa, 1987). 
Finally, in a study by Brown and Mankowski (1993) the relationship 
between mood, self-appraisals and global self-esteem were examined. In the first 
of three laboratory experiments 22 individuals identified as having low self-esteem 
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(LSE) and 29 individuals having high self-esteem (HSE) were exposed to a mood 
inducing experience (positive, neutral, negative) and then given the opportunity to 
make state self-appraisals. The findings were declarative: LSE subjects showed 
greater variation in their self-appraisals across mood conditions than did HSE 
subjects. In terms of direct comparisons, self-esteem groups did not differ in the 
positive mood condition and differed slightly in the neutral condition but then 
diverged significantly in the negative mood condition. Hence, this study 
demonstrated that self-esteem differences widen as moods become increasingly 
negative and dysphoric. In a second study to address the mechanism of the self- 
esteem-mood relationship, they demonstrated that once negative mood states 
arise they are more closely tied to self-evaluations of LSE opposed to HSE 
subjects. Finally, in study three, in an attempt to generalize findings outside of the 
laboratory, Brown and Mankowski had 45 HSE and LSE subjects complete a 
mood and self-appraisal measure on numerous occasions over a six week period. 
Summing across the six week period, LSE subjects reported less positive mood 
and more negative mood than did HSE subjects. Second, individuals with LSE 
consistently appraised themselves less positively. Third, the correlations were 
higher between self-esteem and mood states for LSE compared with HSE 
subjects. In short, these studies have converged on the overlap between self- 
esteem and negative mood, and demonstrate the bi-directional causality in this 
relationship. Yet in the only study knowing to assess the role of negative 
affect and self-evaluations independently, Epstein & Katz (1992) found that 
people who engaged in negative thinking directed against themselves, in contrast 
to general negative thinking, were particularly prone to have stress-produced 
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physical symptoms even for those subjects who had negative self-evaluations but 
did not report experiencing negative emotions. 
Finally, self-esteem may be intimately linked to emotion control patterns, 
particularly cognitive rumination. It has been demonstrated that individuals with 
low self-esteem are more prone to self-focused attention. Because the self is the 
richest and most elaborate knowledge structure stored in memory (Kihlstrom & 
Cantor, 1984) individuals with low self-esteem may be more prone to ruminate 
over primarily negatively-toned experiences that are easily accessible. 
Thus far the discussion has focused on personality trait variables most 
directly implicated in the cognitive-affective components of primary appraisal in 
stress. There is a voluminous literature addressing the role of the secondary 
appraisal process, coping, in the stress-illness relationship. 
1.8 Coping Styles 
In contrast to the static model of trait-neuroticism in health outcomes, coping 
research has detailed the bi-directional influence of personality and physical and 
psychological health. Coping can be defined as the constantly changing cognitive 
and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that 
are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person (Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984). Coping initially referred to the role of unconscious processes, 
defense mechanisms, in managing intrapsychic conflict whereas coping now refers 
to the person's conscious attempts to manage stress. Coping is seen to be a 
'person' variable that is relatively stable over time and influences day-to-day 
demands where people do not meet each situation anew but typically bring to the 
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situation a familiar method of coping. While a large number of relatively enduring 
coping styles have been identified in past research the two most persistently 
identified and predictive styles have been problem-focused coping and emotion- 
focused coping, where the former represents the active cognitive and behavioural 
strategies to manage a stressful situation and the latter refers to change in the 
relational meaning of what is happening which mitigates the stress even though 
the actual conditions of the relationship have not changed (Lazarus, 1993). 
Situational demands are important in determining what kind of coping mechanisms 
are important, and most individuals display a variety of ways of coping although 
there appears to be considerable evidence pointing to the long-term stability of the 
degree to which people engage in either problem-focused or emotion-focused 
coping independent of the specific circumstances. Recent reviews of the literature 
(Endler, Parker, & Summerfeltd, 1993; Lazarus, 1993) demonstrate the mediating 
role of coping processes between life events and somatic complaints and between 
perceived stress and psychopathology, although the results are less than definitive 
and there appears to be greater predictive validity in emotion-oriented coping. 
The research has most consistently pointed to the deleterious effects of emotion- 
oriented coping on physical symptoms, psychological distress, psychophysiological 
measures and psychopathology. In contrast, problem-focused coping has shown 
either slightly positive effects on reducing stress and illness or no relationship. 
Thus, while the coping research is aimed at demonstrating the role of personality 
style in mediating the relationship between stress and illness, the bulk of findings 
primarily demonstrate how coping styles worsen rather than ameliorate stress and 
illness. For instance, Aldwin & Revenson (1987) conducted a longitudinal 
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community survey on the relationship between coping strategies and psychological 
symptoms. The sample was comprised of 291 adults whose prior mental health 
history was known which allowed the authors to address causal directionality: 
whether coping affects mental health independently of prior mental health status 
or whether poor mental health initially determines maladaptive coping attempts. 
Coping was assessed across a wide range of reported stressful situations 
including financial and health problems, interpersonal difficulties and work-related 
problems. Using the Ways of Coping Scale (where eight factors were derived: 
four factors reflecting emotion-focused strategies; escapism, self-blame, 
minimization and seeking meaning; and three problem-focused strategies; 
instrumental action, exercised caution, and negotiation; one final factor included 
problem and emotion-focused items), an emotion-oriented coping practice, 
escapism, was most predictive of psychological symptoms accounting for 19% of 
the variance in residualized symptoms. Problem-focused coping was by-and- 
large unrelated to symptom status. The results also pointed to the bi-directional 
causal relationship between coping and mental health where those who were 
initially poorer in mental health experienced more stressful live events and coped 
in less successful ways. 
In a recent cross-sectional report (Kohn, Hay, & Legere, 1994) the 
moderating effects of coping styles on the adverse impact of hassles were 
examined in student and adult populations. Measures included in this study 
tapped: daily hassles, task-oriented, emotion-oriented, and avoidance-oriented 
coping, perceived stress, psychiatric symptomatology and minor physical ailments. 
Kohn et al. (1994) hypothesized that problem-focused coping would diminish the 
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adverse impact of hassles on perceived stress, psychiatric symptoms, and 
physical ailments whereas emotion-oriented coping would exacerbate the adverse 
impact of hassles on these outcome indices. In the student population (n=186) 
task-focused coping did not diminish the impact of hassles on psychiatric 
symptoms or physical ailments and while it did influence perceived stress this was 
only true when hassles were at relatively low levels. Likewise, emotion-oriented 
coping did not increase the adverse effects of hassles although it directly 
influenced perceived stress and psychiatric symptom reports. Third, when the 
interaction effects of hassles were examined the increased variance for coping 
beyond hassles on psychiatric symptomatology was quite small (. 09) and zero 
(. 00) for physical ailments. The results were nearly identical in the adult sample 
(n=165) in terms of no effects for task-oriented coping although emotion-oriented 
coping did exacerbate the effects of hassles on psychiatric symptomatology but 
again, not physical ailments. Finally, the additional contributions of coping and a 
coping by hassles interaction over and above the impact of hassles were 
insignificant or zero in the case of minor physical ailments. 
The failure of coping styles to mediate the stress-illness relationship has 
been criticized on methodological grounds (Endler & Parker, 1990). For instance, 
despite the presence of over 20 scales measuring coping styles, the bulk of them 
suffer from internal consistency and reliability difficulties. In contrast to the widely 
used Ways of Coping Questionnaire (Folkman & Lazarus, 1988), there are two 
new scales which show the role of avoidance coping in psychopathology (Endler 
& Parker, 1990) and detached coping in the role of health (Roger, Jarvis, & 
Najarian, 1993) (see chapter three for greater discussion of this newly constructed 
45 
coping styles scale). 
Self-esteem and Coping 
Finally, and consistent with the trends in research in personality models 
thus far discussed, there is movement towards linking coping styles more centrally 
with self-processes. Endler (Endler et al., 1993) in a recent review placed 
emphasis in his definition of coping on the importance of personal capacity and 
competence. And after decades of research in the area Lazarus (1993) 
commented 'I am confident that personal meanings are the most important 
aspects of psychological stress with which the person must cope, and they direct 
the choice of coping strategy'. Bednar and colleagues (Bednar, Wells, & 
Peterson, 1989) argue that self-esteem is founded upon coping responses that 
seek to either cope with or avoid that which one fears. Avoidance, accordingly, 
generates negative self-evaluations because of the inherently undesirable qualities 
of this behaviour which create bad feelings and failure to obtain personal growth. 
Although a number of pathways by which self-esteem may influence task-oriented, 
emotion-oriented and avoidant strategies, converging theoretical discussion 
linking self-esteem to coping patterns still remains to be empirically validated. 
Summary 
The personality models discussed have been ` hypothesized to moderate the 
stress-illness relationship by influence on cognitive, emotional and behavioural 
systems. These are multidimensional trait models which, despite their theoretical 
advantages, have not always held up to empirical scrutiny. That is, the locus of 
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control construct; the hardiness construct; neuroticism and coping styles contain 
multiple components that appear to relate to physical and psychological health 
variables differentially. 
In contrast to this global, multidimensional trait personality approach, 
, 
one 
alternative method to the study of personality and health research is to focus on 
more concentrated cognitive, emotional, and behavioural personality processes in 
health. In addition to the indirect impact of self-esteem on health, the remainder 
of this review will focus on existing research that implicates self-esteem directly 
in well-being. 
1.9 Self-esteem and health 
Linville (1987), in perhaps the first large scale study addressing the relationship 
between self-processes and physical health, hypothesized that individual 
differences in vulnerability to stress are due, in part, to differences in cognitive 
representations of the self. Linville's previous work (1985) had demonstrated that 
individuals with low self-complexity tended to have more extreme affective and 
self-appraisal reactions to threat. Self-complexity refers to the extent to which the 
self is represented by multiple cognitive self-aspects and the distinctions among 
these self-aspects. In this way, greater self-complexity would moderate the 
impact of stress on illness and depression because the individual that has 
multiple, independent self-aspects is able to maintain positive feelings in self- 
dimensions when other dimensions are threatened. For the individual with low 
self-complexity negative events trigger negative thoughts and feelings associated 
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with various self-aspects and these in turn, produce heightened negative affect, 
low self-appraisal, depression and other stress reactions. The assumption of the 
model is that individuals high in self-complexity are not immune to physical and 
mental health but rather that self-complexity will reduce the adversity of negative 
events when they do occur. To test the self-complexity-affect-extremity model, 
Linville (1987) in a prospective study over a two week period had 106 
undergraduates complete a card sort exercise to determine self-complexity and 
then report experienced life events in the past two weeks. In addition, at both 
time one and then two weeks later, students completed a questionnaire measuring 
depressive symptoms, physical symptom ratings, and a measure of perceived 
stress. Finally, subjects reported illnesses experienced over the two-week period. 
The results indicated the expected buffering role for self-complexity on physical 
health. At time one in the low stress condition self-complexity was not related to 
perceived stress, physical symptoms or depression (or reported life events) but at 
time two (where all time one scores were partialled), self-complexity (at time one) 
was found to relate to physical symptoms (. 28). Further, significant self- 
complexity by stress interactions were observed for time two ratings of illness, flu, 
aches, and cramps which accounted for more variance than illness ratings at time 
one, total stress at time one or self-complexity at time one. The findings 
supported the buffering role of self-complexity on health although the small sample 
and the modest relationship (5% of the variance of physical health attributed to 
self-complexity) suggest the need for replication. The time lag of experienced life 
events and outcome measures by only two weeks is also potentially problematic. 
A more informative prospective study would include a longer time period to assess 
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the relationship of self-processes and illness. Finally, this study did not directly 
test the assumptions of the model: that is, while self-complexity appeared to buffer 
the adverse consequences of stress and illness, the process by which this occurs 
was not tested. Higher global self-esteem has been observed to relate highly with 
increased self-complexity, or stated differently, more specific, stable self-concepts 
(see chapter two for discussion). While this study did not purport to test self- 
esteem it may have being doing so unwittingly. Notwithstanding this study was 
important in so far as it demonstrated the moderating influence of the self in 
health. 
DeLongis and colleagues (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988) did assess 
the mediating role of self-esteem, as well as social support on the impact of daily 
hassles on health and mood. Seventy-five married couples completed a battery 
of questionnaires (hassles [day-to-day experiences of general irritation, frustration, 
and excessive demands] and uplifts scales [day-to-day positive experiences]; 
daily health record; Rosenberg self-esteem inventory; emotional support report) 
and were interviewed once monthly during a six month period for repeated 
assessment of these variables. During periods of four days between each of the 
six monthly interviews, participants completed the hassles and uplifts scale and 
the daily health record at the end of each day. Hence, there were 20 
assessments of stress and illness plus six assessments of the other variables. 
DeLongis hypothesized that self-esteem would moderate the impact of stress on 
illness through its influence on coping processes. They reasoned that people who 
have positive views of themselves should be less likely to feel overwhelmed 
by stressful situations because they have confidence to cope with an array of 
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problems. The results reflected a positive relationship between hassles and 
physical symptoms across the six months, although this relationship was 
moderated by self-esteem. Self-esteem moderated the impact of daily hassles on 
same-day reported symptoms (-. 19) as well as next-day reported symptoms (-. 25). 
This moderating role of self-esteem was greater than the impact of emotional 
support or network size on the hassles-symptom relationship, although self-esteem 
did not appear to moderate the relationship between hassles and reported daily 
mood whereas emotional support did do so. However, this study also 
demonstrated that self-esteem and social support were not entirely independent 
and this has been demonstrated in previous research as well. For instance, self- 
esteem is built into models of social support (Cobb, 1976; Cohen & Wills, 1985) 
so that when social support demonstrates a moderating impact on mental and/or 
physical illness (e. g., Cohen & Wills, 1985) it is unclear as to whether this 
buffering role is due to the quantity or, quality of support or the underlying 
personality mechanisms (Stroebe & Stroebe, 1995, pp. 215-228). The research 
to follow in this project is to focus on the underlying personality component, 
namely, self-esteem. 
In terms of method, the hassles scale utilized in this study removed 
potentially confounding items with measures of stress. It also used a prospective 
design that controlled for initial values. One major limitation on this study, 
however, is reflected in the sampling. The lower and upper limits of the 
Rosenberg self-esteem scale is 10 and 40, respectively. The mean score in this 
sample was 35 with a mode of 40. It may be that the modest effects of self- 
esteem in this study were due to the attenuated range of self-esteem (as well as 
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emotional support). Hence this study represented a conservative test of the 
moderating influence of self-esteem. 
In addition to the moderating role of self-esteem on negative life events and 
daily hassles, a study by Brown and McGill (1989) examined the relationship 
between self-esteem and stress associated with positive life events. As reviewed 
previously, positive life events have consistently failed to predict health outcomes. 
Following from Brown's identity disruption model of stress, positive life events may 
be particularly adverse for health amongst individuals who have low self-esteem, 
because positive events force the person with low self-esteem to change the way 
they think about themselves and according to Brown the greater the disruption in 
identity the greater the person's risk for developing illness. This occurs by two 
possible paths: a) disruption in identity disrupts the processing of personal 
information and the forming of clear plans and goals and more energy is exerted 
to maintain a life course and thus leaving the person more depleted and 
vulnerable to illness, b) disruption of identity leads to decreased personal control. 
As postulated these changes do not occur for the individual with positive self- 
esteem because they are by definition used to thinking of themselves as 
successful. To test this model Brown and McGill (1989) conducted two studies. 
In the first study 261 female high-school students completed self-reported life 
events, self-esteem, and a measure of physical well-being at the beginning of the 
school year. Four-months later all measures were reassessed again. The 
analyses of health were limited to illness with a short incubation period such as: 
colds, sore throats, sinus and ear infections, and laryngitis. The results indicated 
that a total summed measure of positive life events was unrelated to illness scores 
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at either testing period. The results indicated a positive life-events by self-esteem 
interaction prediction of illness ratings at time two while controlling for time one 
initial illness scores, however. As predicted, high levels of life events were linked 
to increases in self-reports of illness only among subjects with low self-esteem and 
this finding was independent of main effects or any interaction effects with 
negative life events. In the second study a more objective indicator of illness 
was recorded: physician visits. One-hundred and seven (n=107) undergraduates 
were tested in a similar fashion to study one from the fall semester to the spring 
semester. The results corroborated the initial findings where after time one 
scores were statistically controlled, time two health centre visits were only 
predicted by the interaction between positive life-events and self-esteem, again 
even after controlling for negative events. These studies, however, utilized 12- 
month retrospective accounts of life events which could be contaminated by recall 
biases (as previously discussed). Second, examination mean illness reports in 
study one and the mean physician visits in study two reflect that the 
preponderance of the sample was very healthy and floor effects may have 
obscured the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
Lyons and Chamberlain (1994) in a most recent study assessed the 
moderating role of self-esteem and dispositional optimism in the impact of daily 
hassles on health. Optimism is a conceptually related construct to self-esteem 
although they have been found to empirically discriminable (Scheier et al., 1994). 
They are also conceptually distinguishable where self-esteem focuses on one's 
sense of self-worth and acceptance whereas optimism focuses more on the belief 
r:. 
about obtaining outcomes (flöte that this would also appear to differentiate self- 
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esteem from self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) where self-efficacy refers to the 
confidence in reaching goals. This, of course, is only part of self-esteem, as it is 
not uncommon to see very successful people, in terms of achievement, suffering 
from low self-esteem). While self-acceptance may be related to positive and 
negative successes, is not solely dependent on outcomes for maintenance (see 
chapter two for discussion for facets in addition to achievement that constitute self- 
esteem). Central to optimism is the belief that optimists are more likely to persist 
to reach goals because they see desired outcomes as within their reach than 
pessimists. Optimists have been found to suffer less distress following stressful 
experiences than do pessimists (Scheier & Carver, 1987). A number of studies 
have found that Optimism impacts on health through its moderating influence on 
coping styles where pessimists are more likely to engage in denial, distancing, and 
avoidance coping (reported in Stroebe & Stroebe, 1995, p. 213). In this study by 
Lyons & Chamberlain (1994) 169 undergraduate students were first assessed for 
health status, optimism, self-esteem, and minor life events and then re-assessed 
two weeks later. In this study self-esteem and optimism were moderately, 
positively related (. 57). At time one self-esteem was not related to hassles but 
was related to uplifts (. 35) and interpersonal uplifts in particular (. 35) and these 
relationships held at time two as well. In terms of health outcomes, self-esteem 
was related to self-rated health (. 28), total symptom reports (-. 22), upper 
respiratory symptoms (-. 19) as well as non-respiratory symptoms (-. 27). These 
relations were all significant at time two excluding the correlation between 
respiratory symptoms (-. 18ns). However, no self-esteem by hassles or uplifts 
interactions were observed for health reports where optimism did interact with both 
53 
of these measures on symptoms. Self-esteem may moderate the stress-health 
relationship particularly when events are relatively valenced and have personal 
relevance. As the authors note in this study, the tapped daily hassles may not 
have reached this threshold. In contrast to these superior findings for optimism 
on physical health a most recent large scale study (Study 1, n=4,309) by Scheier 
and colleagues (Scheier et al., 1994) self-esteem was found to better predict the 
number and intensity of symptoms and depression ratings (although differences 
may not be statistically different) and when self-esteem was partialled the 
significance between optimism and the number of symptoms became non- 
significant and the intensity of symptom ratings, while remaining significant (. 12) 
fell considerably to be only a marginally meaningful relationship. This study also 
demonstrated positive correlations between self-esteem and the following coping 
practices: active coping (. 25), planning (. 20), denial (-. 20), mental disengagement 
(-. 17), and behavioural disengagement (-. 38). Finally this study showed a positive 
relationship between self-esteem and the ability to make successive re-appraisals 
to reduce stress and growth (. 33). These later correlations link self-esteem 
to coping and stress appraisal. 
There are two recent laboratory studies that link self-evaluative processes 
directly to the perception of stress and the subsequent physiological concomitants. 
Greenberg and colleagues (Greenberg et al., 1992) conducted three laboratory 
experiments to test the buffering effect of self-esteem against anxiety. While the 
framework of the study was the assessment of the relationship between self- 
esteem and anxiety, the use of conditions which included threatening scenes of 
death on a video (study one) and threat of shock (studies two and three) could be 
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arguably better operationalizations of laboratory stress than anxiety. Similarly 
state arousal as measured by skin conductance measures have been used to 
gauge stress reactions. In contrast to previous studies, this study manipulated 
self-esteem levels in subjects through bogus personality feedback and therefore 
could better unravel the causal relationships between self-esteem and outcome 
measures. In the first study, high self-esteem subjects did not report experiencing 
anxiety even when exposed to the most aversive video presentation. In the two 
remaining studies utilizing high and neutral self-esteem groups again, when 
exposed to threat of shock, high self-esteem subjects exhibited less autonomic 
arousal. Most importantly in the third study, the mediation of self-esteem on threat 
and arousal was not accounted for by changes in affectivity. The self-esteem 
manipulation had no effect on positive affect and the later did not impinge on the 
self-esteem-arousal relationship. 
Strauman and colleagues (Strauman, Lemieux & Coe, 1993) have recently 
conducted an investigation of self-evaluations on stress appraisal and 
physiological arousal. In this study, in contrast to all studies reported thus far, an 
individually tailored acute stressor was presented. Thirty-eight subjects 
participated in two sessions one week apart. Based on depression and anxiety 
scores, subjects were divided into dysphoric, anxious and control groups. Subjects 
were told that during each session they would be given a booklet containing open- 
ended questions about personality traits. The content of the questions in the 
booklet constituted the experimental manipulation. Each booklet asked questions 
about the persons perception of themselves and as unknown to the subject, the 
booklet contained either self-guide (self-rated ideal self) attributes that the subject 
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had listed six weeks earlier (self-referential priming) or the self-guide attributes of 
another subject (yoked control priming). The self-referential booklet for each 
distressed group contained some of their own self-guide attributes from the self- 
guide domain of interest, that is, an ideal or ought (characteristics one should 
have) attribute and included any attributes that were discrepant with an actual self- 
attribute. The dependent measures were negative emotional content written in the 
booklets, plasma cortisol levels, and assayed immune measures. Based on the 
model, it was expected that the anxious group would have greater actual-ought 
discrepancies and dysphoric individuals would have greater actual-ideal 
discrepancies and these discrepancies would lead to decreased NK cytotoxicity. 
The results indicated that the pattern of actual-ought and actual-ideal 
discrepancies for the anxious and dysphoric groups, respectively, were supported. 
In terms of the negative affect content of written responses, group differences 
were observed for dysphoric and anxious content during self-referential priming 
but not during yoked control priming and the content reflected group membership: 
so that anxious group members demonstrated more anxiety and the dysphoric 
group relayed more dysphoric content. Further, in terms of cortisol measures, 
cortisol tended to be higher following self-referential priming than following yoked 
control priming and differences in NK toxicity were observed in the expected 
direction, but only for the anxious- group and the relationship held even after 
controlling for life events. Finally, when the control group was exposed to self- 
referential priming there was trend towards increase NK cytotoxicity suggesting 
that positive, self-evaluations may have stress-buffering, immune enhancing 
effects. Although the external validity of this study is compromised by the few 
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subjects and the multiple analyses which capitalize on chance, the study points 
to the important role of self-evaluation in the perception of stress and the 
subsequent catecholamine and cortisol consequences. Finally, in contrast to 
Greenberg et al's., (1992) formulations, Strauman et al. (1993) suggest that self- 
evaluations moderate stress appraisal through negative affectivity so that 
individuals characterized by chronic negative self-evaluations are more vulnerable 
to acute exacerbations of negative affect in situations that trigger self-evaluative 
cognition. However, the sample in Strauman's study was pre-selected for its 
tendency to experience negative affectivity and so replication is much needed in 
normal populations. 
1.10 Summary and Research Outline 
The accumulated literature, despite its brevity, is suggestive of a stress-buffering 
role of self-esteem in psychosocial stress and laboratory-induced stressors. 
Individuals with low self-esteem may be more likely to maintain negative affective 
arousal that places them at direct risk for illness and disease because of the 
chronic arousal associated with chronic negative self-evaluations. Second, 
individuals with self-esteem may be more likely to show exaggerated, negative 
arousal in response to negative events when they occur. Third, individuals with 
low self-esteem may be more likely to appraise even benign experiences as more 
threatening. Relatedly, individuals with low self-esteem may be at greater risk for 
health-related complications in response to positive life events. Fourth, individuals 
with low self-esteem may employ non-effective and ' even counter-productive 
coping strategies that inadvertently prolong the pernicious effects of acute 
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stressors. The research that follows is an examination of the relationship 
between self-esteem and psychosocial stress, psychophysiological, and 
psychopathology. 
In chapter two, a new measure for evaluating self-reported self-esteem is. 
developed. Virtually all studies examining self-esteem utilized a single 
operationalization of self-esteem, namely, the Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory 
(RSE: Rosenberg, 1965). As will be described in the next chapter the RSE fails 
to tap life domains that have been shown to relate to global self-esteem and, 
correspondingly, life stress. As such, there are serious challenges to the validity 
of the RSE and its continued use as an operationalization of phenomenological 
self-esteem in health research. The chapter outlines the shortcomings in the RSE; 
shortcomings with other multidimensional self-esteem scales; the confounding of 
self-concept and self-esteem measures, and finally presents a new measure of 
self-esteem that is constructed specifically for clinical-health research and practice. 
In chapter three the buffering role of self-esteem is examined in a group of 
students over an eight-week period and in chapter four, a more process-oriented 
approach is undertaken whereby the bi-directional influence of self-esteem and 
coping on health and distress is investigated over the academic year of first year 
university students. 
In chapter five, a series of laboratory experiments will attempt to address 
the causality of self-esteem in stress reactivity by manipulating self-esteem levels 
in different groups and then exposing them to relatively stressful situations. In this 
way, the psychophysiological concomitants of self-esteem will be examined. 
In Chapter six, the nature and function of self-esteem is assessed in a 
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group of patients diagnosed with depression or anxiety-related spectrum disorders 
and who are undergoing psychological treatment. This chapter will explicitly test 
the interactive influence of self-esteem and emotion-control in patients perhaps 
most susceptible to difficulties in each of these domains. 
Finally, the concluding chapter will attempt to summarize the findings and 
provide a tentative model for self-esteem in health and well-being, with an 
emphasis on the interaction with coping and emotion-control processes. 
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Chapter 2 
2 The Construction and Validation of The York Self-esteem Inventory 
2.1 Introduction 
The term self-esteem has been used since the late 17th century, although 
the pioneering efforts of the American Psychologist, William James (1890/1950) 
defined it more precisely as a central psychological construct. The academic 
developments in the study of self-esteem over the past century are well beyond 
the scope of the present author's objectives, but a short review is presented that 
gives the necessary background and relevance for the development of a new 
measure of self-esteem. Not too long ago Wylie (1974) stated that Nit has recently 
become widely fashionable and acceptable to write about such hypothetical 
constructs as the self-concept and self-esteem without seriously attempting to 
define such terms' (p. 316). There is still, currently, the sense that research on 
self-esteem lacks theoretical clarity and methodological sophistication and 
prominent self-theorists (Gergen, 1983; Wylie, 1979) have argued that self- 
esteem must first be clearly defined and operationalized before initiating 
experimentation. This chapter presents the construction of a new global measure 
of self-esteem to be utilized in clinical health research. 
2.1.1 Background 
There has been a plethora of conceptual and methodological approaches 
to the study of self-esteem since James (1890/1950) first attempted systematically 
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to delineate its structure and function. He saw the self as comprised of two 
dualistic parts; the conscious, experiencing 'I' and the empirical self or 'me', the 
object of reflection for the experiencing 'I. ' The 'me' is equivalent to what is 
currently considered the self-concept and was said by James to include the sum 
total of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his 
clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his 
reputation and works, his land and horses, and yacht and bank account. " (1890 
in Donnelly, 1992, p. 176). James suggested that self-concepts emerged from 
one of three principle self-relevant categories: the material self (objects and 
possessions considered to be one's personal property), the social self (a persons 
reputation or share of recognition) and the spiritual self. 
The experiencing, process-oriented 'I' reflects what we currently view as 
self-esteem, and this received much less attention in James' deliberations. Self- 
esteem was seen to be dependent on the goodness-of-fit between one's 
aspirations in a specific self-domain and the realized potential in that self-domain. 
Thus, according to James, self-esteem was linked directly to achievement in 
important, chosen self-concept areas. In James's account, self-esteem was seen 
to be a stable trait with some fluctuation due to successful and failed experiences, 
but at the same time always returning to an "average tone" that is independent of 
objective feedback (Bednar et al., 1989). 
Two fundamental distinctions arise from James's early formulations that 
have influenced subsequent attempts to measure and examine self-esteem. First, 
self-concept and self-esteem are distinguished conceptually as the former 
represents the descriptive, static, categorical structure-like aspects of the self 
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whereas the latter represents the non-static process by which we actively employ 
self-evaluations and maintain a sense of self-worth. To the present, there is 
confusion about this distinction in the empirical literature despite the general 
agreement that conceptually, self-concept and self-esteem are not identical 
constructs (Gergen, 1984; Wylie, 1974,1979). 
Several authors who have developed scales to measure multidimensional 
self-concept (e. g., Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976; Flemming and Watts, 
1980; Marsh, Smith, Barnes, & Butler, 1983; Roid & Fitts, 1991) have argued that 
the self is comprised of both descriptive (self-concept) and evaluative (self- 
esteem) elements that are not empirically distinguishable. In this way, global self- 
esteem is usually derived by summing the various descriptive self-components, 
despite the absence of the important evaluative component. This problem is 
reflected in the widely-used Tennesseee Self-concept Scale (TSCS, 3rd Edition: 
Roid & Fitts, 1991). The TSCS purports to measure independent multiple self- 
concept factors and utilizes many sophisticated scoring summaries to arrive at a 
host of psychological health indices. Yet summing across all of the independent, 
descriptive factors is also operationalized as a global measure of self-esteem. 
The absence of consistent evaluative items mitigates this simplistic reduction of 
description to self-evaluation. For example, this is clearly seen in TSCS items, 
"I understand my family as well as I should", "I try to please people but not 
overdo it", I am as religious as I want to be, or "I try to be careful about my 
appearance", but to name a few. These items are not assessing self-evaluations. 
Recent examination of the relationship between self-concept and self- 
esteem has demonstrated only a modest relationship between specific self- 
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concepts and global self-esteem (Marsh, 1986; Pelham & Swann, 1989). In this 
later study Pelman and Swann found that individuals with low global self-esteem 
tended to have fewer positive self-concepts but they were not equivalent. Marsh 
(1986) found that specific self-views only accounted for approximately 50% of the 
variance of global self-esteem. In short, recent evidence appears to lend 
empirical support to the conceptual distinction between self-concept and self- 
esteem. Despite this advance recent attempts to measure the self still witness the 
conflation between self-concept and self-esteem (e. g., Beck, Steer, Epstein, & 
Brown, 1990; Roid & Fitts, 1991). For instance, Beck et al. (1990) in the 
development of the Beck Self-Concept Inventory comments that in his discussion 
of self-esteem instruments, Demo (1985) "indicated that there are too many poorly 
validated self-concept scales in the psychological literature', and further, 
"operational definition and evaluation of the self-concept is important because 
persons with low self-esteem are more vulnerable to the development of 
psychiatric disorders than persons with high self-esteem. " (p. 23). The lack of 
precision in self definitions continues to plague developments in self-esteem 
research, in the newly standardized TSCS (Roid & Fitts, 1991), for example, it is 
argued that the total scale score on the TSCS can be taken as a global measure 
of self-esteem or alternatively as an index of total self-concept. 
Gergen (1984) has argued that not only is it important for theoretical 
developments in self theory to recognize the distinction between self-as-structure 
versus self-as-process but that research efforts should move away from its current 
emphasis on mechanistic models of self-concept and focus on the process 
elements of self. The emphasis on process and feedback models is consistent 
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with other models attempting to conceptualize and measure the relationship 
between personality, stress and well-being (as reviewed in chapter one) and 
reflects the interest in the relationship between person variables and situation 
variables in studies to follow. 
The second relevant issue emerging from James's perspective was that the 
self-concept is multidimensionsional. It has long been accepted that the self- 
concept is comprised of multiple domains such as interpersonal relations, 
academic achievement, family relations, to name a few, and empirical measures 
have included these dimensions in their item ratings. Consistent with the above 
discussion about the distinction between self-concept and self-esteem, recent 
research has-begun to assess the level of self-esteem related to each specific 
self-concept and then arriving at a global measure of self-esteem by summing the 
component sub-scores. This scoring technique is a return to a view that global 
self-esteem is multidimensional as it relates to specific self-concepts. However, 
by measuring individual, specific self-concepts and deriving separate self-concept 
scores and then correlating these totals with a global self-esteem measure would 
still seem to leave the self-evaluation component relevant to that specific self- 
domain missing (e. g., examining family self-concept in relation to core global self- 
esteem instead of global self-esteem with family-relevant self-evaluations). In this 
way, the process-oriented self-evaluations are being extracted from the relevant 
self-domains. It would appear that there is room for development of a new 
measure of self-esteem that takes into account important, multiple domains of self- 
esteem in the rating measure. Several multidimensional self-esteem measures 
are already in current, use. However, these scales include self-evaluations 
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relevant to only a restricted number of self-domains, particularly the academic 
domain that may not be relevant for a wider subject panel (e. g., Shavelson et al., 
1976; Coopersmith, 1967). Second, there is a confusion between self-description 
and self-evaluation in these multidimensional scales (as previously mentioned, ) 
(e. g., Flemming and Watts, 1980; Marsh et al., 1983). 
For example, the most widely used scale of multidimensional self-esteem 
is the Coopersmith Self-esteem Inventory (Coopersmith, 1967). However, it 
contains only three dimensions (social, academic and home), and while it has 
been used successfully for many years in the educational arena its clinical utility 
has been questioned (Anastasi, 1988, p. 638). Furthermore, the inventory was 
constructed and standardized exclusively with young primary school children, and 
so items are most reflective of this developmental period. 
Just as existing measures of multidimensional self-esteem suffer from 
construct limitations, the most widely used measure of global self-esteem, the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Inventory (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) suffers from several 
limitations. It consists of 10 items coded in a 4-point likert format, with items 
tapping core self-esteem such as "all in all I am a person of self-worth. " The 
scale has been shown to possess very good reliability and validity. However, the 
RSE measures self-esteem independent of important self-domains and fails to 
capture the developmental nature of self-esteem. While it is generally accepted 
that self-esteem fluctuates somewhat across time and situations, the RSE has 
been shown to be rather impervious to situationally-based manipulations directed 
at influencing self-esteem (Heatherton and Polivy, 1991). Collectively, these 
limitations point to the restricted breadth of the RSE and its insensitivity to 
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situational fluctuations. 
In summary, currently existing multi-dimensional self-esteem scales tap too 
few self-esteem domains and have not been found suitable for clinical contexts but 
rather offer advantages for school-based samples. Second, scales that do assess 
multiple life domains focus on the descriptive relevance of each domain and not 
the important evaluative component. Third, the most widely used measure of self- 
esteem, the Rosenberg, taps only the personal domain of self-esteem and, is 
therefore, not a truly global measure. A valid global self-esteem scale for 
research and practice in stress would not only comprise the important domains 
that have been shown in the literature to contribute to self-esteem, but also the 
domains which have been sources of threat and stress. There is a need for a 
measure of self-esteem that is related to important self-esteem dimensions and 
reflects the specific evaluative component that constitutes self-esteem and 
differentiates it from self-concept and other phenomenal aspects of the self. A 
brief review of the literature on the structure and function of self-esteem will follow 
with the aim of demonstrating the important domains relevant to self-esteem and 
a valid measure for stress research. 
2.1.2. Current Clinical and Empirical Evidence Relating 
to Self-esteem Measurement 
Individual differences in self-esteem have been shown to reflect differences 
in 'cognitive access' to affectively positive versus affectively negative knowledge 
about the self (Greenwald, Bellezza, & Banaji, 1988). Consistent with self-esteem 
as a cognitive-affective construct, self-esteem can be seen as attitude toward the 
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self that is based on an elaborated set of beliefs about oneself with different 
beliefs having differential valence of evaluations. These self-evaluations have 
been theorized to develop very early in childhood (Coopersmith, 1967; Bowlby, 
1969; Kegan, 1982). Individual differences in self-esteem emerge very early in 
childhood and seem dependent on the degree of closeness and love from 
caregivers. Additional studies have shown that parental style influences childhood 
self-esteem. Parents who offer their children strong expectations for goal-directed 
behaviour; provide adequate rules and guidelines for behaviour; communicate to 
the child their acceptance and belonging in the family and respect the child's 
individuality, are more likely to have children with high self-esteem (Sroufe, 1983). 
It has been suggested that early parental relations are central not just to childhood 
self-esteem but predict adult self-esteem as well (Rosenberg, 1986; Roberts and 
Bengton, 1993). Moreover, adolescent self-esteem is seen to be relatively stable 
into adulthood contrary to the view that adolescence is a time of turmoil for the 
self (Savin-Williams & Devo, 1984). Roberts and Bengton (1993) conducted a 
14 year longitudinal study to measure the relationship between familial relations 
and self-esteem. Baseline rates of parent-child relations were obtained, including 
measures of self-esteem (RSE), psychological health (Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies-Depression-CES-D) and a qualitative measure of parental affection. The 
average age of the child and parent at the baseline period was 19 and 44, 
respectively. The results showed that baseline affection was the best predictor of 
self-esteem at 14-year follow-up. Subsequent analyses matched parent-child age 
cohorts and found no differences in the correlations between parental affection 
and self-esteem thus suggesting that age is not a powerful proxy for reducing the 
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contribution of parent-child affection to a young adult's self-esteem. The general 
conclusions of this important study suggest that greater parent-child affection early 
in a child's life contributes to later well-being in adulthood (Roberts and Bengton; 
1993). Finally, this study also pointed successfully to the distinction between self- 
concept and self-esteem. Even though the family role-identity was shown to 
decrease during young adulthood the evaluative component established early was 
important to later global self-esteem. 
While Rosenberg (1965) argued that adolescence is a time of storm and 
stress, Savin-Williams and Devo (1984) argue that this is true only for a 
percentage of adolescents. They argue that if an adolescent experiences 
uncertainty and turmoil in self-understanding then this may be characteristic of his 
or her entire life course. Rosenberg (1979) observed that adolescents with 
inconsistent self-concepts showed greater psychological distress and increased 
predisposition to antisocial behaviour than those with a firm understanding of self- 
worth. Collectively, these studies suggest that ambiguity in self-worth may be an 
important component of self-esteem and there may be stability in this instability 
throughout the life span. Hence uncertainty or ambiguity in self-evaluations may 
be an important component of self-esteem. 
The symbolic interactionists, Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) attempted to 
define the self much more in terms of the social sphere. Like James, Cooley 
argued that the self is multidimensional but that the social self was the important 
component. In this way people learn to define themselves by their perceptions of 
the way others define them., as Cooley stated "we always imagine, and in the 
imagining share the judgments of the other mind" (Cooley, 1902, p. 152). This is 
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what Cooley referred to as the "looking-glass self", the self developing according 
to: a) the individual's perception of how he or she must appear to the other 
person, b) the individual's interpretation of how the other person evaluates him or 
her on the basis of that interpreted perception and c) the individual's personally 
experienced affective response to the perceived judgment (Bednar et al., 1989). 
Mead (1934) similarly followed Cooley's emphasis on the social aspect of 
self-concept and self-evaluation and emphasized the development of the self via 
language and interpersonal experience. Together, Cooley and Mead suggested 
that self-esteem is fundamentally dependent on the view others have of us so that 
to achieve high self-esteem we need to be highly esteemed by significant others. 
In addition to these important theoretical developments, self-conceptions and 
evaluations have been shown to derive from social comparison and social 
interaction with others (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Marsh, 1986) and scales exist that 
measure social self-esteem exclusively of other dimensions, for example the 
Janis-Field Feelings of Inadequacy Scale (JPI; Janis & Field, 1959). Relatedly, 
research on self-presentation has shown that physical attraction is highly related 
to global self-esteem. Physical attraction is a valued commodity in western culture 
which may have direct effects on level of self-esteem in the first instance, and it 
has been shown that people who are attractive are treated more favourably, are 
assumed to possess numerous positive qualities, and are given more opportunities 
to succeed (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheild, 1977), which may all contribute to 
opportunities for positive self-evaluation in the second instance. Further, Sabini 
states that more attractive people possess more confidence to practice social skills 
and are therefore more likely to obtain positive feedback about themselves. 
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Following James's formulations that self-esteem is directly linked to 
successes or achievement in important self-concept domains, there have been 
numerous empirical studies showing a positive relationship between expectations 
for achievement, actual achievement and self-esteem on the assumption that 
academic achievement is an important dimension of self-concept (e. g., Shavelson 
et al., 1976). The best known self-concept measures have also routinely included 
a large proportion of items tapping academic achievement (e. g., Piers-Harris Self- 
concept Scale (Piers & Harris, 1969), as have multidimensional measures of self- 
esteem (e. g., Coopersmith, 1967). Moreover, self-esteem has also be related to 
other social-cognition processes that mediate achievement. For example, Midkiff 
and Griffen (1992) found that self-esteem mediated students' causal attributions 
for achievement-related outcomes. Multidimensional scales of self-concept have 
invariably included academic achievement as a core aspect of the self as have the 
several existing multidimensional measure of self-esteem. 
2.1.3 Anew self-esteem scale 
As has been shown, the argument against a unidimensional, atemporal, 
adevelopmental self-concept has been responded to by self-concept scale 
constructionists. However, existing global self-esteem measures have failed to 
incorporate the same methodological advancements obtained in the self-concept 
area. As described, research has returned to examining global self-esteem in 
relation to self-concept domains. Because self-evaluations are primarily rooted in 
social experience, a valid and reliable measure of global self-esteem would need 
to take into account the accumulated emphasis in the literature on the importance 
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of the family, interpersonal relations, achievement, and physical attractiveness as 
well as the ambiguity within these evaluative realms. There is no existing self- 
esteem scale that attempts to assess these dimensions. The remainder of this 
chapter will be devoted to reporting the validation results of a new scale for 
measuring self-esteem. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Subjects 
Subjects were recruited from a research panel comprised of first year students at 
the University of York who agreed to volunteer for research throughout the 
academic year. Two-hundred and twenty-four (224) were contacted via the 
internal university mail for the questionnaire survey and 183 returned the forms for 
a response rate of 82%. Of the 183 subjects in this study, 72 were male (mean 
age = 19.6, SD = 7.1) and 110 female (mean age = 20.0, SD = 4.26), one subject 
declined to provide their sex. Subjects received no financial or academic credit for 
their involvement. 
2.2.2 Scale Construction 
Initially, a 60-item questionnaire, entitled the 'York Self-esteem Inventory' (YSEI) 
was created. The new scale used a 5-point likert scale score format for each 
individual item, ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly agree'. Scale 
items were generated to reflect the following self-esteem domains: personal-core 
self-esteem, social, family, achievement, attractiveness and ambiguity in self- 
evaluation across these domains. In addition to these central aspects of global 
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self-esteem, various other items were included that were thought to be related to 
self-esteem, such as negative emotionality, poor coping patterns, and frequency 
of common health complaints. The inclusion of the latter variables operated as 
a preliminary test of the inter-relationship between self-esteem and health related 
variables. Finally, subjects also received a-measure (Reynolds, 1982) to assess 
the degree of social desirability in scale responses, 
The first analysis involved the assessment for response frequencies, 
including a check on the distribution of individual items for extreme skewness or 
kurtosis (<1) and all variables were found to be within this acceptable range. The 
60-item scale was next subjected to principal-axis factoring, using oblimin rotation. 
The latter method was used based on the assumption that factors were likely to 
be intercorrelated. Sixteen Factors with Eigenvalue >1 (Cattell, 1966) initially 
emerged from the analysis. Of the original 60 items, 49 loaded on the first factor, 
with the highest loading being question 55, 'I am comfortable with myself'. 
Nineteen of these items were then removed, owing to item redundancy or if they 
were questions that measured health status thus leaving a scale of 30 items for 
additional analyses. 
This was an important consideration because the scale was being 
constructed to assess the relationship with stress, coping and health, and 
therefore the scale needed to be free of these items so as to reduce statistical 
confounding with other health-related measures. As was discussed in the 
previous chapter the confounding of personality and health has presented 
difficulties in the measurement of neuroticism, and life events research. The items 
were included in the analyses to provide an initial test of the relationship between 
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self-esteem and health status. Some examples of the non-retained loadings 
included: emotionality (Items loading: "I am nervous" (-. 39), "I worry too much (- 
. 28), "I am cheerful"(. 69), and "I am moody" 
(-. 30); health status ("I am sick 
frequently" (-. 33), "I have a good deal of energy" (. 45), and self-evaluated coping 
status ("I cope well under pressure" (. 41)). 
After the scale had been reduced to 30 items (The 30 item YSEI can be 
seen in Appendix Al) it was re-submitted to principal axis factoring using 
oblimin rotation and the same criteria for extraction. Seven factors with 
Eigenvalue >1 criteria emerged. Despite the multiple factors the scree test 
suggested a one-factor solution (see Appendix A2) or possibly a two-factor 
solution as 8 items also loaded on a second factor (Eigenvalue = 2.13,7.6% of 
explained variance). However, each of these items on the second factor double 
loaded on the first factor with the majority of these items showing the opposite 
valence to the item loadings on the first factor. The analysis was, therefore, re- 
run restricting the factor extraction to 1 and a factor-loading criterion of . 30. The 
analysis demonstrated that all 30 items loaded significantly on factor 1 (Eigenvalue 
= 8.55, explaining 28.5% of the variance). As seen in Table 2.1, the two highest 
loadings were on item 29 'I am comfortable with myself' (. 74) and item 11 'I wish 
were different' (-. 73). The removal of the 19 items to reduce the scale to 30 
items, provided a more valid construct, measuring global self-esteem, whilst not 
artificially inflating the reliability of the scale. That is, the internal alpha reliability 
of the scale decreased with the reduction of items (from . 94 to . 86) but this loss 
in internal consistency was felt necessary to preserve the purity of the self-esteem 
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Table 2.1 
Item Loadings From Factor Analysis (PAF) for The 
York Self-esteem Inventory 
Loadings 
Item Total Males Females 
1. -. 59 -. 62 -. 56 
2. . 51 . 52 . 48 
3. . 49 . 50 . 
48 
4. . 34 . 14 . 
47 
5. -. 36 -. 35 -. 36 
6. -. 44 -. 55 -. 35 
7. . 47 . 40 . 52 
8. . 65 . 55 . 69 
9. -. 50 -. 55 -. 35 
10. -. 44 -. 31 -. 48 
11. -. 73 -. 65 -. 75 
12. . 63 . 50 . 69 
13. -. 60 -. 70 -. 58 
14 
. 55 . 
62 . 54 
15 . 41 . 43 . 43 
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Table 2.1 Continued 
Loadings 
Item Total Males Females 
16. -. 48 -. 44 -. 49 
17. -. 37 -. 17 -. 51 
18. . 57 . 45 . 69 
19. . 45 . 49 . 43 
20. -. 38 -. 29 -. 43 
21. . 57 . 57 . 57 
22. . 53 . 51 . 
54 
23. . 48 . 66 . 
53 
24. . 40 . 42 . 39 
25. . 47 . 49 . 48 
26. -. 67 -. 66 -. 67 
27. -. 48 -. 42 -. 50 
28. -. 34 -. 43 -. 24 
29. . 74 . 71 . 79 
30. . 39 . 29 . 46 
construct. 
Separate factor analyses were then conducted for male (n=72) and female 
(n=110) subjects. The results from the analyses produced one-factor solutions 
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with nearly identical factor loadings. The highest item loading for both male and 
female subjects was 29 'I am comfortable with myself'. As seen in Table 2.1, 
while all 30 items loaded significantly on the first factor in the factor analysis of 
female responses, 4 items loaded under . 30 in the factor analysis of male 
responses (items 4,17,20,30). While two items were just short of loading (r = 
. 29) two other items were considerably 
lower. Inspection of these items reflected 
items tapping the family domain. These low loadings may represent significant 
differences in the structure of self-esteem for males and females, or they may 
potentially reflect differences due to sample size. It was decided to retain these 
items with the prospect of re-assessing item loadings for male subjects in a larger, 
subsequent study. Mean scores and standard deviations for male and female 
subjects separately as well as the entire sample are provided in Table 2.2, which 
shows that scores for both males and females were skewed in the positive 
direction, with a mean item score of 3.53 (SD =. 53) for males and 3.62 (SD =. 49) 
for females. 
The unidimensional nature of the YSEI suggests that by summing across 
all 30 items, a global self-esteem index can be arrived at. All scores that were 
negatively coded (N=14) were reversed to so that the index represents total 
positive self-esteem, with upper and lower theoretical limits of 30 and 150 
respectively. Male subjects had a mean scale score of 108.3 (SD = 13.25) 
versus 104.9 (SD = 15.6) for females, a difference which was not statistically 
significant 
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Table 2.2 
Frequency Distributions of Items Comprising The 
York Self-esteem Inventory 
Total Males Females 
Item# M SD M SD M SD 
1, 
---- 
2.95 1.13 3.36 
----------- 
1.21 
------------- 
3.13 
------------- 
1.18 
--- - - ------ 
2. 
-------- 
3.16 
------------ 
0.76 
--- 
3.31 0.76 3.22 
---- 
0.77 
---------- 
3. 
--------- 
3.48 
---------- 
0.80 
------------- 
3.75 
------------- 
0.81 
------------- 
3.58 
------- 
0.81 
------------- 
4. 
------------ 
4.19 
------------- 
1.04 
--------------- 
4.17 
------------- 
0.93 
------------- 
4.18 
-------- 
1.00 
------------- 
5. 
------------ 
3.84 
------------- 
1.13 
--------------- 
3.94 
------------- 
0.95 
------------- 
3.88 
-------- 
1.06 
--------- 
6. 
---------- 
3.03 
----------- 
1.32 
------------- 
3.31 
------------- 
1.33 
------------ 
3.14 
-------- 
1.33 
--------- 
7. 
----------- 
3.49 
---------- 
0.78 
-------------- 
3.53 
-------- 
------------ 
0.86 
----------- 
3.51 
------- 
0.80 
----------- 
8. 
---------- 
3.66 
----------- 
1.07 
------ - 
3.93 
------------- 
0.98 
------------- 
3.77 
-------- 
1.04 
----------- 
9. 
------------ 
3.31 
---------- 
1.02 
--------------- 
3.51 
------------- 
0.99 
------------- 
3.40 
-------- 
1.01 
------------- 
10. 
------ ------- 
4.35 
----------- - 
1.09 
--------------- 
4.60 
------------- 
0.83 
------------- 
4.45 
-------- 
1.00 
--------- 
11. 
---------- 
3.58 
------- 
1.22 
----------- 
3.94 
--------- 
1.11 
---------- 
3.73 
-------- 
1.19 
------------ 
12. 
- 
------------ 
3.86 
---------- 
1.01 
-------------- 
4.04 
-- 
------------ 
0.91 
------------ 
3.93 
-------- 
0.97 
------- ----- 
13. 
------------- 
4.53 
------------ 
0.78 
------ ------- 
2.71 
------------- 
0.88 
------------- 
2.73 
-------- 
0.82 
---------- 
14. 
-------- 
---------- 
3.73 
---------- 
1.23 
-------------- 
3.57 
------------- 
1.12 
----------- 
3.67 
-------- 
1.19 
--- 
15. 
--------- 
2.73 
--------- 
0.78 
--------------- 
2.71 
------------- 
0.88 
------------- 
2.73 
-------- 
0.82 
------------ 
16. 
----------- 
3.50 
---------- 
1.08 
-------------- 
3.22 
------------- 
1.08 
------------- 
3.40 
-------- 
1.08 
----------- 
17. 
--------- 
4.51 
---------- 
0.97 
-------------- 
4.46 
------------- 
1.03 
------------- 
4.50 
-------- 
0.99 
---------- 
18. 
--------- 
--------- 
3.36 
---------- 
----------- 
1.03 
--------- 
--------------- 
3.20 
--------------- 
------------- 
1.02 
------------- 
------------ 
3.30 
------------- 
-------- 
1.03 
------- 
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Table 2.2 Continued 
Total 
Item# M SD 
Males Females 
M SD M SD 
19. 3.04 1.04 3.46 1.10 3.20 1.06 
20. 3.46 1.18 3.60 1.30 3.52 1.22 
---------- 
21. 
--------- 
3.10 
---------- 
1.24 
------------- 
3.44 
------------- 
1.10 
------------ 
3.24 
-------- 
1.19 
---------- 
22. 
------------ 
3.79 
----------- 
0.89 
--------------- 
3.78 
------------- 
0.89 
------------- 
3.79 
-------- 
0.89 
----------- 
23. 
---------- 
2.66 
---------- 
1.20 
--------------- 
2.83 
------------- 
1.06 
------------- 
2.73 
-------- 
1.14 
------ 
24. 
------ -- - 
3.86 
------- -- 
0.91 
-- - ----------- 
3.89 
------------- 
0.70 
------------- 
3.88 
------ - 
0.83 
25. 3.54 0.93 3.38 0.95 3.49 0.94 
-------- 
26. 
------------ 
2.68 
------------ 
1.30 
--------------- 
3.17 
------------- 
1.42 
------------- 
2.88 
-------- 
1.37 
---------- 
27. 
-------------- 
2.98 
----------- 
1.30 
------------- 
3.11 
------------- 
1.16 
------------- 
3.04 
-------- 
1.24 
--------- 
28. 
------------ 
3.47 
------------ 
1.06 
------------- 
2.82 
------------ 
1.07 
------------- 
3.21 
-------- 
1.11 
29. 3.75 1.06 3.82 1.00 3.78 1.03 
----------- 
30. 
---------- 
--------------- 
4.42 
----------- 
------------ 
1.06 
----------- 
--------------- 
4.18 
--------------- 
------------- 
1.05 
------------- 
------------- 
4.20 
------------- 
-------- 
1.05 
-------- 
(t (173) = 1.62, p =. 205 Because total scale scores were skewed in the positive 
direction (to the right), median total scale scores were also calculated and found 
to be higher for males (Mode = 115) than females (Mode = 93) but this difference 
was not significant (X2 (172)=1.12, p=. 30ns). Further, an inverse relationship was 
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observed between the total scale score and age (r(173) = -. 15 ns) although this 
was not statistically significant. 
2.3 Reliabilfty 
2.3.1 Internal Consistency: 
The internal consistency was assessed by means of Cronbach's Alpha. A 
coefficient of . 86 was produced for the entire scale. Separate co-efficients were 
produced for males (. 83) and females (. 88) and the results demonstrated good 
internal consistency for both groups. 
2.3.2 Test-retest 
Test-retest reliability was determined over an eight-week inter-test interval 
(ITI). The YSEI was sent out to all subjects who had participated at the time of 
first testing. Of the 183 who responded at time one, an additional 134 completed 
the scale at time two, eight weeks later, resulting in a coefficient of . 78 for the 
entire unitary scale for the 8-week ITI. 
2.3.3 Social Desirability (Examining For Response Tendencies) 
Finally, the total scale score on the YSEI was examined in relation to the 
potential confounding effect of social desirability. There is a recognized need to 
examine response tendencies with self-report measures. Social desirability has 
been seen to be significantly related to self-esteem ratings in the past and in some 
other studies, the relationship was assumed to be so great that self-esteem had 
been operationalized as the total scale score on social desirability measures (e. g., 
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Evans, 1980). An analysis was conducted with an abbreviated form of the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SDS; Reynolds, 1982) and the YSEI 
A positive, non-significant correlation was observed between social desirability 
and the YSEI (r(173)=. 16 ns) thus pointing to the discriminability of the two 
constructs and the absence of contamination of the latter from the former for the 
sample as a whole. When the relationship between social desirability and the total 
scale score of the YSEI was examined separately for males and females, a near- 
zero relationship was observed for females (r(110) =. 02 ns) whilst the relationship 
was positive and statistically significant for males (r(72) = . 36, p< . 01) thus 
pointing to greater social desirability in reported self-esteem for male than female 
subjects in this study. This is consistent with the finding that males tend to be 
more defensive and protective of their self-esteem (e. g., Evans, 1980). However, 
the magnitude of this relationship (10% of the variance of self-esteem being 
accounted for by social desirability) would not appear to jeopardize the reliability 
or validity of the scale. 
2.4 Study 2- Replication and Extension 
2.4.1 Introduction 
A second study was conducted to examine further the psychometric properties of 
the YSEI and to assess the relationship of the YSEI to two well-known self 
measures: The Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory (RSE; Rosenberg, 1965) and the 
Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS: Roid & Fitts, 1991). In this way, the 
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convergent validity of the YSEI could be assessed with the RSE (by way of 
addressing overlap of self-esteem constructs) and discriminate validity (by way of 
testing the relationship between self-esteem and self-concept) with the TSCS. 
2.5 Method 
2.5.1 Subjects 
Subjects were recruited from a second research panel comprised of first year 
students at the University of York who agreed to volunteer for research throughout 
the academic year. A total of 315 subjects (n=315) out of 414 mailed the 
questionnaire package completed the mailout for a response rate of 76%. Of the 
315 subjects in this study 144 were male (mean age = 19.7, SD = 4.2) and 171 
were female (mean age = 19.5, SD = 3.8). Subjects were not paid for their help 
nor did they receive academic credit. 
2.6 Factor Analysis of The YSEI 
Similar to the initial factor analysis of the YSEI the results in this study, utilizing 
a much larger sample, demonstrated that the data were best explained by a one- 
factor unidimensional scale as assessed by the scree test (see Appendix A3) 
(Factor 1, Eigenvalue = 7.47,24.9% variance explained). All items loaded 
significantly at the factor-loading criteria . 30 excluding scale items 5 'I have good 
ideas' and 7 'I am an important member of my family'. The highest loading was 
observed again on scale item 29, 'I am comfortable with myself' (. 74). A one- 
factor solution best explained the data in separate factor analysis (PAF) for male 
(n=144) and female (n=171) subjects, however, several individual item loadings 
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and the total explained variance was higher for female subjects (24.9%) than for 
male subjects (20.4%). Additionally, several items reflecting the family dimension 
( 7,28, and 49) failed to load significantly for males at factor-loading criteria . 30, 
whilst only item 7 failed to load on the first factor in the scale analysis for female 
subjects. In conclusion, the results from this replication study of psychometric 
properties further support a) the initial unidimensional nature of the YSEI, and b) 
the possible conclusion that family-related self-evaluations may be less important 
to global self-esteem for males than for females. 
2.7 Convergent Validity 1: The Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory 
The convergent validity between the YSEI and the RSE was examined. 
Total scale scores for both the YSEI and the RSE were derived by summing 
across all items for each scale separately. All items that were scored in the 
negative direction were reversed to create a total scale score in the direction of 
high self-esteem. The scoring of the RSE was changed to reflect the same five- 
point likert-scale format used in the YSEI, with the same anchoring points. A 
previous transformation of the RSE to a five-point likert scale (Pelham & Swann, 
1989) showed that its psychometric properties were not affected and this allowed 
a direct comparison of items and scale scores for the YSEI and RSE free of the 
potential effects of method variance. It was anticipated that the relationship 
between the two scales would be a significant positive one, as both scales purport 
to measure unidimensional self-esteem. The Pearson Correlation analysis 
revealed a very strong, positive correlation between the RSE and YSEI (r(314) = 
. 83, p< . 001). This high correlation would not seem to be due to item overlap 
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as can be seen by comparing the two scales (see Appendix A4). 
2.8 Factor Analysis of YSEI with RSE 
This high magnitude correlation pointed to the overlap in constructs 
between the YSEI and the RSE. To further assess the degree of overlap in the 
scale items a factor analysis was completed using the 30 items from the YSEI and 
the 10 items from the RSE. Using principal axis factoring, with oblimin rotation, 
and factor-loading criteria . 30,9 
factors were extracted with Eigenvalue > 1.0. 
The scree test, however, demonstrated that the data reflected a unidimensional 
structure (Factor 1, Eigenvalue = 10.54,26.4% variance explained). All items 
from the YSEI and the RSE loaded significantly on the first factor (excluding YSEI 
items 5 and 7) with the highest loading representing RSE item 7, 'On the whole, 
I am satisfied with myself' (. 78). These results offer further support for the 
construct validity of the YSEI. 
Alternatively, it could be argued that with such overlap a new scale is not 
required. It would be expected that the RSE would overlap with the YSEI to b 
large degree due to the fact that both scales comprise items that tap personal 
self-esteem. Despite this overlap, the narrow breadth of the RSE, with its 10 
items tapping only personal self-esteem, fails to extend its purview to other 
relevant domains of self-esteem. 
2.9 Convergent Validity 2: The Tennessee Self-concept Test 
The TSCS consists of 100 self-descriptive statements that the respondent uses 
to portray his or her own self-picture. Items reflect a range of self dimensions 
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including the: a) physical self, b) moral-ethical self, c) personal self, d) family self, 
e) social self. `Across these five domains, and a self-criticism domain, items are 
targeted at measuring identity, self-satisfaction and behavioural tendencies related 
to each of these dimensions. In this way, the scale can be scored column-wise 
for each self-dimension across the three levels (identity, self-satisfaction, 
behaviour) or row-wise tallying across all self-dimensions to produce a total index 
score for identity, self-satisfaction and behaviour. Despite the multiplicity of 
scoring indices in this scale, it is argued that the total scale score "is the single 
most important score on the TSCS. It reflects the overall level of self-esteem. " 
(Roid & Fitts, 1991, p. 3). 
Many factor analytic studies assessing the factorial structure of the TSCS 
have failed to replicate the orthogonality (or at least some discrimination) of 
specific self-concept dimensions. In a review of the factor studies, McGuire and 
Tinsley (1981; reported in Roid & Fitts, 1991) argued that the majority of studies 
that produced a unidimensional factor had failed to use adequately large sample 
sizes and used principal components analysis with orthogonal rotation. They 
argued that a more appropriate analysis would allow for intercorrelation between 
items and factors and therefore a more suitable factorial approach would include 
principal axis factoring with oblique rotation. This study aimed to assess the 
factorial structure of the TSCS using PAF with oblique rotation amongst a larger 
sample then previously used (n=315). Secondly, this study allowed for the direct 
assessment of factor and scale scores of the TSCS in relation to the YSEI. 
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2.10 Factor Analysis of TSCS 
The 100-item TSCS was subjected to prinicipal-axis factoring, using oblimin 
rotation. The latter method was used based on the assumption that factors could, 
and would be likely to be, intercorrelated. The scree test and Eigenvalue > 1.00 
criteria was employed to determine the number of factors for extraction and 
rotation. The analysis produced 25 factors with Eigenvalue > 1.00 that failed to 
converge. Examination of the scree plot pointed to a very large first factor (Factor 
1, Eigenvalue 19.53,19.5% variance explained) with redundant and insignificant 
subsequent factors (e. g., Factor 2, Eigenvalue = 4.89,4.9% variance explained). 
The additional factors produced low order correlations and double loadings with 
the first factor (Amongst the 25 variables that did not load, the most apparent 
trend was several non loadings from family-oriented items). Hence, the best fit to 
the data was a one-factor solution with seventy-five of the items loading 
significantly on the first factor. These results point to the inter-relatedness of self- 
domains and the difficulty in distinguishing them empirically, either with descriptive 
(identity items), evaluative items (self-satisfaction items), or behavioural items. 
Second, the relationship between the TSCS, YSEI, and the RSE, was 
examined by Pearson Correlation tests, using total sum scores from each 
measure as well as sub-scores from the TSCS. Even though there was no 
justification in this study for computing sub-scores for separate self-concepts, 
scores were created based on the previously derived self-dimensions to better 
examine the relationship between global self-esteem and specific self-concept 
comments of the TSCS. Based on the previous discussion the following 
relationships were anticipated: a) different self-concept dimensions of the TSCS 
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would produce only moderate correlations demonstrating the close relationship 
between self-concept and self-esteem but some discrim inability, empirically, b) the 
correlation between the YSEI and RSE will be higher than the correlation between 
the total score of the TSCS and the RSE, demonstrating the YSEI's greater 
relatedness to self-esteem than summed self-concepts, and c) because of the 
increased breadth in self-evaluation dimensions in the YSEI, and relate to the self- 
concept dimensions in the TSCS, the total score of the TSCS will correlate more 
highly with the YSEI then with the RSE. 
2.11 Results 
A subset of subjects of the original sample completed all three measures (n=135) 
and analyses were conducted with this sample. It was hypothesized above that 
correlations with descriptive, identity statements would be lower than with the total 
scale score across dimensions n the TSCS because of the inclusion of evaluative 
items. As seen in Table 2.3 the c rrelation matrix demonstrates marginal support 
for this hypothesis as there was q trend for each of the correlations of TSCS self- 
concept dimensions to be lower than the total scale score with either the YSEI or 
the RSE. Consistent with Marsh's (1986) findings, no self-concept dimension 
explained more than 50% of the variance of global self-esteem, with variances 
ranging from a high of 46% (personal) to a low of 17% (family) with the YSEI and 
from a high of 35% (personal) to a low of 4% (family) in relation to the RSE. 
Moreover, Roids and Fitts (1991) purport that the Personal self-concept dimension 
can be seen as a general self-esteem measure. The correlations of . 68 with the 
YSEI and . 60 with the RSE provide little support for this. 
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Table 2.3 
Correlations Betw een The YSEI. RSE. and The TSCS 
Self-esteem Meas ures 
Y SEI R SE 
TSCS Dimension 
Physical . 64 . 56 ' 
Moral . 41 . 38 
Personal . 68 . 60 
Family , 41 . 
21 
Social 
. 57 . 43 
Total identity . 71 . 55 
TSCS Total Score . 81 ' . 71 
All correlations significant at p<. 001 excluding the relationship between 
TSCS-Family and RSE. 
Second, it was anticipated that the correlation between the YSEI would be higher 
with the RSE (because of its shared focus on self-evaluation) than would the 
correlation between the RSE and the total scale score of the TSCS, thus providing 
convergent (with the RSE) and discriminant (with the TSCS) validity for the YSEI. 
The observed correlations between the YSEI and the RSE (r(135) = . 85, p< . 001) 
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and the RSE and the TSCS (r(135) = . 71, p <. 001) showed a trend in this 
direction but the difference was not statistically significant. With respect to the 
third hypothesis, the correlation between the YSEI and the TSCS total scale (r 
(135) = . 81, p< . 001) was greater than the correlation between the TSCS total 
score and the RSE (r(135)=. 71, p< . 001) as was anticipated but again not to a 
degree of statistical significance. These trends should be interpreted with 
caution, however, as it is possible that the differential relationship patterns may be 
due to the differences in the number of items in the various scales. 
Finally, the conclusion amongst the TSCS authors that the total scale score 
measures global self-esteem was, in fact, supported in this study. The TSCS 
produces a total score that is highly related empirically to other global measures 
of self-esteem, such as the YSEI and RSE, despite the obvious conflation 
between self-concept, self-esteem, social desirability, and non-evaluative 
behavioural items in scale content. It is possible that the relationship between the 
total scale score of the TSCS and self-esteem (as measured by the YSEI or RSE) 
is artificially enhanced because of the large number of scale items. The scale 
does appear to contain a large number of redundant items (100 items explaining 
only 19.5% percent of the variance) and all correlations between sub-components 
of the scale are smaller than when all items are summed together. 
In conclusion, the YSEI appears to offer a more parsimonious (30 items 
versus 100 items) and theoretically consistent (i. e., only including self-evaluation 
items) account of global self-esteem than does the TSCS, and may be seen as 
potentially more useful in clinical and health research with its wider breadth in self- 
domains than the RSE. 
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2.12 Discussion 
The factor analyses of the 30-item YSEI produced a unidimensional factor 
measuring global self-esteem. The final scale consists of items that pertain to 
self-evaluation in the following self-relevant domains: personal, social, family, 
achievement, attractiveness and ambiguity in self-evaluations across these 
dimensions. In this way, self-esteem represents the inter-relatedness of valenced, 
relatively stable, self-evaluations (across important core dimensions as above). 
Self-evaluations are assumed to have both a cognitive and affective component, 
where the affective reactions to valenced self-evaluations occur simultaneously. 
Self-esteem, as measured by the YSEI also appears to be fairly normally 
distributed in student populations with skewness to the right in the positive 
direction. Further, there appears to be little influence of age or gender effects on 
the valence of self-esteem. While no gender differences were found in the 
general level of self-esteem maintained, several items comprising the family 
dimension failed to load consistently in male subject responses in the two scale 
construction studies which may point to the relatively less pertinent role of family- 
related self-evaluations -in global self-esteem for males than females. 
Interestingly, in the factorial examination of the TSCS the family self-concept items 
were also observed to be the weakest or failed loadings, despite psychometric 
support for this dimension in the scales re-standardization (Roid and Fitts, 1991, 
e. g., standardization sample of adolescents and adults averaged an internal alpha 
of . 78, and test-retest reliability of . 81). One alternative explanation is that family- 
related concerns are less important for first year students who are working very 
hard to adjust outside of the family, with new peer groups, new academic 
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pressures, and a host of acculturation difficulties, and this may be more true for 
males as there is pressure to demonstrate emotional control and/or maturity and 
focus on achievement. This explanation is partially supported when the 
correlations between the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale and the YSEI 
were examined for males and females separately. If social desirability is 
operationalized as a measure of defensiveness, then it would appear that males 
are more likely to inflate and then defend tentatively held self-esteem than are 
females. However, because the decrement in item loadings for these items were 
not consistently poor for male subjects, and because of their demonstrated 
importance in female global self-esteem, as well as the prospect of their greater 
relative importance in other populations than students, they were retained in the 
scale. 
This chapter has set out to review the shortcomings in existing measures 
of self-esteem; the existing confusion between self-concept and self-esteem, both 
theoretically and empirically; and a review of the literature on the structure of self- 
esteem was offered to provide a foundation for understanding the features 
required for a valid global self-esteem measure. Based on the item selection and 
the proven psychometric foundation of the scale, the YSEI would appear to be an 
ideal scale for use in stress research. 
Collectively, the results support the construction and validation of a new 
unidimensional measure of self-esteem for clinical-health research. Self-esteem 
is seen to be anchored to internal (e. g., goals, expectations) and external (e. g., 
behaviour) experience and the remainder of this text will be concerned with 
addressing the empirical relationship between self-esteem and psychological and 
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physical well-being. That is, while this chapter placed some emphasis on the 
interface between self-concept and self-esteem, the emphasis in the research to 
follow will be on the moderating influence of self-esteem in health and well-being. 
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Chapter 3 
3 Self-Esteem. Emotion-control and Selected Personality 
Measures In a Two-phase-Prospective Examination of Health 
3.1 Introduction 
Self-esteem may potentially buffer the stress-illness relationship directly via its 
influence on the primary appraisal process and secondly, by way of influencing 
coping responses which serve either to prolong or to attenuate behavioural, 
emotional and physiological aspects of stress. As discussed earlier (see chapter 
1, section 1; 12), there are two studies that sought to examine the relationship 
between self-esteem, psychosocial stress, and somatic complaints. Linville (1985) 
had demonstrated that individuals with low self-complexity, that is, few 
independent self-aspects, tended to have more extreme affective and self- 
appraisal reactions to threat. She subsequently hypothesized that individuals with 
greater self-complexity would be less likely to experience the negative 
consequences off stress and subsequent illness and/or depression because when 
certain dimensions were threatened these individuals were able to maintain 
positive feelings in other non-threatened self-dimensions. Linville (1987) in a 
prospective study over a two week period had 106 undergraduates complete a 
card sort exercise to determine self-complexity and then report experienced life 
events in the past two weeks. On two separate occasions within the two week 
period subjects completed questionnaires measuring depressive symptoms, 
physical symptoms, and perceived stress. Finally, subjects reported somatic 
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Illness experienced over the two-week period. The results supported the expected 
buffering role for self-complexity on physical health while controlling for initial 
values on perceived stress and illness. In addition to the methodological 
limitations of the study, including a limited 'buffering zone' of two weeks, this 
study was focused on self-concept structure not self-esteem. While related, the 
relationship between self-concept and self-esteem has demonstrated only a 
modest relationship between specific self-concepts and global self-esteem (Marsh, 
1986; Pelham & Swann, 1989). Pelman and Swann (1989) found that individuals 
with low global self-esteem tended to have fewer positive self-concepts but they 
were not equivalent. Marsh (1986) found that specific self-views only accounted 
for approximately 50% of the variance of global self-esteem. 
In contrast to Linville's (1987) emphasis on the buffering role of self- 
concept, DeLongis and colleagues (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 1988) 
assessed the mediating role of self-esteem on health directly. Seventy-five 
(n=75) married couples completed a battery of questionnaires (hassles and uplift 
scale; daily health record, self-esteem inventory; and an emotional support report) 
and were interviewed once monthly during a six month period for repeated 
assessment of these variables. DeLongis hypothesized that self-esteem would 
moderate the impact of stress on illness through its influence on coping 
processes. They reasoned that people who have positive views of themselves 
should be less likely to feel overwhelmed by stressful situations because they 
have confidence to cope with an array of problems. The results indicated that 
self-esteem moderated the impact of daily hassles on same-day reported 
symptoms as well as next-day reported symptoms. This moderating role of self- 
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esteem was greater than the impact of emotional support or network size on the 
hassles-symptom relationship. In addition to the methodological shortcomings of 
this study, which have also been addressed, (recall the potential ceiling effect 
problem with self-esteem ratings in this study), the study failed to test the 
mechanism by which self-esteem purportedly influences the stress-illness 
relationship, that is, as mediated by particular coping practices. To date, the 
mediating role of coping on the stress buffering effect of self-esteem has not been 
empirically tested, although a recent theoretical model (Bednar et al., 1989) links 
self-esteem with avoidant coping practices. 
In addition to the potential moderating role of self-esteem, recent work by 
Roger and his colleagues (Roger, 1988; Roger & Jamieson, 1988) suggests that 
individual differences in emotional control patterns, particularly the degree to 
which individuals mentally rehearse past failures concerning interpersonal conflict, 
may serve to either prolong or attenuate physiological recovery from stress. In 
the multidimensional scale assessing emotional control styles (Emotion Control 
Questionnaire (ECQ): Roger & Nesshoever, 1987; Roger & Najarian, 1989), items 
that tap "feelings of dissatisfaction in interpersonal encounters and an inability to 
resolve conflict arising from them` strongly predicts prolonged physiological 
arousal during stressful laboratory exercises (Roger & Jamieson, 1988). It could 
be hypothesized that persons who are more likely to mentally rehearse failures 
may be those with low self-esteem. Indeed, it may be the case that individuals 
who perpetually call into consciousness past failures are likely to feel less positive 
about themselves and have low expectation for success when faced with the 
demands of a potentially threatening situation. Additionally, being preoccupied 
with emotional upset may inhibit individuals with low self-esteem from engaging 
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in assertive and adaptive coping behaviours to combat stress. 
Finally, this study sought to test the moderating influence of two other 
personality variables which have been hypothesized to impact on stress appraisal 
and health outcomes, namely, locus of control and 'tolerance of ambiguity'. The 
former was discussed at length earlier (see chapter 1, section 1.4.1). The latter, 
TAMB, represents a personality construct that reflects an inflexible and 
emotionally rigid approach to the world. TAMB has been found to moderate the 
impact of role ambiguity in the work place and the associated work-related stress 
(Frone, 1990) and this study provided an opportunity to test its moderating 
influence outside of the work context. 
This study aimed first to determine the relationship between self-esteem, 
coping practices, emotion control patterns, and other personality moderators, as 
well as to assess the unique, cumulative, and interactive effects of these variables 
on physical and emotional well-being in a group of first year university students. 
These domains were also assessed in relation to locus of control, another well- 
known personality construct hypothesized to moderate the stress-illness 
relationship. It was hypothesized that self-esteem would relate to coping and 
emotion control patterns, as well as locus of control, although self-esteem would 
show superior prediction of health outcome. It was anticipated that this pattern 
would be relatively stable over the 8 week period (thus reflecting a dispositional 
moderating influence). That is, in contrast to the hardiness model (Kobasa, 1979) 
and Linville's self-complexity model (Linville, 1987), no a priori distinction between 
high and low stressful situations was set out in this study (which would allow for 
the testing of the interactional (mediating) effects of the 'buffering' hypothesis). 
Second, it was hypothesized that the impact of self-esteem on the stress-illness 
relationship would be mediated by coping patterns and emotion 
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control patterns, in the later case, especially the tendency to mentally rehearse 
past failures. 
It has been demonstrated that self-esteem differences become most salient 
when individuals are faced with valenced (either positive or negative) life events 
(Brown, 1991), particularly events that are personally meaningful (Strauman et al. 
1993). In order to examine person x situation components of self-esteem and 
health, all students were tested during the potentially stressful period of adaptation 
to university life. Entry to university presents unique challenges for all students; 
as it implies significant life event alterations related to the self: leaving home; 
demanding academic pressure; and possibly new sources of social comparison, 
as well as the pressure to make new friends and develop a social support 
network. It was anticipated that self-esteem would play an important role in 
health status and well-being at both entry to the university and later throughout the 
term. 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Subjects 
Subjects in this study were the same subjects who had participated in the initial 
standardization study on the YSEI in the previous chapter (p. 66). They were 
recruited from a research panel comprised of first year students at the University 
of York who agreed to volunteer for research throughout the academic year. Two- 
hundred and twenty-four (224) were contacted via the internal university mail for 
the questionnaire survey and 183 returned the forms for a response rate of 82%. 
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Of the 183 subjects in this study 72 were male (mean age = 19.6, SD = 7.1) and 
110 female (mean age = 20.0, SD = 4.26) (One subject declined to provide their 
sex). Of the 183 subjects who returned the questionnaire responses a further 22 
subjects' health reports were discarded due to unreliable or incomplete responses 
thus rendering a sample of 161 with all measures completed at time one. The full 
sample was maintained for examination of the inter-relationship between self- 
esteem and personality measures while the reduced sample was utilized when 
examining the correlational patterns with health outcome. Finally, subjects 
received no financial or academic credit for their involvement. 
3.2.2 Procedure 
Subjects were mailed a questionnaire package three weeks after beginning term 
and were asked to complete and return them via internal university mail. At time 
one subjects received the following questionnaires: a) the York Self-esteem 
Inventory (YSEI), b) the Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ: Roger et at., 1993), 
c) the Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ: Roger & Najarian, 1989), d) a 
Tolerance of Ambiguity Measure and e) the Health Checklist Questionnaire (HCQ: 
Meadows, 1989). To assess the stability of the relationship between the 
independent variables and health outcome, a follow-up mail out was performed at 
the beginning of the second term (approximately 8 weeks later) with those 
subjects who had participated at the first mail out. At time two subjects were re- 
tested with the HCQ and were also provided with the Spheres of Control 
Questionnaire (SOCQ: Paulhus, 1983), a three-sphere measure of locus of 
control. The administering of the SOCQ at time two provided a robust test of the 
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moderating influence of self-esteem above and beyond locus of control as locus 
of control was more contiguous with the time two health measure. 
3.2.3 Materials 
York Self-esteem Inventory (YSEI) 
The psychometric properties of the YSEI were reported in detail in the previous 
chapter. The scale comprises 30 items measuring global self-esteem. Items 
reflect various evaluative self-domains including: personal, interpersonal, familial, 
achievement, physical attractiveness and the degree of evaluative uncertainty 
across these domains. Preliminary psychometric examination of the scale has 
revealed strong internal reliability (Alpha. 86) and test- re-test reliability (. 83) over 
an 8-week IT]. In part, this study also served to test the predictive validity of the 
YSEI in relation to health and well-being. 
Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ) 
The Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ: Roger & Nesshoever, 1987; Roger & 
Najarian, 1989) comprises four scales labelled Rehearsal (R), Emotion Inhibition 
(EI), Aggression Control (AC) and Benign Control (BC). R examines the degree 
to which a person broods over past threats and failure. For example an item from 
this factor is 'I get 'worked up' just thinking about things that have upset me in 
the past'. El measures the willingness of subjects to express emotion; When 
someone upsets me, I try to hide my feelings'. AC is a measure of the degree 
to which aggression is controlled; 'If someone were to hit me, I would hit back'. 
Finally, BC has been shown to be a measure of impulsivity; 'I often do or say 
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things I later regret. Previous examination of this scale has shown the factors to 
be relatively independent, particularly R and El, and the individual factors have 
also been shown to possess satisfactory internal and test-retest reliability (Roger 
& Najarian, 1989). 
Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ) 
Scales for assessing coping strategies have generally consisted of three primary 
dimensions: rational, emotional, and avoidance. The measure used to assess 
coping in this study was the newly constructed CSQ (CSQ: Roger, Jarvis, & 
Najarian, 1993) that includes these three factors and a new dimension entitled 
detached coping. The rational dimension consists of 16 items, with the highest 
loading on 'Try to find out more information to help make a decision about things. ' 
The detached dimension consists of 15 items, and the highest loading item on 
this factor is: 'just take nothing personally. ' Emotional coping comprises 16 items 
and the highest loading is 'Feel worthless and unimportant. ' Finally, the avoidant 
coping factor consists of 13 items and a typical item is: 'talk about it as little as 
possible. ' The factors have been shown to possess acceptable internal 
consistency (range from . 69 to . 85) and good test-retest reliability over a three- 
month period (range . 70 to . 80). The rational and detached factors have been 
shown to be moderately inter-related (. 49), as have the rational and the emotion- 
oriented coping factors (-. 41). The avoidant and emotion-oriented coping factors 
are also interdependent (. 33), whilst rational (. 11) and detached (. 05) are 
unrelated with avoidant coping strategies. 
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The Spheres of Control Scale (SOCQ) 
The SOCQ (SOCQ: Paulhus, 1983) comprises 30 items that assess three domain- 
specific components of perceived control: Personal, Interpersonal, and Socio- 
political control. The personal control domain comprises 10 items, including 'I 
usually achieve what I want when I work hard for it. ' The interpersonal control 
sphere also contains 10 items, including 'I have no trouble making and keeping 
friends' or 'I often find it difficult to get my point of view across to others. ' Finally, 
the socio-political sphere comprises 10 items such as 'an average citizen can 
have an influence on government decisions. ' The scale has been shown to 
possess adequate internal and test-retest reliability across many populations and 
scoring formats, and following Paulhus's suggestion, three new items replaced 
three old items to improve the internal reliability of the personal control dimension 
(Paulhus & Van Selst, 1990). In this study, a dichotomous 'yes" no' format was 
employed with negatively-keyed items reversed for computing sub-scale total 
scores. Across a wide array of populations the scale has been shown to have 
acceptable internal and test-retest reliability. 
Tolerance of Ambiguity CLAMB) 
Tolerance of ambiguity has been linked to the personality constructs of 
conservatism and dogmatism and is seen to reflect an inflexible approach to the 
world. TAMB has been found to moderate the impact of role ambiguity in the 
work place and the associated work-related stress (Frone, 1990). This study 
aimed to test the relationship between self-esteem and TAMB as well as its 
moderating influence outside of the occupational context. This study utilized a 
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composite measure of TAMB; following Kirton's (1981) suggestion, the short-forms 
of Rydell and Rosen's (1966) Tolerance of Ambiguity Scale (11 items) and 
Budner's (1962) test of Intolerance of Ambiguity scale (8 items) were used plus 
an additional 10 self-generated pilot items producing a 29-item scale. In Kirton's 
factor analysis of the two published scales the highest loading was on the item 'I 
have always felt that there is a clear solution between right and wrong'. The 
scoring format was on a 5-point likert scale ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 
5 'strongly agree'. Items were scored in the direction of greater intolerance so 
that items that reflected greater tolerance were reversed to generate a total scale 
score that represented intolerance of ambiguity with a theoretical range of 29-154. 
In addition the scale was found to have acceptable psychometric properties (e. g., 
Alpha=. 86). In the present study, the Cronbach Alpha Coefficient was found to 
be satisfactory for the 29-item scale (. 81). 
General Health Checklist (GHC) 
In this study the General Health Checklist (GHC: Meadows, 1989) was used to 
assess general health (see Appendix A5). - The scale consists of items that 
measure common physical complaints frequently made to general practitioners. 
It also includes more serious illnesses that are reported less frequently. In 
previous validation of the scale Meadows (1989) had general practitioners 
independently rank order symptoms in terms of their severity and a weighted 
severity score can be obtained. There is a total of 28 items with an additional 
two items for female subjects only. The scale is scored as follows: 1 'Better', 2 
'Unchanged', 3 'Worse' 4 'Don't have/suffer from'. On each administration, 
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subjects answered questions pertaining to their health within the past three 
weeks. A variety of health scores were derived: total frequency of symptoms (1-3 
endorsed); severity of symptoms (3 endorsed) and a third weighted score was 
derived by summing across all scale items excluding three items measuring 
anxiety, depression and insomnia; these were scored independently as a general 
measure of 'psychological distress' so as not to confound the illness ratings. 
Distress ratings were scored for frequency and severity in the same way as the 
illness index, but no weighted ranks were computed because of the small number 
of items comprising the factor. 
3.3 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 describes the score distributions for the various measures completed at 
time one (Ti). An examination of total scale score for the YSEI and sub-scale 
scores for the ECQ, CSQ, HCQ and SOCQ demonstrated approximate normality. 
That is, no scores exceeded acceptable limits with respect to kurtosis (<. 1) or 
skewness (<. 1) except the CSQ factor, detached coping style, which had a slightly 
elevated kurtosis score (1.20) although acceptable skewness. To examine N 
possible sex differences across the various personality measures a multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted (for all personality measures 
including time two (T2) SOCQ scores). The results reflected multivariate 
significance (Wilks =. 34, F(1,117) = 3.28, p<. 001). Subsequent inspection of the 
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Characteristics for YSEI. ECQ. CSQ. Tolerance of Ambiguity 
(TAME) And Total Frequency of Somatic Illness and Worsening of Illness. 
Variable 
GHC-Total Number of 
Somatic Complaints 
GHC-Total Number 
of Somatic Symptoms 
Worsening 
YSEI 
ECQ-Rehearse 
ECQ-Emotion 
ECQ-Aggression 
ECQ-Benign Cntrl. 
CSQ-Emotion 
CSQ-Rational 
CSQ-Detached 
CSQ-Avoidant 
TAMB 
Mean $D Range 
6.5 3.3 0-16 
2.7 2.5 0-11 
107.1 14.5 64-141 
41.3 9.3 19-65 
41.1 10.5 17-64 
42.5 6.1 30-60 
40.6 6.3 20-60 
18.5 8.3 5-45 
25.2 9.1 8-51 
17.9 8.8 3-48 
15.9 6.0 2-36 
82.7 13.4 45-122 
univariate analyses pointed to differences between male and female subjects on 
CSQ factor scores (emotion, rational, and detached) and the personal control 
dimension of the SOCQ. Females scored higher on emotion-oriented coping 
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whilst males scored higher on rational and detached-oriented coping styles and 
females were also found to score higher on personal control of the SOCQ. In 
order not to reduce statistical power by examining the large number of measures 
independently in the male sample the results from male and female subjects were 
collapsed, although subsequent correlation analyses and hierarchial regression 
analyses will consider, and where applicable statistically control for, possible sex 
differences. 
Time 1 Results 
To examine the relationship between self-esteem, coping, emotion-control 
patterns and tolerance of ambiguity, correlation analyses were computed. The 
relationship between self-esteem and the personality measures can be seen in 
Table 3.2. Examining the correlations between self-esteem and the ECQ factors 
point to significant, negative relationships between self-esteem and rehearsal 
(r(161) =-. 31, p<. 001), emotion inhibition (r(161) =-. 25, p. <01), and aggression 
control (r(161) =-. 23, p<. 01) and a positive relationship between self-esteem and 
benign control (r(161) = . 21, p<. 01). 
Subjects with low self-esteem were more 
likely to rehearse, inhibit the expression of emotion, and demonstrate less 
aggression control. They were also less likely to demonstrate benign control. 
Second, there were significant positive correlations between self-esteem and 
rational (r(161) =. 42, p<. 001) and detached (r(161) =. 44, p<. 001) coping styles 
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Table 3.2 
Correlations Among the Measured Personality Variables 
At Time 1 
123456789 10 
1. YSBI - -. 49tt . 43** . 44** -. 
17 -. 31** -. 25* - ". 
23* . 21* . 03 
2. CSQ-B -. 36tt -. 54** . 31** . 59tß . 03 . 21+ -. 23* . 12 
3. CSQ-R - . 76** -. 15 -. 30** -. 14 -. 15 . 37** -. 20* 
4. CSQ-D - . 20* -. 45** -. 03 -. 21* . 29+f -. 20* 
5. CSQ-A - . 27tß . 29*t . 15 -. 26* . 27** 
6. ECQ-R - . 02 -. 02 -. 33tß . 37** 
7. ECQ-E - . 19 . 11 -. 01 
8. ECQ-A - . 08 . 04 
9. ECQ-B - -. 17 
10. TAMB - 
'p<. 05, **p<. 001 
and a negative correlation with emotion-oriented coping (r(161) = -. 49, p<. 001). 
Avoidant coping was not significantly related to self-esteem although the 
relationship was in the expected direction (r(161) = -. 17ns). Hence, subjects with 
high self-esteem engaged in more adaptive, rational and detached coping, while 
subjects with low self-esteem were more likely to engage in emotion-oriented 
coping. Finally, self-esteem was unrelated to tolerance of ambiguity (r(161) = 
: 03ns). Separate pearson correlation analyses for males (n=65) and females 
(n=96), for the three coping dimensions which males and females significantly 
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differed, reflected identical correlation patterns with self-esteem, although the 
pattern was higher for females in terms of emotion-oriented coping (Males; r(65) 
= -39, p<. 001 vs. Females; r(96) = -. 52, p<. 001) and higher for males in terms of 
rational (Males; r(65) =. 59, p<. 001 vs Females; r(96) =. 27, p<. 01) and detached 
coping (Males; r(65) = . 51, p<. 001 vs. Females r(96) = . 35, p<. 001). 
Also seen 
in Table 3.2 are the inter-relationships within scale factors of the ECQ and the 
CSQ as well as the between scale factor correlations. As observed, correlations 
are in the moderate to strong range thus reflecting their inter-dependence and 
relative non-orthogonality. 
The relationship between self-esteem and the other personality measures 
with illness and psychological distress reports can be seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. 
First, self-esteem was significantly related to the reported frequency of somatic 
complaints at Ti (r(161) = -. 24, p<. 01), reported worsening of symptoms at T1 
(r(161) = -. 31, p<. 001) although not with weighted severity of illness (r(161) =- 
. 14ns). As indicated subjects with high self-esteem were less likely to report 
illness complications or worsening of existing symptoms. A similar pattern 
emerged for reported psychological distress, with low self-esteem subjects 
reporting more distress (r(161) = -. 46, p<. 001) and severity of distress (r(161) = 
-41, p<. 001). As also seen significant relationships were observed for ECQ- 
rehearsal and the frequency and severity of somatic complaints and psychological 
distress, with those subjects scoring higher on rehearsal also tending to report 
poorer health status. Moreover, coping styles (excluding avoidance) were 
significantly related to the frequency and severity of somatic complaints but only 
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Table 3.3 
Correlations Between Measured Personality Variables and 
Frequency. Severity and Weighted Symptom Reports at Time 1 
Reported Health-Symptoms (HCQ) 
Frequency Severi Weighted 
YSEI -. 24* -. 32** -. 14 
CSQ-E 
. 29** . 
45** . 24* 
CSQ-R -. 24* -. 25** -. 19 
CSQ-D -. 22* -. 31 -. 22 
CSQ-A . 18 . 
14 . 21 
ECQ-R . 22* . 32** . 14 
ECQ-E . 09 -. 
03 . 22 
ECQ-A . 11 . 
01 . 08 
ECQ-B -. 18 -. 14 -. 08 
IAMB -. 10 . 06 -. 05 
* p<. 05, **p<. 001 
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Table 3.4 
Correlations Between Measured Personality Variables and 
Frequency and Severity of Reported Distress at Time 1 
Reported Psychological Distress (HCQ) 
Frequency Severity 
YSEI -. 46** -. 41 ** 
CSQ-E 
. 34** . 
37** 
CSQ-R -. 11 -. 13 
CSQ-D -. 15 -. 18 
CSQ-A . 20 . 11 
ECQ-R 
. 29** . 
29** 
ECQ-E . 11 -. 
09 
ECQ-A . 21 * . 09 
ECQ-B -. 12 -. 02 
TAMB -. 01 . 06 
* p<. 05, "p<. 001 
emotion-oriented coping was related to the frequency and severity of 
psychological distress. Tolerance of ambiguity showed no relationship to any of 
the health indices. Finally, the only significant relationship observed with weighted 
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severity was emotion-oriented coping (r(161) = . 24 p<. 01). The apparent 
overlapping pattern of correlations between self-esteem, coping, and emotion- 
control and health outcomes required hierarchial regression analyses to better 
gauge the unique effects of the independent variables on health status. 
Regression analyses would also allow for the testing of the a priori hypothesis that 
the moderating influence of self-esteem on health and psychological distress is 
mediated, in part, by coping and emotion-control processes. 
Hierarchial regression analyses were conducted with frequency of somatic 
complaints and psychological distress as the dependent variables with predictor 
variables being those personality measures showing a significant relationship with 
the dependents in the correlation analyses. First, the regression model for 
predicting somatic complaints was constructed in such a way so as to assess the 
comparative moderating influence of self-esteem after the variance for all other 
measures had been already accounted for so as to provide a conservative and 
robust test for the influence of self-esteem on health. The model format, then, 
was as follows: at step 1 subject sex was entered: at step 2, the significant CSQ 
terms were entered; at step 3, the significant ECQ terms were entered; at step 4, 
self-esteem was entered; and finally, all possible two-way interaction terms were 
entered into the model. In this way, the influence of emotion control was 
assessed after coping, to assess its predictive utility after controlling for the well- 
supported influence of coping in health. The same model was constructed with 
psychological distress as the dependent variable. Although the steps of the model 
remained the same, the sub-factors entered into the model for the CSQ and the 
ECQ scales varied in accordance with non-significant terms from the correlational 
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Table 3.5 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 1 Health and Distress Scores 
Health Distress 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Sex 10.46** . 06 . 25* 
2. CSQ-Main Effects 5.55** . 12 
Emotion-CSQ . 20* 
Rational-CSQ -. 20* 
Detached-CSQ . 10 
3 ECQ-Main Effects 4.72** 
Rehearse-ECQ . 13 . 11 
Aggression-ECQ . 08 
4 YSEI-Self-esteem 4.23** . 14 -. 12 
5 Two-way Interact 
Main Effects 3.19** . 19 
YSEI X Rehearse -1.52* 
YSEI X Detached -2.41 * 
1.4 . 01 . 09 
12.4** . 12 
. 37** 
8.69** . 17 
. 17* 
. 19* 
12.16** . 27 -. 37* 
*p<. 05, **p<. 01 
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analyses. The results for the regression analyses can be seen in Table 3.5 (see 
appendix A9 for full regression table). First, significant main effects were 
observed for sex, coping, emotion-control and self-esteem, with an increase in 
variance explained at each step. Finally, the significant main effect for two-way 
interactions were accounted for by two interactions, namely, self-esteem by 
rehearsal and self-esteem by detached coping. These interaction terms 
superseded the influence of the main effects and explained variance than for 
these variables alone. To better understand the significant interaction effects 
between self-esteem and rehearsal and between self-esteem and detached 
coping, median splits were computed on the YSEI total scale score, ECQ- 
rehearsal, and CSQ-detached coping and then submitted to an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with frequency of somatic complaints as the dependent 
variable. The significant interactions indicated that individuals with low self-esteem 
and high rehearsal scores were most likely to show increased health complaints. 
Second, a similar pattern emerged for the second interaction, with low self-esteem 
subjects who used little detached coping reporting more health difficulties. 
Finally, to unpack the direction of these interactions, subsequent ANCOVA's were 
conducted that partialled for one or the other measure. For instance, while the 
main effect for self-esteem and health remained significant while partialling for 
rehearsal (F(1,161) = 6.34, p<. 01) the main effect for rehearsal and health was 
reduced to non-significance when controlling for self-esteem (F(1,161) = 3.16, p 
= . 08). Similarly, the main effect for self-esteem and health status remained 
significant (F(1,161) = 11.26, p<. 001) while controlling for detached coping but the 
main effect for detached coping and health was reduced to non-significance while 
controlling for self-esteem (F(1,161) = 2.84, p= . 09). 
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Also seen in Table 3.5 are the results for the regression analysis with 
psychological distress as the outcome variable. When compared to the results for 
health status, significant main effects were observed for coping (emotion-oriented), 
emotion-control (rehearsal and aggression-control) and self-esteem, with 
increasing variance explained at each step. There was no main effect for subject 
sex, nor were any interactions observed. After all variables had been entered into 
the model, self-esteem was shown to account for 10% of the variance. 
Time 2 
Approximately 8 weeks later subjects were sent and asked to complete the 
GHC for a second time in addition to the SOCQ. Of the 183 subjects who 
participated at T1,120 subjects completed the SOCQ, while 60 subjects reliably 
completed the GHC. Hence, the final sample who had completed health 
measures at both times was 60. Subsequent correlation analyses between 
personality measures utilized the full 120 subjects whilst correlation and regression 
analyses for health and psychological distress utilized the reduced sample. In light 
of this sizeable attrition rate (63%) across the study period a series of Nests were 
conducted to determine whether the remaining sample at T2 was biased in any 
way from the initial sample in relation to demographic features or personality 
profile. The results indicated that the remaining sample was not significantly 
different from the initial sample on any of the personality measures (CSQ or ECQ 
factors, or YSEI). However, of the 60 subjects who completed the GHC at T2 all 
were female save one male. Despite the sex differences noted on the coping 
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dimensions at T1, the exclusion of males at T2 did not apparently skew the 
sample on measured personality domains as indicated by the absence of 
significant differences between the mean scores from Ti to T2. 
As seen in Table 3.6 are the pearson correlation coefficients for the 
relationships between T1 health and personality measures (and T2 SOCQ scores) 
with T2 health and psychological distress reports. There was large stability in the 
frequency (r(60) = . 69, p<. 001) and reported severity 
(r(60) = . 61, p<. 001) of 
somatic symptoms from T1 to T2 as well as for reported frequency (r(60) = . 55, 
p<. 001) and severity (r(60) =. 38, p<.. 01) of psychological distress. Self-esteem, 
as measured at T1 was related to the frequency of symptoms (r(60) = -. 41, p<. 01) 
and reported severity (r(60) = -. 36, p<. 01). Note that the correlations between 
self-esteem and T2 health status tend to be higher than the correlations observed 
between self-esteem and Ti health status. ECQ-rehearsal and CSQ-emotion- 
oriented coping were also related to reported frequency and severity of symptoms 
at T2. With respect to the reported frequency and severity of psychological 
distress at T2, self-esteem was found to relate highly to both frequency (r(60) = 
-. 52, p<. 001) and severity (r(60) = -. 41, p<. 001). As seen in Table 3.6 the only 
other dimension related to both the frequency and severity of psychological 
distress was emotion-oriented coping, although other CSQ factors were related 
depending on whether it was frequency or severity of psychological distress 
assessed. 
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Table 3.6 
Correlations Between Measured Personality Variables and 
Frequency and Severity of reported symptoms at Time 2 
Reported Symptoms (HCQ) 
Frequency Severity 
HCQ-FREQ (Ti) . 69** . 
61** 
YSEI -. 41 * -. 36* 
CSQ-E . 41* . 
44** 
CSQ-R -. 07 -. 01 
CSQ-D -. 10 -. 14 
CSQ-A . 10 . 07 
ECQ-R . 34* . 
34* 
ECQ-E . 16 . 09 
ECQ-A . 07 . 
08 
ECQ-B -. 19 -. 06 
TAMB -. 14 -. 04 
LOC-PER . 04 . 
11 
LOC-INT -. 04 -. 06 
LOC-POL -. 21 -. 09 
* p<. 01, **p<. 001 
While the correlations between self-esteem and T2 health suggest a 
moderating influence for self-esteem on Health over time it would be necessary 
to control for the law of initial values. In this way, the relationship between self- 
esteem and health and psychological distress at T2 would be assessed while 
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controlling for T1 health and psychological distress ratings. Towards this end, 
hierarchial regression analyses were conducted. As in T1 regression analyses, 
the correlational patterns were similar for both frequency and severity of the 2 
well-being indices so analyses were conducted on the reported frequency of 
symptoms to reduce redundancy in results. Consistent with the first series of 
regression analyses a conservative test of the predictive validity self-esteem was 
initiated by entering it into the regression equation after coping and emotion- 
control factors had been entered. In these analyses subject sex was not entered 
into the model and health status at T1 was entered first in its place. The results 
for reported somatic complaints and psychological distress can be seen in Table 
3.8 (see Appendix A10 for full regression table). First, after accounting for the 
frequency of reported somatic complaints at T1 (which accounted for 50% of the 
explained variance) emotion-oriented coping and rehearsal produced significant 
main effects as did self-esteem after these variables had been entered. Finally, 
two-way interaction effects contributed slightly to the explained variance with there 
being a self-esteem by rehearsal interaction. This finding replicates the 
interaction pattern observed between self-esteem and rehearsal at time one with 
low self-esteem and high rehearsing leading to poorer outcome. The final 
equation demonstrated that after controlling for the law of initial values the sole 
remaining predictor of health status at T2 was self-esteem (t(60) = -2.48, p<. 02). 
115 
Table 3.7 
Correlations Between Measured Personality Variables and 
Frequency and Severity of Reported Distress at Time 2 
Reported Psychological Distress (HCQ) 
Frequency Severi 
HCQ-FREQ (Ti) . 55** . 
38** 
YSEI -. 52*` -. 41''# 
CSQ-E . 35" . 
32* 
CSQ-R -. 26* -. 16 
CSQ-D -. 30* -. 28'' 
CSQ-A . 19 . 
13 
ECQ-R . 12 . 
15 
ECQ-E . 11 . 03 
ECQ-A . 14 . 
16 
ECQ-B -. 10 . 03 
TAMB -. 02 . 08 
LOC-PER . 00 -. 
02 
LOC-INT -. 19 -. 09 
LOC-POL -. 16 -. 18 
* p<. 05 **p<. 001 
As anticipated, subjects with low self-esteem who engage in emotion-oriented 
coping reported the most somatic complaints over the study period. A similar 
pattern emerged in the multiple regression analysis with psychological distress as 
the dependent measure. After controlling for the frequency of psychological 
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Table 3.8 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predictin 
Time 2 Health and Distress Scores 
Health Distress 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Time 1 Health 74.70** . 50 . 71 
Time 1 Distress 
2 CSQ-Main Effects 42.39** . 54 
Emotion-CSQ . 19 
Rational-CSQ 
Detached-CSQ 
3 ECQ-Main Effects 28.66** . 54 
Rehearse-ECQ . 17 
Aggression-ECQ . 19 
50.30** . 28 . 53`* 
15.72** . 33 
. 11 
-. 06 
. 11 
4 YSEI-Self-esteem 24.56** . 58 -. 23* 15.14** . 38 -. 29* 
5 Two-way Interact 
Main Effects 17.08** . 60 
YSEI X Rehearse -. 57* 
pc. u 1. -- -p<. uu I 
distress at Ti (which accounted for 28% of the explained variance) main effects 
were found for coping factors and self-esteem but the only variable retained in the 
final equation was self-esteem (t(60) = -2.99, p<. 005). 
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3.4 Discussion 
This study sought to examine a) the relationship of self-esteem to coping and 
emotion-control processes, b) the moderating influence of self-esteem on health 
in a prospective design, and c) the possible mediating role of coping and emotion- 
control processes in the moderating influence of self-esteem on the stress-illness 
relationship. In contrast to past studies (e. g, Linville, 1987; DeLongis et al., 1988) 
which operationalized stress in terms of previously reported life events, this study 
examined the role of self-esteem in subjects facing a personally relevant acute 
stressor: the arrival and early adaptation to university life. 
First, the correlation patterns between self-esteem and the various coping 
styles were statistically significant and conceptually meaningful. Individuals with 
trait low self-esteem are typically more likely to engage in coping practices that do 
not help them adapt to challenging situations. They are less likely to utilize 
effortful, controlling responses to either change stressful situations or alternatively 
to achieve a state of mind of rational, calm detachment. Rather, individuals with 
low self-esteem appear to be chronically emotionally engaged and return to this 
form of coping persistently. Similarly, self-esteem was related to the tendency to 
ruminate or rehearse mentally upsetting events and to inhibit emotion as well 
some evidence that self-esteem relates to anger control and impulsivity (benign 
control). Hence a rough profile emerges of the individual with low self-esteem, 
engaging in less adaptive coping practices over time and spending more time 
ruminating over past upset; particularly upset related to self experience. This 
pattern appears true for a considerable group of individuals thus reflecting an 
interactive personality dynamic opposed to a severe process in those with serious 
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mental health difficulties. In addition, this study did not appear restrained by 
ceiling effects on self-esteem or other any of the other personality dimensions as 
was evidenced in a previous attempt to document the role of self-esteem in health 
(DeLongis et al., 1988). As would be anticipated in a university student 
population, self-esteem scores were slightly skewed in the positive direction but 
not overly so, with the distribution reflecting approximate normality. Moreover, the 
range and variation in somatic symptoms was adequate for assessment of the role 
of individual differences: 
It is also noteworthy that locus of control or tolerance of ambiguity appeared 
unrelated to self-esteem or only nominally to other personality dimensions. 
Theoretical accounts have held self-esteem and perceived control to be intimately 
connected (e. g., Taylor & Brown, 1988) although other studies have also failed to 
find strong relationships between locus of control and personality process 
variables implicated in the stress-illness relationship (Epstein & Katz, 1990). 
Moreover, the absence of significant findings for tolerance of ambiguity suggest 
that its applicability in broader health models outside of the work place may be 
more limited. 
Second, self-esteem was found to moderate the stress-illness relationship. 
Individuals with low self-esteem were more likely to report greater frequency of 
somatic symptoms; greater severity of somatic symptoms; and increased 
psychological distress than subjects with high self-esteem. Emotion-oriented 
coping and rehearsal were also consistently related to health status but to a less 
extent than self-esteem. Moreover, the effects of self-esteem, coping and 
emotion-control were greatest when they were assessed interactively on health. 
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That is, the best predictors of health status at time one were the interactive effects 
of self-esteem and coping (detached); and self-esteem and rehearsal in addition 
to their independent effects. In this way, it is individuals with high-esteem who 
also engage in detached (adaptive) coping and ruminate less often who appear 
buffered against health complications and experience distress beyond those 
simply with high self-esteem., The prospective design allowed for the control of 
individual differences in symptom reporting at time one and a test of the stability 
of this pattern over time. While the apparent mediating role of coping and 
emotion-control in the self-esteem-stress-illness relationship was reduced 
somewhat over time, the moderating influence of self-esteem was relatively stable 
and even seemingly greater at time two. This is in stark contrast to the absence 
of any predictive utility of locus of control which has been implicated in moderating 
the stress-illness relationship. In summary, the results from the analyses appear 
to support a direct ufferin role of self-esteem on health and psychological 
distress and indirect in uence by way of influencing the particular coping and 
emotion-control strategies associated with either the prolongation or attenuation 
of stress. Conceptually, the study highlights the importance of self-process in 
health. In comparison to Linville's (1987) emphasis on the stress-buffering role of 
chronically activated self-aspects as self-structure, this study points more directly 
to the important moderating influence of valanced self-evaluation. The inter- 
relationship between self-esteem, coping and rehearsal further suggest possible 
pathways by which self-esteem is maintained, with individuals low on self-esteem 
being less likely to cope effectively with situational challenges, and then 
subsequently, ruminating on the upset residue from failed coping which, in turn, 
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lowers self-esteem and so on in cyclical fashion. 
There are several limitations to this study, however. First, the attrition rate 
in this study was high, with only one third of the sample completing all relevant 
measures. While the analyses did not point to biases in those subjects who 
remained in the study until its completion, the sample, however, was comprised 
entirely of female subjects save one male. Hence, the more conservative test of 
the moderating influence of self-esteem after accounting for individual differences 
in health reporting at time one was achieved only for females. It may be that the 
interactive effects for self-esteem, coping and emotion-control are especially 
pertinent for females. The correlations between self-esteem and coping factors 
may, in fact, support this position. While the pattern of correlations between self- 
esteem and emotion-oriented and more adaptive coping styles, the magnitude of 
the correlations appeared to differ somewhat. This may also help explain, in part, 
why the correlations between self-esteem, emotion-oriented coping, and rehearsal 
increased in the time two analyses with female subjects. The results, therefore, 
are most generalizable for female subjects and replication with male subjects is 
required. 
Second, the study demonstrates a moderating influence of self-esteem on 
health and distress but it does not necessarily provide evidence for a stress- 
buffering role of self-esteem. The relationship between self-esteem and health 
outcome remained relatively stable over the 8 week period. This may be the case 
as both assessments were conducted during high stress periods (beginning and 
end of first term at university) and/or self-esteem influences somatic experience 
during high (beginning of term) and low (end of term) periods of stress. The 
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stress-buffering hypothesis, alternatively, would suggest that self-esteem should 
influence health status only during periods of comparatively high stress. It may 
be that individuals with low self-esteem (and comparatively less adaptive coping 
and emotion-control styles) persistently experience more health difficulties and this 
general tendency becomes exacerbated during periods of high stress. Linville 
(1987) demonstrated a stress-buffering role for self-complexity where self- 
complexity only moderated the stress-illness relationship during periods of high 
stress although a recent report also suggests that self-esteem may lead to 
dysphoria even during periods of low stress (Whisman & Kwon, 1993). 
To conclude, while it is difficult to determine the absolute directionality of 
the relationships observed in this study, the following tentative conclusions can be 
drawn: a) self-esteem moderates the cognitive-perceptual component that initially 
identifies a challenging event, experience etc., as potentially stressful, b) self- 
esteem may moderate the potential coping behaviours employed which have 
subsequently been found to mediate between exposure to potentially stressful 
events and the subjective experience of stress. Finally, self-esteem may, similarly 
moderate the way in which past emotional upsets are constructed and resolved- 
and more basically, the way an individual responds to experiencing and 
expressing emotion and these processes, independently as well as collectively, 
influence health status across time. 
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Chapter 4 
4 Self-Esteem. Emotion-control and Situational Coping 
In A Four-phase Prospective Examination Of Health 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter self-esteem was shown to moderate the stress-illness 
relationship across the first term in a group of first-year university students. Self- 
esteem predicted health and distress scores directly from time one to time two and 
indirectly by influencing coping strategies employed during stress. That is, subjects 
with high self-esteem who reported a dispositional tendency to deal with stress with 
a detached coping pattern were found to report less health complications and lower 
psychological distress at time two, eight weeks later. These interactive effects of 
self-esteem and coping exceeded the predictability of either self-esteem or coping 
styles, independently. In this study coping was assessed as a dispositional 
tendency; as a trait reflecting individual differences in the propensity to deal with 
stress in a particular way. In addition to the demonstrated relationship between self- 
esteem and dispositional coping, it would also be valuable to assess the importance 
of the role of self-esteem with more contextually-based coping efforts. Lazarus 
(1993) has argued that coping is process-oriented where coping changes over time 
and in accordance with the situational contexts in which it occurs. In this way, the 
transactional model of stress points to the cyclical nature of stress appraisal, 
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coping patterns, and subsequent re-appraisals and subsequent coping patterns 
and so on. A number of studies have shown that situationally dependent coping 
influences immediate momentary and day-to-day fluctuations in emotions that 
result from immediate and delayed stressors (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985). 
A more recent study has further demonstrated how coping practices change 
throughout different stages of a stressful transaction (Carver & Scheier, 1994). 
In this study student subjects (n=125) were monitored across a personally relevant 
stressor, an exam. After completing measures tapping dispositional coping styles 
students reported situational coping styles and related affect across four weekly 
stages of the exam process: two days before the exam; five days after the exam; 
two days before the exams were posted and five days after their posti g. 
Consistent with a process model of coping the authors were attempting to 
determine whether coping reactions relevant at one phase are used at a 
subsequent phase, as well as the possible differential effects of coping practices 
at different phases of the transaction. To summarize: the results coping efforts did 
change throughout the exam period; particularly noticeable was the change with 
active coping and planning as the modal response prior to the exam and then 
falling off following the exam. Coping was also related to emotions at different 
stages of the transaction. In contrast to previous studies, they found that at time 
. one perceived threat and challenge were related. 
Threat and challenge were 
related to problem-focused coping at time one although at subsequent points 
whereas threat was related to the concurrent use of social support, challenge was 
more clearly related to continued problem-focused coping and positive re-framing. 
Further, this study also found consistent moderate relationships between 
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dispositional and situational coping (32 out of 39 correlations significant) but 
dispositional coping did not tend to relate to the emotion outcome measures. 
Finally this study also assessed a self-related process, self-confidence in relation 
to coping and emotion patterns across the different phases. Confidence was 
related to trends towards more beneficial emotions after exam and prior to the 
posting of exams, although it was not a significant predictor in the regression 
analysis. 
These findings need further discussion. While confidence was examined 
as a potential moderating variable, it was also potentially contaminated with the 
sample selection process. Only subjects who indicated before the study that they 
expected to do well on the exam and who indicated that the exam was important 
to them were selected for the study. Thus only subjects with high self-confidence 
participated in the study. It is also conceivable in light of the close association 
between self-esteem, confidence (as well as potentially optimism in this case) that 
the effects observed in this study were particularly true for those with high self- 
esteem. Consistent with this argument, and the theoretical expectations of the 
relationship between self-esteem and stress appraisal, this study found that 
positive re-appraisal was one of only a few coping patterns that remained 
consistent over time. It might be high self-esteem subjects maintain high self- 
esteem via their comparative advantage in utilizing problem-focused coping during 
periods of challenge as well as threat as well as their persistent ability to re-frame 
even threatening events in positive terms. In short, a prospective study 
examining the relationship between dispositional coping, situational coping and 
self-esteem would answer some of the questions left remaining from Carver and 
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Scheier's (1994) recent study. 
Collectively, the evidence from research on coping as a trait and coping as 
a process indicates that while coping appears to change from moment-to-moment 
these changes also occur within the backdrop of habitual patterns of dealing with 
stress. A parallel argument has long been maintained for the function of self- 
esteem as self-evaluations are sensitive to situational feedback, success and 
failures, it also tends to return to a fairly enduring baseline. In addition to the 
demonstrated relationship between self-esteem and dispositional coping in health 
and distress, it would be a more powerful test of the coping model postulated by 
Lazarus and Folkman (1984), and the interactional model of stress, as it stresses 
the cyclical role of situationally-based coping efforts and particular stressful life 
events over time. Because people experience repeatedly positive and negative 
life events it may be important to examine the relationship between moderating 
self-processes and situationally-based coping styles and their effects, in a middle 
ground between a-contextual dispositional coping response tendencies and 
assessment of single stressful events. For example, conducting multiple 
assessments of coping patterns utilized within the past several weeks for a range 
of negative and positive life events. 
The current study was aimed, in part, to determine the relationship between 
self-esteem and situational-based coping patterns in a group of student subjects 
making the transition from high school to university life. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the transition to university life may be a most suitable context 
to assess the role of self-esteem in the stress-coping-illness relationship because 
of the personal meaningfulness of the stressor as well as the personally relevant 
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nature of the outcomes (e. g., academic success, career options, probable life-style 
implications). Cantor and colleagues (Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & 
Brower, 1987) have previously assessed coping patterns prospectively in a group 
of first year university students with an emphasis on the person-by-situation 
interactions in adaptation. For instance they found that students showed 
considerable flexibility in response to different domains in their life. That is, while 
the academic and social pressures demanded particular coping efforts, they also 
had to contend with extraneous life events occurring outside of the academic 
realm. Hence, it would be important to examine the interaction between academic 
and social adjustment in light of experienced life events across different stages of 
adjustment to university life. Cantor and colleagues (1987) found that appraisals 
and achievement tasks were independent of appraisals in interpersonal tasks. 
They concluded that the solutions that work best for individual students will 
depend in large part on the ways in which they make those tasks their own by 
bringing to bear their unique constellations of social intelligence. 
The current study set out to extend the examination of self-esteem, coping, 
and emotion-control processes and health initiated in the previous chapter. In 
addition to the assessment of reported symptoms and psychological distress 
experienced over four 8-week intervals, the study provided a test of the 
moderating influence of self-esteem on outcome germane to the contextual goals, 
namely social and academic adjustment. Further, this study provided the 
opportunity to assess the unique and potential interacting effects of self-esteem 
and valanced life events on health and adjustment. 
The particular hypotheses were: 
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1. individuals with high self-esteem will experience better health and 
social and academic adjustment than individuals with low self-esteem and this will 
be borne out at each phase of the study, 
2. individuals with high self-esteem who also cope with rational and 
detached styles, and who tend to ruminate less, are particularly likely to 
experience better health and adjustment, 
3. the effects of a) and b) will supersede the importance of life events as 
will be evidenced in the amount of explained variance in the separate 
regression analyses at each phase of the study, 
4. individuals with low self-esteem and greater frequency of negative life 
events will demonstrate the worst health status and adjustment at any given 
phase of the study. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Subjects 
The subjects in this study were the same participants from the second, replication 
study on the YSEI in chapter two (p. 75). Subjects were comprised of first year 
students at the University of York who agreed to volunteer for research throughout 
the academic year. Three-hundred and seventy-one (371) were contacted through 
the internal university mail system for the questionnaire survey and 311 returned 
the forms for a response rate of 84%. Of the 311 subjects in this study 136 
(43.7%) were male and 170 (54.7%) female (mean age = 19.5, SD = 3.76) (5 
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subjects did not indicate their sex on the returned forms). Subjects received no 
financial or academic credit for their involvement. 
4.2.2 Procedure 
This study involved four assessments corresponding to roughly 8 week intervals 
throughout the academic year. Subjects were mailed a questionnaire package 
three weeks after beginning term and were asked to complete and return them via 
internal university mail. At time one (T1) subjects received the following 
questionnaires the YSEI, CSQ-Trait, ECQ and the HCQ. At time two (T2), 
approximately 8 weeks later subjects completed a second packet of 
questionnaires that included: CSQ-State, and GHQ-Revised, Social and Academic 
Adjustment ratings and reported positive and negative life events experienced in 
the preceding three months. At time three (T3) approximately 8 weeks later, 
subjects again received the CSQ-state and questionnaires for social and academic 
adjustment ratings and experienced life events in the preceding three months. 
Finally, 8 weeks later at time four (T4), subjects received the following: CSQ- 
state, HCQ, GHQ and the questionnaire tapping social and academic adjustment 
and experienced life events in the preceding three months. 
4.2.3 Materials 
York Self-esteem Inventory (YSEI) 
The psychometric properties of the YSEI have been detailed previously (see 
chapter two). The scale compromises 30 items measuring global self-esteem. 
Preliminary psychometric examination of the scale has revealed strong internal 
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reliability (Alpha . 86) and test- re-test reliability 
(. 83) over an 8-week ITI. This 
study was also aimed, in part, to extend the examination of the predictive validity 
of the YSEI in health research and other sources of adaptation whilst under stress. 
Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ) 
The Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ: Roger & Nesshoever, 1987; Roger & 
Najarian, 1989) utilized in this study was in no way changed from its form in the 
previous study. The scale comprises four scales labelled Rehearsal (R), Emotion 
Inhibition (EI), Aggression Control (AC) and Benign Control (BC). As shown in the 
previous study the two most important factors for health research appear to be R 
and El. R examines the degree to which a person broods over past threats and 
failure. For example an item from this factor is "I get "worked up" just thinking 
about things that have upset me in the past". El measures the willingness of 
subjects to express emotion; "When someone upsets me, I try to hide my 
feelings". The characteristics of the other two factors and the overall scales 
psychometric properties have been previously outlined. 
Coping Styles Questionnaire (CSQ) 
CSQ-Trait 
As detailed in chapter three the CSQ includes four factors measuring dispositional 
coping tendencies: rational ("Try to find out more information to help make a 
decision about things. "), detached ("just take nothing personally. "), emotional 
("Feel worthless and unimportant. ") and avoidant "talk about it as little as 
possible. '). The factors have been shown to possess acceptable internal 
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consistency (range from . 69 to . 85) and good test-retest reliability over a three- 
month period (range . 70 to . 80). As devised the CSQ aims to assess a wide 
range of potential responses to stressors and the aim is to identify the relative 
combination of coping tendencies across the four factors opposed to identifying 
the modal coping style. 
CSQ-State 
Subject's coping reactions across three points in the academic year were 
measured by the CSQ in its situational form. In contrast to the assessment of 
relatively enduring dispositional coping styles assessed by the CSQ trait format, 
this version asks subjects how they have been engaging in particular coping 
responses during the previous week. Because the scoring key includes the 
temporal location (e. g., sometimes, never) the items did not need to be re-written 
although the instructions for completion changed somewhat. Subjects read 
'during the past week how would you describe the way you have tended to react 
to upsets?... remember, the questions are about how you have reacted during the 
past week, even if that has been different from the way you feel you might 
typically react. " Further, the scoring was exactly as it is with the trait version. 
General Health Checklist (GHC) 
The GHC (GHC: Meadows, 1989), as described in chapter three was used to 
assess general health. The scale consists of items that measure common 
physical complaints frequently made to general practitioners. It also includes more 
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serious illnesses that are reported less frequently. Severity and a weighted 
severity score can be obtained in addition to the reported frequency of various 
symptoms. There is a total of 28 items with an additional two items for female 
subjects only. The scale is scored as follows: 1 'Better', 2'Unchanged', 3'Worse' 
4'Don't have/suffer from'. On each administration, subjects answered questions 
pertaining to their health within the past three weeks. As computed in chapter 
three, several health scores were derived: total frequency of symptoms (1-3 
endorsed); severity of symptoms (3 endorsed) a third weighted severity index. 
Three items measuring anxiety, depression and insomnia which were used as the 
measure of well-being in chapter three were removed so as to not confound 
distress with illness but they were not summed to form a distress factor. In this 
study a more reliable and valid measure of psychological distress was used 
instead. 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) 
In its original form the GHQ is a 60-item self-administered screening test for 
detecting non-psychotic psychiatric disorders in community populations. A 
subsequent short version, the GHQ-30, has been widely used as a screening 
device for psychiatric disorders as well a general measure of distress. This study 
utilized a version abbreviated version to 20 items, the GHQ-20 (Siegart, 
McCormick, Taylor & Walkey, 1987). The GHQ-20 has four sub-scales containing 
five items each: general illness, sleep disturbance, anxiety and dysphoria, and 
severe depression with suicide ideation. All four factors have been shown to 
possess good internal reliability (. 81 to. 90). In this study the general illness factor 
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was examined separately from the other factors to provide a 'pure' illness index 
free of the contaminating effects of distress. To assess psychological distress, the 
five items from the anxiety and dysphoria dimension were utilized. The sleep 
disturbance factor was not used because it was felt that this factor was more 
ambiguous; where it would be difficult to separate physical and distress causes 
and consequences. Finally, the severe depression items were removed from the 
scale prior to mail out because of the ethical issues involved in tapping students 
level of suicidality. Hence, two factors from the GHQ-20 were utilized in this 
study: general illness (Factor 1) and anxiety and dysphoria (Factor 3), each 
comprising five items. A typical item from the former dimension is 'been feeling 
perfectly well and in good health' (reversed item) with the scoring key ranging from 
1 'better than usual', 2 'same as usual', 3 'worse than usual' and 4 'don't suffer 
from'. A total factor score for general illness was derived by summing the five 
items with the total score reflecting poor health. A typical item from the anxiety- 
dysphoria dimension is 'found everything getting on top of you' with the same 
four-point scoring system. The total distress factor score was in the direction of 
increasing distress. 
Social and Academic Adjustment 
To gauge subject's perceived adjustment to university life, both socially and 
academically, a questionnaire was created for this study which included two 
questions; 'compared with my fellow-students, I feel I have so far adapted to 
social life at university' and 'compared with my fellow-students, I feel I have so far 
adapted to academic work at university'. Each question was rated on a four-point 
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likert scale ranging from 1 'very badly' to 4 'very well'. Subjects received these 
questions at T2, T3, T4, so that a state marker for adjustment could be obtained 
at each point in time as well as an average index for adjustment across the 
academic year. 
Life Events 
In light of the problems associated with existing structured life event scales (see 
chapter one for review) and the fairly consistent finding that the frequency of 
experienced life events best predicts health outcomes above and beyond the 
importance of specific life events or their rated severity, in this study a simple 
index of frequency of life events was obtained at times T2, T3 and T4. The 
instructions for rating life events were as follows: 'we constantly experience events 
which may have either a positive or a negative impact on us. For example, we 
may start a new relationship, which we will probably rate as a positive event. On 
the other hand, a relationship may end, and in this case we may rate it as positive 
if we wanted it to end but negative if we didn't. Another example might be failing 
an examination, or more seriously, a death in the family, both of which will 
normally be regarded as negative or stressful events-' Subjects were then asked 
to rate separately the number of positive and negative events experienced over 
the past three months ranging from 1 to 10 or more. In this way, multiple ratings 
of life events provided the opportunity to gauge the state effects of experienced 
life events on the adjustment and health indices as well the cumulative effects 
across the academic year. 
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4.3 Results 
This study attempted to determine the relationship between self-esteem, 
dispositional and situational coping, and emotion-control styles across four stages 
of the first year of university for a large group of student subjects (n=311). 
The means, standard deviations and ranges for each of the independent 
variables at each point of assessment can be seen in Table 4.1. Note that the 
sample size for each variable is reported based on the number of subjects who 
completed all measures at each phase of the study. A series of multiple t-tests 
were conducted to examine whether subjects who left the study from T1 to T2 and 
so on until the completion of the study differed across any of the measured 
variables. Subjects who failed to complete all measures at T2, T3, or T4 did not 
differ from subjects who remained in the study from one stage to the next nor did 
subjects who concluded the study differ on any earlier T1 to T3 measures. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the exponential attrition rate for male subjects in the 
previous chapter, the percentage of females and males at the various phases of 
the study remained relatively constant and near-equivalent (cf., percentage of 
female subjects across study period; T1: 53.5%, T2; 50.4%, T3 52.3%, T4; 
58.2%). Consistent with the results from the previous study the distribution 
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Table 4.1 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviation Terms for All Variables Measured 
At Each Phase of The Study For Male and Female Subjects and the Total 
Sample 
Variable Females Males Total 
M SID M 
----- - - - 
Q M. SID 
---------------------------- 
Time 1 
-------------------------- 
(n=136) 
- - ------ - - 
(n=1 
------------ 
14) 
--------------------------- 
(n=250) 
YS EI 105.64 
- ------ -- 
15.46 
------------------ 
106.72 
------------ 
13.86 
---------- ---- 
106.12 
------------ 
14.74 
CSQ-Rational 18.30 5.04 19.37 5.13 18.81 5.06 
CSQ-Detached 11.24 4.89 *** 14.44 5.23 12.77 5.29 
CSQ-Emotional 15.36 5.72 *** 12.51 5.20 14.04 5.62 
CSQ-Avoidant 14.08 4.48 15.05 4.42 14.52 4.23 
ECQ-Rehearse 37.00 6.90 37.68 6.57 37.38 6.73 
ECQ-Emotion 38.18 6.38 *** 34.25 5.77 36.43 6.38 
ECQ-Aggression 34.52 4.10 ** 35.64 4.38 35.06 4.25 
ECQ-Benign 33.15 3.97 33.49 4.72 33.31 4.30 
Time 2 
- ----- - --- - ---- 
(n=70) 
-- ---------------- - -- - --- 
(n=67) 
--------------------------- 
(n=139) 
CSQ-Rational 15.67 5.23 17.37 5.86 16.55 5.57 
CSQ-Detached 1027 4.89 *** 14.45 5.83 12.33 6.04 
CSQ-Emotional 13.30 6.05 ** 10.42 5.62 11.82 6.00 
CSQ-Avoidant 13.74 4.76 13.55 5.26 13.58 5.00 
Events-Negative 4.44 2.19 ** 3.45 2.11 3.95 2.19 
Events-Positive 6.07 3.01 5.49 3.07 5.84 3.05 
Adjust-Social 3.17 . 59 3.15 . 58 3.17 . 59 
Adjust-Academic 2.79 . 61 2.76 . 80 2.78 . 71 
GHQ-Illness 12.30 2.57 11.19 2.67 11.71 2.70 
GHQ-Distress 11.77 3.03 10.25 2.33 11.00 2.85 
Table 4.1 Continued... 
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Table 4.1 Continued 
Variable Females Males Total 
91 M SD M SD M SD 
Time 3 
- 
(n=57) 
--- -- - --- - -------- 
(n=51) 
- ----------- - --- - ------ - ---- 
(n=108) 
------------------ --- --- 
CSQ-Rational 17.32 5.80 18.12 6.76 17.60 6.26 
CSQ-Detached 11 91 5.68 14.39 6.13 13.03 6.00 
CSQ-Emotional 11.97 5.68 11.61 5.90 11.87 5.79 
CSQ-Avoidant 13.56 4.67 14.16 4.42 13.85 4.52 
Events-Negative 4.83 2.56 4.16 2.33 4.51 2.46 
Events-Positive 6.30 2.72 4.96 2.42 5.68 2.65 
Adjust-Social 3.28 . 62 3.06 . 58 3.17 . 62 
Adjust-Academic 2.97 . 63 2.94 . 79 2.95 . 70 
--- -- 
Time 4 
-- -- --- -- -- -- - ----- 
- --- - -- --- ----- - --- - 
(n=53) 
---------- - ------------- 
--- - ----------- - ------- - ---- 
' (n=38) 
--- -------- - -- 
----------- - ------------- 
(n=91) 
- 
YSEI 
-- -- - -------- - ---- - -- - -- -------- 
CSQ-Rational 17.32 6.52 17.74 6.58 17.46 6.48 
CSQ-Detached 12.26 5.40 * 14.82 5.80 13.37 5.67 
CSQ-Emotional 12.00 5.37 12.11 6.25 12.02 5.69 
CSQ-Avoidant 12.55 4.62 * 15.11 5.00 13.61 4.89 
Events-Negative 4.53 2.57 4.18 2.12 4.38 2.37 
Events-Positive 6.00 2.92 5.05 2.46 5.62 2.75 
Adjust-Social 3.17 . 70 3.11 . 61 3.14 . 66 
Adjust-Academic 3.04 . 71 2.92 . 82 2.99 . 75 
GHQ-Illness 11.85 3.43 11.74 2.60 11.78 3.08 
GHQ-Distress 10.94 2.48 11.05 2.32 11.00 2.39 
HCQ-Illness 4.60 3.55 *** 2.24 2.01 3.59 3.20 
*p<. 05, **p<. 01, ***p<. 001 
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qualities for the YSEI reflected a fairly normal distribution. All but two items of the 
scale (items 7 and 15 had slightly elevated kurtosis (<1.20) and acceptable 
skewness) had acceptable levels of kurtosis (<1) and skewness (<1) and the total 
scale score demonstrated approximated normality. The sub-factor scores of the 
CSQ-Trait, CSQ-State, ECQ and the adjustment and life event scores also had 
acceptable distribution qualities excluding CSQ-State Avoidance at T4 which had 
elevated kurtosis (1.98). This factor was normally distributed in all other 
assessments and T4 data were used in conjunction with all Ti T2 and T3 data so 
a transformation was not conducted on the CSQ-State avoidance T4 data. 
The analyses in this study focused on the moderating influence of self- 
esteem and the possible mediating role of state coping above and beyond the 
impact of life events on subject health, distress, and social and academic 
adjustment over four phases of the academic year. Analyses were conducted 
individually at each phase of the study to maximize statistical power in the 
regression equations. In addition to individual phase-specific examination of the 
moderating role of self-esteem, the results will also be presented that assess 
trends for the within-subject variables on the 92 subjects who completed all study 
measures from T1 to T4. 
4.3.1 Time 1 results 
Possible sex differences in measured variables were assessed 
independently at each phase of the study with Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
(MANOVA). For subjects who completed all T1 measures (N=251) the results 
indicated overall multivariate significance (Pillais =. 22, F(1,249)= 6.60, p<. 001). 
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The subsequent univariate analyses demonstrated sex differences on CSQ-Trait 
detached coping (F(1,249)=24.11, p<. 001), CSQ-Trait emotion coping 
(E(1,249)=15.08, p<. 001), ECQ-emotion inhibition (F(1,249)=26.06, p<001) and 
ECQ-aggression control (F(1,249)=4.51, p<. 05). As seen in Table 4.1 Female 
subjects were less likely to engage in detached coping and more likely to engage 
in emotion-oriented coping and maintain higher aggression control. In light of 
these sex differences relationship patterns between the independent and 
dependent variables would be independently assessed for male and female 
subjects. 
Correlation coeff icients were computed on T1 measures, self-esteem, CSQ, 
ECQ, and health, and the results for the entire sample can be seen in Table 4.2. 
Due to the similarity in measures at included at T1 and measures used in the 
previous study, these analyses provided an opportunity to confirm previously 
identified relationships between self-esteem and CSQ and ECQ factors in a 
considerably larger sample as well as relationship patterns for males and females 
separately. As seen in Table 4.2 with respect to coping, self-esteem was 
positively related to CSQ-rational (r(251)=. 33, p<. 001), CSQ-detached (r(251)=. 25, 
p<. 001) so that individuals with higher self-esteem were more likely to engage in 
these adaptive coping practices. Conversely, individuals with low self-esteem 
were more likely to engage in emotion (r(251)=-. 47, p<. 001) and to a less extent 
avoidant-oriented coping (r(251)=-. 19, p<. 01). Turning to the observed 
relationships between self-esteem and the ECQ dimensions, the expected patterns 
were observed with self-esteem relating inversely 
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Table 4.2 
Correlations Between Self-esteem and the CSQ and ECQ Dimensions 
and The Symptom Severity at Time 1 For Male and Female Subjects 
Separately and For the Entire Sample (N=251) 
Self-Esteem Sco res (YSEI) 
Females Males Total 
CSQ-Rational . 32** . 33** . 33** 
CSQ-Detached 
. 24* . 27** . 25* 
CSQ-Emotional -. 49** -. 46** -. 47** 
CSQ-Avoidant -. 24* -. 15 -. 19* 
ECQ-Rehearse -. 30** -. 23* -. 27** 
ECQ-Emotion Inhb. -. 33** -. 23* -. 26** 
ECQ-Aggression -. 28** -. 15 -. 21 
ECQ-Benign Cntrl . 26* . 25* . 26** 
HCQ-Symptom Sev. -. 21 -. 24* -. 23* 
* p<. 01, **p<. 001 
with rehearsal (r(251)=-. 27, p<. 001) and emotion-inhibition (r(251)=-. 26, p<. 001) 
thus demonstrating that subjects with high self-esteem were less prone to 
rumination or the inhibiting of the expression of emotion. Further, self-esteem 
was inversely related to aggression control (r(251)=-. 21, p<. 001) and positively 
with benign control (r(251)=. 26, p<. 001), suggesting that individuals with high self- 
esteem were better able to contain experienced anger and tend to be less 
impulsive (high benign control) than individuals with low self-esteem. Self-esteem 
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was also significantly related to the reported frequency and (r(251)=-. 26, p<. 001) 
and severity (r(251)=-. 23, p<. 001) of symptoms as well as the absence of 
symptoms (r(251)=. 27, p<. 001). The correlation coefficients between all 
independent variables and the weighted-ranked severity index of the HCQ was 
near zero. 
As seen in Table 4.2 the pattern of results for males and females at Ti are 
nearly identical although the magnitude of the correlations were somewhat 
different on avoidant coping, rehearsal and emotion-inhibition with these 
correlations being higher amongst female subjects. Further, the correlations 
between aggression control and health status were slightly higher for male 
subjects. In short, the significant relationship patterns between self-esteem and 
coping and between self-esteem and health status are nearly equivalent for male 
and female subjects. 
The pattern of relationships at Ti replicate and extend the findings in 
chapter three and in order to reduce redundancy in reported results from the 
previous chapter, replication of T1 regressions were not conducted so as the more 
stringent assessment of the moderating influence of self-esteem would be 
conducted whilst controlling for initial health status at T1. 
4.22.2 Time 2 results 
For subjects who completed all T1 and T2 measures (n=136), multivariate 
significance was again observed based on sex (Pillais = . 17, F (1,135) = 2.66, 
p<. 01). Univariate analyses pointed to continued sex differences on CSQ- 
Detached (F(1,135)=18.21, p<. 001), CSQ-Emotion (F(1,135)=8.32, p<. 005) as well 
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Table 4.3 
Zero-order Correlations between Trait and State Personality Measures. Life 
Events and Adjustment and Health profiles at Time 2 
Life Events Adjustment Health 
Variable Negative Positive Social Academic Illness Distress 
YSEI -. 24 . 13 . 
47** . 28* -. 24* -. 29** 
ECQ-Rehearse -. 14 . 07 . 02 . 00 . 
24* . 22* 
ECQ-Emot Inhib. . 06 -. 
13 . 06 -. 14 . 
06 -. 05 
ECQ-Aggress . 19 . 00 -. 
23* -. 05 . 15 . 21 
ECQ-Benign -. 05 -. 01 -. 07 -. 06 -. 02 -. 07 
CSQ-Trait 
CSQ-Rational -. 03 . 08 . 15 . 
14 -. 18 -. 12 
CSQ-Detached -. 06 . 05 . 01 . 04 -. 
12 -. 22* 
CSQ-Emotional . 28** -. 14 -. 
24" -. 17 . 34** . 37** 
CSQ-Avoidant . 11 -. 
11 -, 11 -. 17 . 11 . 14 
CSQ-State (. T2) 
CSQ-Rational . 04 . 13 . 
08 . 15 -. 22* -. 31 ** 
CSQ-Detached -. 21 . 07 . 02 . 07 -. 
32** -. 50** 
CSQ-Emotional . 33** -. 09 -. 
17 -. 21 . 39** . 53** 
CSQ-Avoidant . 16 -. 07 -. 
09 -. 13 . 09 . 11 
Negative Events -- . 31 ** -. 11 -. 
20 . 17 . 24* 
Positive Events -- -- . 15 . 08 -. 16 -. 17 
**p< 001, *p<. 01 
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as reported negative life events (F(1,135)=7.36, p<. 01), reported illness 
(F(1,135)=6.10, p<. 05) and distress (F(1,135)=10.74, p<. 001) symptoms on the 
GHQ. As seen in Table 4.3 the coping differences were in the same direction as 
that observed at T1 and females tended to report negative life events, illness and 
distress. To examine the relationship between self-esteem, dispositional coping, 
emotion-control patterns with health status, life events and social and academic 
adjustment at T2 pearson correlations were computed. The concurrent and 
prospective relationship patterns can be seen in Table 4.3. Self-esteem was 
significantly related to the reporting of negative (r(138)=-. 23, p<. 01) but' not 
positive life events (r(138)=. 13 ns). Subjects scoring high on disposition emotion- 
oriented coping (r(138)=. 28, p<. 01) and state emotion-oriented coping (r(138)=. 33, 
p<. 001) were also more likely to report experiencing more negative life events at 
T2. No other T1 variables or T2 state coping dimensions were significantly related 
to reported life events. Self-esteem was positively related to social (r(138)=. 47, 
p<. 001) and academic adjustment (r(138)=. 28 p<. 01). In both cases subjects who 
reported higher self-esteem at T1 reported greater perceived social and academic 
adjustment at T2. Life events were unrelated to perceived social and academic 
adjustment as were all other Ti and T2 measures. As also seen in Table 4.3 self- 
esteem was significantly related to reported illness (r(138)=-. 24, p<. 01) and 
psychological distress (r(138)=-. 29, p<. 001) on the GHQ. Subjects with higher 
self-esteem as reported at Ti were more likely to report less general illness or 
distress at T2. Significant point-biserial correlations based on sex (dummy codes 
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issued so that females were coded as 1 and males coded as 2) were also noted 
with female subjects demonstrating a greater incidence of illness complaints 
(r(138)=-. 22, p<. 01) and psychological distress (r(138)=-. 28, p<. 001). Of the 
dispositional coping styles only emotion-oriented coping was similarly related to 
both illness (r(138)=. 34, p<. 001) and distress (r(138)=. 37, p<. 001). However, 
CSQ rational, detached and emotion-oriented state coping strategies showed 
significant patterns to illness and distress in the expected directions. Avoidant- 
oriented state coping remained unrelated to health indices at T2. Finally neither 
negative or positive life events were significantly related to health status at T2 
although negative events were positively related to reported distress (r(138)=. 24, 
p<. 001). Note that the reporting of negative and positive life events were 
moderately positively correlated (r(138)=. 31, p<. 001) so that subjects who reported 
negative life events were similarly more likely to also report experiencing positive 
life events. This pattern would appear to counter arguments launched at response 
bias in reporting either positive or negative valanced life events. 
To assess the unique effect of each of the significant independent 
variables at T1 and state coping at T2 on health status and adjustment, hierarchial 
regression analyses were completed. The regression equations were constructed 
in such a way as to statistically partial out statistically prior health status when 
examining health status at T2 and in addition models allowed for the direct 
comparison of differential effects for state coping independent from dispositional 
coping strategies. With this proviso the regression equations were constructed as 
follows: at step 1 prior health was entered; at step 2 positive and negative life 
events were added; at step 3 subject sex was entered; at step 4 CSQ-disposition 
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(T1) scores were entered; at step 5 CSQ-State (T2) scores were then added, 
at step 6 significant ECQ dimensions were added; and finally self-esteem was 
added at step 7. Consistent with regression modelling from chapter three, the 
model was built so as to test the effects of self-esteem after all other variables 
were accounted for thus providing a conservative test of the moderating 
influence of self-esteem. Finally, the deviation score product terms of 
significant independent variables were calculated to create interaction terms. 
All possible two-way interactions with self-esteem were added 
as a block at step 8. A priori assumptions included significant interactions 
between self-esteem and state coping for the different dependent variables as 
well as a possible three-way interaction Self-esteem by state coping dimensions 
by life events, positive and/or negative. The results from these analyses can 
be seen in summary in Table 4.4. and Table 4.5. 
Regression Analyses Summary 
In each separate regression analysis for the four dependent variables after 
statistically controlling for prior health status at Ti life events were found to 
contribute significantly to the model in the expected direction, that is, with 
negative life events leading to worse health and well-being (Table 4.4) and 
poorer adjustment (Table 4.5) (see Appendix All for full regression tables) 
whereas positive life events successfully predicted outcomes in the opposite 
direction, in this way providing a buffering role against poor health and 
enhancing adjustment. After controlling for prior illness and experienced life 
events, subject sex was found to significantly predict distress scores, with 
female subjects reporting more general distress at T2. No other 
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Table 4.4 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predictin 
Time 2 Health Scores 
Step Predictor 
Health Scores 
Somatic Illness Distress 
F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Time 1 Health 21.74*** . 14 . 37*** 14.20*** . 09 . 31 *** 
2. Life Events 
Main Effects 9.89*** . 18 3.38* . 18 
Negative . 16* . 26** 
Positive -. 19* -. 24** 
3. Subject Sex 7.67*** . 19 -. 09 8.54*** . 20 -. 18* 
4. CSQ-Trait 
Main Effects 6.98*** . 21 7.94*** . 23 
CSQ-Emotion . 17* . 19* 
5. CSQ-State 
Main Effects 5.46*** . 25 10.27*** . 39 
CSQ-Emotion . 19* . 33** 
CSQ-Rational -. 04 -. 06 
CSQ-Detached -. 10 -. 23* 
6 ECQMain Effects 4.62*** . 27 8.73*** . 
41 
Rehearse . 11 . 05 
Aggression . 10 . 14* 
7 YSEI-Self-esteem 4.19*** . 27 -. 03 7.96*** . 41 -. 06 
Table 4.4 Continued 
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Table 4.4 Continued 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 2 Health Scores 
Health Scores 
Somatic Illness Distress 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
8. Two-way Interact. 
Main Effects 
YSEI X Pos. Events 
3.14** . 34 
-. 61 "** 
4.87*** . 44 
***p<. 001, **p<. 01, *p<05 
differences based on subject sex were observed. T1 disposition coping styles 
were unrelated to social or academic adjustment and the only factor related to 
illness and distress was emotion-oriented coping. Likewise, state-coping 
strategies were unrelated to social or academic achievement, or illness ratings, 
although emotion-oriented and detached coping patterns were significant 
predictors of reported distress even after partialling for dispositional emotion- 
oriented coping. Next emotion-control factor, aggression control significantly 
predicted social adjustment and psychological distress scores with individuals with 
higher aggression-control typically showing better adjustment and experiencing 
less distress. Rehearsal did not remain within the model although controlling for 
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Table 4.5 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predictin 
Time 2 Adiustment Scores 
Adjustment Scores 
Social Academic 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Time 1 Health 9.34*** . 06 . 25*** 2.86* . 02 -. 14 
2. Life Events 
Main Effects 4.71 *** . 09 3.38* . 07 
Negative -. 12 -. 23* 
Positive . 17* . 15 
3. Subject Sex 4.06** . 11 -. 13 2.86* . 08 -. 10 
4. CSQ-State 
Main Effects 3.41 ** . 11 2.70* . 09 
CSQ-Emotion . 08 -. 13 
5 ECQ-Main Effects 4.03** . 16 2.23* . 09 
Rehearse -. 10 . 06 
Aggression -. 21 ** . 01 
4 YSEI-Self-esteem 6.97*** . 27 . 39*** 2.54* . 12 . 19* 
Table 4.5 co ntinued 
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Table 4.5 Continued 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 2 Adjustment Scores 
Adjustment Scores 
Social Academic 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
5 Two-way Interact. 
Main Effects 3.14** . 36 
YSEI X Pos. Events 1.27*** 
***p<. 001, **p<. 01, *p<05 
life events and coping practices also provided a conservative test of the effects of 
rehearsal on the outcome measures. 
The results for the role of self-esteem are somewhat more varied than the 
other independent predictors although the bulk of results support the hypotheses 
as outlined. After all other significantly related variables had been accounted for 
self-esteem still made a significant contribution to the model for social (full model 
R-square reported) (F(8,126)=6.97, p<. 001, Beta=. 39, R-Square = . 27) and 
academic (F(8,126)=2.54, p<. 001, Beta=. 19, R-Square = . 12) adjustment. With 
respect to social adjustment a two-way interaction between self-esteem and 
positive life events demonstrated a significant increase in the explained variance 
(9%) after the main effects for all other variables had been accounted for. While 
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self-esteem was significantly related to illness and distress scores as indicated by 
the significant F ratios, it did not significantly predict these indices after all other 
variables had been controlled for (as noted by the non-significant Beta terms). 
The effect for self-esteem in illness ratings was similarly embedded within the two- 
way interaction between self-esteem and positive life events with this interaction 
accounting for the greatest amount of variance (7%) in the model after prior health 
and the main effects for life events were removed. No other two-way or three-way 
interactions were significant. 
42.3 Time 3 results 
For subjects who had completed all measures at T1, T2 and T3 (n=109), there 
was only a statistical trend observed in the MANOVA for sex differences in the 
assessed variables at that phase of the study (Pillais=. 12, F(1,106)=1.75, p<. 10). 
This non-significant result prevented examination of univariate differences between 
male and female subjects at T3. 
To reduce redundancy in reported zero-order correlation coefficients for T1 
and T2 with T3 measures only significant terms will be reported. Subject sex, 
CSQ-dispositional coping styles (Ti) (r range from . 02 to . 12), ECQ factors other 
than Aggression Control (r range from . 01 to . 16) were unrelated to social or 
academic adjustment at T3. While neither T2 or T3 negative life events were 
related to either social (. 11 and . 08) or academic adjustment (. 00 and -. 11) at T3, 
positive life events at T2 (r(109)=. 35, p<. 001) and T3 (r(109)=. 39, p<. 001) 
significantly predicted social adjustment at T3. Neither previous life events (T2) or 
more recent life events (T3) were related to academic adjustment at T3. Beyond 
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life events the highest correlation amongst the independents with social 
adjustment was self-esteem (r(109)=. 33, p<. 001). Consistent with the results from 
T2 individuals with high self-esteem were reporting better social adjustment at T3. 
There was a similar trend in the relationship between self-esteem and academic 
adjustment at T3 although the coefficient did not meet statistical significance 
(r(109)=. 18 ns). The only other variable relating to social adjustment was ECQ- 
aggression control (r(109)=-. 26, p<. 01), the inverse correlation indicating that 
subjects who reported better aggression control (Ti) also showing better social 
adjustment. No other variables were significantly related to social or academic 
adjustment. There was a fair degree of variability across the period from T2 to T3 
in perceived social adjustment (r(109)=. 48, p. 001) and to a less extent academic 
adjustment (r(109)=. 60, p<. 001). Nonetheless a considerable number of students 
who were reporting poor adjustment T2 were reporting comparatively better 
adjustment at T3 and the opposite also being true for those reporting 
comparatively better adjustment at T2. 
To examine the unique and potential interactive effects of significant 
predictor variables at T3 median splits were conducted on self-esteem, positive 
life events and aggression control to produce a self-esteem (high/low) x positive 
events (high/low) x aggression control (high/low) crossed factorial Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) with social and academic adjustment as the dependent 
variables. A priori assumptions pointed to an expected two-way and possible 
three-way interaction with subjects with high self-esteem and more positive life 
events and better aggression control showing the greatest adjustment at T3. The 
results from the two-way ANOVA with social adjustment as the dependent variable 
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reflected the expected main effects for self-esteem (F(1,88)=8.08, p<. 01), positiv 
life events (F(1,88)=4.18, p<. 05) and a trend in the effect for aggression contrc 
(F(1,88)=3.30, p=. 07 ns) with subjects with high self-esteem and comparativel 
more positive life events, and better aggression control showing better socie 
adjustment. There were no two-way or three-way interactions observed. Thy 
results from the two-way ANOVA with academic adjustment as the dependen 
demonstrated only a significant main effect for positive life events (F(1,88)=5.38 
p<. 05) where as the results for self-esteem (F(1,88)=1.90, p=. 17 ns) ani 
aggression control were non-significant and no additional two-way or three-wa: 
interactions were observed. The results, in part, reflect the relative independence 
in social and academic adjustment across time with self-esteem best predictinc 
social adjustment approximately 19 weeks into the first year of university. 
4.3.4 Time 4 results 
At T4 (n=92) the MANOVA revealed overall multivariate significance for se; 
differences, with univariate differences emerging on CSQ-Detached (F(1,89)=4.64 
p<. 05), CSQ-Avoidant (F(1,89)=6.34, p<. 05) and severity of symptom., 
(F(1,89)=13.73, p<. 001). As seen in Table 4.6, the pattern of findings sugges 
that males continued to use more detached coping and avoidant coping at thi., 
stage. Females were also likely to report greater severity of illness on the HCQ 
although not on the GHQ. To reduce redundancy in the reported results and tc 
shed light on the time trends in the examined relationships, the data at T4 were 
collapsed with previous data observations and submitted to multiple Repeater 
Measures MANOVA's with illness, distress, and social and academic adjustmen 
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as the within-subject repeated dependent measures for Ti T2 T3 and T4 
observations. These analyses also aimed to provide a better index of there 
stability across the duration of the study period. 
In the absence of multiple assessments of self-esteem over time, the 
analyses precluded examination of the bi-directional effects of self-esteem, coping, 
life events and the various outcomes, which could be captured with a 
sophisticated trend analysis. Second, no a priori assumptions were presented 
about the specific path by which self-esteem exerts its influence on health 
outcomes over time. That is, while self-esteem was expected to relate to coping 
practices, emotion-control strategies, and show differential patterns in response 
to life events, and better or worse health and adjustment, the aim of this study 
was not to devise a model that would explain this path, and thus a path analysis 
was deemed inappropriate. 
The results are broken down by section, starting arbitrarily with the results 
between self-esteem and coping. 
43.4.1 Coping 
First, a major aim of this study was to assess the relationship between self-esteem 
and coping practices over a long period of adaptation. The first analysis 
conducted was pearson correlation coefficients to first determine the relative 
stability of coping practices. Seen in table 4.6 are the correlations between the 
dispositional coping styles (CSQ-Trait) and situational coping strategies for each 
of the CSQ coping dimensions. As seen, all correlations are highly significant 
(p<. 001) and in the moderate to strong range (. 35 to. 68). Hence, although some 
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variability in state coping was observed dispositional patterns also appear to be 
relatively stable across time. Of particular note appears to be the drop off in 
potentially emotion-oriented and avoidant-oriented coping strategies from T2 to T3. 
To better gauge time trends in coping strategies and to determine whether or not 
Table 4.6 
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN DISPOSITIONAL COPING STYLES (CSQ-TRAIT) 
AND SITUATIONAL COPING STRATEGIES FOR EACH OF THE CSQ COPING 
DIMENSIONS 
Time of Assessment 
Coping Dimension Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 
CSQ-Rational . 68 . 65 . 64 
CSQ-Detached . 61 . 59 . 57 
CSQ-Emotional . 64 . 35 . 51 
CSQ-Avoidant . 60 . 44 . 62 
all correlations significant at one-tail p<. 001 
strategies differed by level of self-esteem a series of repeated measures 
MANOVAs were conducted. A median-split was first conducted on the total self- 
esteem score to create a high (upper median) and low (lower median) self-esteem 
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groups and this served as the between groups variable in the analysis. The 
within-group variable was T2 T3 and T4 state coping. Four separate MANOVAs 
were conducted for each of the four coping dimensions. The results from these 
analyses will be briefly summarized. First, with respect to emotion-oriented coping 
there was a significant between-group main effect (F(1,90)=5.33, p=. 02). Subjects 
with HSE were less likely to engage in emotion-oriented coping across the study 
period. There was also a trend within-group self-esteem by emotion coping effect 
(F(2,90)=3.31, p<. 08) although the absence of statistical significance precluded 
post-hoc analyses. Finally, there was no within-subject effect for coping thus 
pointing to the stability in this style over the different phases of the academic year 
for subjects in this study. There were no observed between-group or within-group 
effects for ether of the remaining coping patterns, rational, detached, or avoidance 
coping. 
4.2.4.2 Life Events 
Repeated measures MANOVAs were conducted to assess the stability of reported 
positive and negative life events across the study and to determine whether, 
overall, level of self-esteem predicted the frequency of life event reports. The 
between group variable was self-esteem (high/low) and the repeated measure was 
reported life events at T2 T3 T4. No between group differences were observed 
for self-esteem for either positive or negative life events indicating their relative 
independence. That is, low self-esteem subjects were no more likely to report 
negative life events and similarly high self-esteem were no more likely to report 
experiencing positive life events, as was expected. 
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4.3.4.3 Illness and Psychological Distress 
Consistent with the previous MANOVAs repeated measures analyses were 
conducted with self-esteem (high/low) as the between-subjects variable and illness 
reports on the HCQ (Ti, T4) and GHQ (T2, T4) as the within-subjects repeated 
dependent measure. In the third analysis distress scores on the GHQ (T2, T4) 
was the within-subject dependent measure. In each of the three separate 
analyses a between-group effect was observed for self-esteem, HCQ illness 
(F(1,90)=9.71, p<. 005), GHQ illness (F(1,90)=13.86, p<001) and GHQ distress 
(F(1,90)=11.33, p<. 001). Across the study period, subjects with high self-esteem 
were more likely to experience better health and less psychological distress. No 
within-subject effects were found for any of the health indices or for self-esteem 
by health index thus pointing to the stability of this relationship at different phases 
of the study. 
4. $. 4.4 Adjustment 
A one-between, one-within repeated measures design was similarly conducted for 
adjustment scores across the study with self-esteem (high/low) and social and 
academic adjustment scores at T2 T3 and T4 as the within-subject repeated 
measure. With respect to academic adjustment there was a trend in the 
between-subject effect suggesting that subjects with high self-esteem were more 
likely to report better academic adjustment, although this trend was not statistically 
significant (F(1,90)=2.66, p=. 11). There was, however, a between-group effect 
(F(1,90)=5.17, p<. 05) with subjects with high self-esteem reporting better social 
adjustment across all phases of the study. There was also a within-subject effect 
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for self-esteem (F(2,90)=4.91, p<. 01). A univariate analysis with post-hoc 
comparisons (Tukey) indicated that differences between high and low subjects 
were present at T2 and T3 although scores converged at T4 and the group 
differences were no longer significant thus suggesting that the effects of self- 
esteem were most important during the early phases of adaptation to university 
life. 
4.4 Discussion 
This study sought to examine the moderating influence of self-esteem in social 
and academic adjustment and health in a group of first year university students 
over the course of the academic year. Hypotheses were focused on the 
relationship between self-esteem and state coping strategies at 4 different phases 
of the study in addition to the possible mediating role of life stress as measured 
by the frequency of positive and negative life events at 3 different phases covering 
total life events over roughly a 8-9 month period. The specific hypotheses will be 
addressed in turn. 
Self-esteem and Coping 
The assessment of individual differences in dispositional coping in relation to self- 
esteem supports and extends the findings in the previous chapter. Individuals with 
high self-esteem tend to maintain a disposition towards problem-focused and 
adaptive coping strategies whereas individuals with low self-esteem are more 
likely to engage in emotion-oriented coping. The positive correlation between self- 
esteem and disposition coping strategies points to their inter-relationship 
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independent of situational demands or contextual cues. What was the relationship 
between self-esteem and more situationally based coping strategies in this study? 
Across time, the pattern demonstrated between personality dispositions (traits) 
were replicated at various points in time so that individuals with high self-esteem 
were less likely to engage in emotion-oriented coping and there was a trend in the 
opposite direction for detached coping, with individuals with high self-esteem 
tending to report more detached coping at different phases of the study. 
Furthermore, the coping patterns in this study tended to be fairly stable. Hence, 
in this study the findings would appear to support both contentions that specific 
coping practices change according to the situational demands but situational 
strategies are more likely to reflect dispositional tendencies and both are 
influenced by self-esteem. In this way, knowing an individuals general level of 
self-esteem does provide some indication of how they are likely to cope with 
potentially challenging circumstances above and beyond the valence and impact 
of the events themselves. That is, while the reporting of negative life events were 
related to dispositional and state-emotion coping strategies, none of the other 
coping patterns appeared to either influence the reporting of life events (T1 CSQ- 
dimensions not predicting T2 reported life events) or change as a result of life 
events (T2 negative life events not related to T3 CSQ-dimensions nor a pattern 
between T3 life events and T4 CSQ- dimensions). 
Consistent with past research and the results in chapter 3, the main effects 
model for coping was supported in this study in relation to the various health 
indices. Greater predictive validity was also noted in state coping strategies 
beyond the impact of dispositional coping styles when the outcome measure was 
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assessed health or psychological distress at two separate points in the study 
approximately 16 weeks apart. Particularly important were the positive findings 
between the adaptive coping strategies and health outcomes. The preponderance 
of research on coping process and health have not found a buffering effect for 
adaptational coping but rather the intensification of health difficulties and 
psychopathology as the result of engaging in typically maladaptive strategies such 
as emotion-oriented coping. In this study while dispositional emotion-coping did 
predict health outcomes across time as shown in most studies, as did state- 
emotion strategies, the positive effects of rational and detached coping in 
buffering against illness and distress only emerged in the assessment of state- 
processes (at T2). Finally, avoidant-oriented coping consistently failed to show 
any relationship between the other moderating variables and categorically failed 
to relate to any health or adjustment measure at any point in the study. This 
raises some doubt as to the importance of this dimension in health-related 
contexts. While a number of authors have suggested that low self-esteem is 
intimately linked with avoidance behaviours, empirical examination has more 
successfully pointed to self-esteem relating to the positive influence of adaptational 
strategies as well as (inversely) with. the negative consequences of emotional 
strategies. Further, coping processes appeared to be less related to social and 
academic adjustment than health outcomes in this study thus pointing to their 
comparative importance for health-related domains. 
Finally, despite the important relationship between coping and health 
outcomes in this study, the expected interactive effects of coping with self-esteem 
in relation to health outcomes was not observed. It has been argued previously 
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that controlling for main effects may limit the potential for demonstrated interactive 
effects and so it may that this study provided a more rigorous and conservative 
test of the interaction effects. This in fact, was supported by the significant F ratio 
in each regression equation but then the failure of specific two-way and three-way 
interaction terms to remain in the model after all main effects were accounted for. 
Further, interaction effects may have been hindered due to the inter-relationship 
between self-esteem and coping practices. That is, self-esteem was not 
orthogonal to dispositional or state-coping processes and this have prevented 
interaction effects from emerging. 
Self-esteem and Life Events 
Consistent with Linville's (1987) findings that self-complexity was unrelated 
to the reporting of negative life events, in this study, when the total frequency of 
life events was extracted for the entire study period, neither negative(Or positive 
life events were found to related to level of self-esteem. Hence, subjects with high 
self-esteem were no more likely to report experiencing positive life events as were 
subjects with low self-esteem no more likely to report a greater frequency of 
negative life events. This study pointed to a comparatively nominal impact of 
negative life events on adjustment scores at individual stages and collectively for 
the study period. Further, while negative life events were related to health and 
distress scores at T2 and then again at T4 they typically accounted for less than 
5% of the variance. Further, when the impact of positive life events was examined 
while statistically partialling the effects of negative life events, they were shown to 
predict social adjustment (T2, T3), illness (T2) and psychological distress (T2). 
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These findings are to be contrasted with the bulk of published reports which have 
found no effect for positive events on health outcomes. In this study individuals 
experiencing relatively more positive life events also tended to experience better 
health and adjustment thus suggesting a buffering role for positive life events. 
This finding supports a recent study that found as strong an effect for daily uplifts 
as for daily hassles on upper respiratory illnesses (Lyons & Chamberlain, 1994). 
In this study self-esteem was also found to correlate positively and significantly 
with reported uplifts at two periods of assessment whereas daily hassles did not 
correlate significantly with self-esteem at either time. 
Moreover, the influence of positive life events appeared to be especially 
true for subjects with high self-esteem. Analyses were conducted to assess 
Brown and McGill's (1989) findings that positive life events impact negatively on 
the health only among individuals with negative self-views. Of the total 92 
subjects who completed the study, correlations between all health measures were 
examined in relation to a summed score for positive life events across the entire 
study for subjects within the low self esteem (n=44) and high self-esteem (n=48) 
groups. The correlational patterns were virtually identical although subjects with 
low self-esteem were not buffered by positive life events at T4 with respect to 
psychological distress (r(48)=. 08 ns) although those with high self-esteem were 
(r(48)=-. 45, p<. 01). These results suggest that positive life events do not enhance 
illness difficulties with those with low self-esteem but rather only offer a 
comparative advantage for those with high self-esteem. Hence, while subjects 
with high self-esteem are no more likely to experience positive life events, it may 
be that when they do experience positive life events those with high self-esteem 
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are better able to capitalize on the positive effects emanating from such 
experiences. One possible avenue by which this may occur is the expression of 
positive affect when something goes well. A recent study (Langston, 1994) has 
pointed to the beneficial effects for health for having an opportunity to celebrate 
and express positive emotions. Consistent with the finding that subjects with low 
self-esteem are also likely to inhibit the expression of emotion, it may be that they 
limit the extent to which a positive event can be beneficial. It is also noteworthy 
that interactions were not found between self-esteem and negative life events, 
suggesting that what is more important is how high and low self-esteem subjects 
differ in their experience of positive life events opposed to their experience of 
negative life events. Linville (1987) argued that negative life events trigger 
negative thoughts and feelings associated with various self-aspects which 
subsequently leads to negative arousal and the consequent health difficulties. In 
this study the findings point to a potential self-inflating effect of positive life events 
that exceed detrimental effects of experienced negative life events. These findings, 
in part, support experimental studies on motivational strategies of high self-esteem 
subjects who are more likely to selectively attend to positive events and positive 
feedback in interpersonal relations thus maximizing and reinforcing positive 
information while also minimizing attentiveness and the impact of negative life 
events. This may be the first study pointing to the differential health outcomes 
based on the different motivational strategies of high and low self-esteem subjects 
when confronted with valanced life events. 
If-esteem and Emotion Control 
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This study also demonstrated the relationship between self-esteem and emotion- 
control strategies, with subjects with low self-esteem tending to inhibit emotion and 
report poor aggression control. The relationship between self-esteem and 
aggression control appeared to be especially important for male subjects. Further, 
aggression control was significantly related to reported social adjustment and 
experienced distress at T2 and then social adjustment ratings again at T3 
approximately 16 weeks into university life: subjects with better aggression control 
reported better social relationships across this period. The differential relationship 
patterns between self-esteem and aggression control and the latter's importance 
in predicting adjustment and distress at different points in the study suggests that 
it may be an important process in health-outcome research, particularly for male 
subjects. These results converge with other studies that have looked at the role 
of aggression on health outcomes in typically male samples (e. g., Type A studies 
and hardiness studies) and found the expected predicted effects. 
This study supported the inter-relationship between self-esteem and 
rehearsal although their interactive effects on health outcomes were not replicated. 
The theoretical model, as reflected in the regression equations, also tended to 
provide a conservative test of the impact of emotion-control processes (i. e., 
following main effects for life events, coping) and so this study may have 
conducted a more stringent test of rehearsal than has been achieved previously. 
Relatedly, because rehearsal is by definition motivated by negative life 
experiences and perceived interpersonal failure it may be that its effects were 
reduced when life events and coping practices were statistically controlled. 
Chapters 6 and 7 will provide further examination of the important relationship 
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between self-esteem and rehearsal in controlled experimental conditions where 
these relationships can be more exactly assessed. 
Self-esteem and Social and Academic Adjustment 
As mentioned, the additive effects or main effects model of self-esteem on 
adjustment was supported in this study at the various stages. Self-esteem 
accounted for the greatest variance in social and academic adjustment scores at 
T2 and social adjustment scores at T3 beyond life events, coping strategies, and 
emotion-control patterns. Moreover, as discussed their were interactive effects 
for self-esteem and positive life events for T2 adjustment scores. 
The predictive impact of self-esteem on academic adjustment dropped after 
the first 8 week phase of the study. However, the first term may be particularly 
important for students adapting to new academic demands and competition. 
Again, the correlation between self-esteem and T2 academic adjustment scores 
exceeded all other effects including previously experienced life events and 
dispositional and state coping. Hence, subjects with high self-esteem perceive 
themselves to be doing better academically after the first term, regardless of 
extraneous life stress or the particular level of problem-focused coping (which 
would be expected to study habits) engaged in prior to or just before the second 
assessment phase. This may reflect actual academic performance or it may 
reflect positive illusions about performance as individuals with high self-esteem are 
more likely to maintain positive illusions about self-related goals and health (Taylor 
& Brown, 1988). 
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Sex (Gender) Differences 
At different points in the study female subjects differed from male subjects with 
respect to the moderating variables and outcome measures. Consistent with the 
results from Endler and Parker (1990) female subjects are more likely to maintain 
a dispositional emotion-oriented coping style. However, in this study female 
subjects were also shown to more consistently engage in emotion-oriented coping 
in response to specific situational demands at different (T2) points in the study. 
The most consistent differences between male and female subjects in terms of 
coping was the greater likelihood for male subjects to reporting preference for 
detached coping at different phases of the study (T1, T2, T4). The greater 
likelihood of female subjects to engage in emotion-oriented coping may have been 
the result of having experienced more negative life events earlier in the study (as 
reported at T2). However, the general consistency from dispositional to state 
coping processes suggest a more robust gender difference in preferred ways of 
confronting and alleviating stress. The general finding that both dispositional and 
state coping consistently predicted negative health status and heightened 
psychological distress raises important gender issues for coping and health. 
Because the health measures in this study reflect self-reported health complaints 
opposed to objective, verified illnesses, it may be that females are more willing to 
acknowledge emotional upset, emotional coping strategies, and poor health. This 
possible explanation may be supported by the near zero-order correlations 
between gender and the potentially more neutral assessment of perceived 
adjustment. 
This prospective offers a unique perspective of the moderating influence of 
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self-esteem on health and adjustment over a comparatively longer duration than ha: 
previously been reported. This allowed for the assessment of the stability it 
relationships between self-esteem and coping within a time frame that provided fo 
the assessment of minor as well as more serious symptomatology. The shor 
incubation period of two weeks tested by Linville (1987) potentially constrained the 
effects of self-esteem on health. The role of self-esteem in this study, points to C, 
number of conclusions. While individual phase-specific regression analyses pointer 
to the differential impact of self-esteem at different points in the study, the repeatec 
measures analysis reflected fairly stable patterns over approximately 24 week., 
between self-esteem and coping; self-esteem and social adjustment; between self 
esteem and illness; and between self-esteem and distress. Subjects with high self 
esteem tended to utilize more adaptive coping, reported greater perceived socia 
adjustment (with trends reflecting positive perceptions with academic adjustment) 
reported less general illness (GHQ) or specific health problems (HCQ) over time anc 
experienced less psychological distress over time. In short, these results point to the 
relatively stable moderating influence of self-esteem. However, the absence 0 
interaction effects with life events does not suggest a buffering role of self-esteem 
That is, the moderating influence of self-esteem occurred in both high and low stress 
conditions. This was evidence by the absence of an interaction between self-esteerr 
and negative life events in any of the regression analyses. While not reported, C, 
series of supplemental repeated measures analyses were conducted for the repeatec 
health measures for subjects reporting high life stress (n=50) (as calculated by c' 
itnd 
median split on total reported life events across the study period)., low life stress 
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(n=42). As before, the between-group variable was high and low self-esteem. 
The moderating influence of self-esteem was nearly identical (all p<, 01) for all 
health and distress for both high and low stress conditions. Hence, the results in 
this study clearly do not support a buffering role for self-esteem. Perhaps a more 
robust test of the buffering model of self-esteem in health outcomes could be 
conducted within a more clearly circumscribed stressful and non-stressful period. 
In general the findings suggest that people with high self-esteem are less likely to 
be overwhelmed when faced with self-relevant stressors; adapt successfully, both 
in the short and longer term, and function relatively free of chronic somatic 
complaints and psychological distress. Finally, with particular respect to coping, 
this study has shown that not only is self-esteem related to personality trait 
measures relevant to health and well-being but also influence situationally- 
dependent coping processes. 
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I 
Chapter 
5 Experimental Examination of the Stress 
Buffering Effects of Self-esteem 
5.1 Introduction 
The studies reported thus far have focused on a macro approach to delineating 
the role of self-esteem in health. Consistent with the small handful of studies that 
have aimed to implicate self-esteem in health-related processes, the approach has 
been correlational in nature, with the examination of baseline self-esteem with other 
personality measures and related physical and psychological health outcomes. To 
some extent the problem of directionality in the correlational patterns was clarified 
through their prospective designs and the control of baseline values in chapters three 
and four. 
Another related avenue of research has attempted to explain the motivational, 
affective and performance-related sequelae of self-esteem in specific evaluative 
laboratory situations with the manipulation of success and failure feedback. It has 
been shown that people with low self-esteem are considerably more likely to show 
impairment in subsequent motivation and performance than persons with high self- 
esteem when faced with failure feedback (Brockner, Derr, & Laing, 1987; Campbell 
& Fairey, 1985). In addition to the impact of negative feedback on performance and 
motivation in individuals with low self-esteem, Moreland and Sweeney (1984) also 
found that failure feedback elicited more negative affect in low than in high self-esteem 
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subjects. Linville (1985) replicated Moreland and Sweeney's work and extended it by 
suggesting that low self-esteem individuals were typically more labile with greater 
emotional reactivity to both positive and negative feedback. 
A number of theorists have attempted to examine the psychological 
mechanisms to explain the differential responding of low versus high self-esteem 
subjects under threat conditions (i. e., receiving negative feedback). Individuals with 
low self-esteem have been shown to react to failure feedback in very similar ways to 
individuals who are depressed insofar as they are likely to overgeneralize (Brown, 
1988,1989). Further, individuals possessing high self-esteem demonstrate a variety 
of self-enhancing reactions when under threat (Baumeister, 1982; Tesser, 1986; 
Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990) including exceptional skills at 
minimizing the impact of failure feedback and attacking the credibility of the source of 
negative feedback. It has also been argued that individuals with high self-esteem are 
more likely to maintain positive illusions about their abilities thus providing further 
minimization of negative and maximization of positive feedback (Taylor & Brown, 
1988). The research appears to point to the cruel and self-perpetuating aspect of low 
self-esteem and the adaptive state of high self-esteem. 
These experimental findings may shed light on the role of self-esteem in health- 
related processes. Studies of immunologic functioning have shown that psychological 
processes are also implicated in inducing acute and prolonged changes in immune 
responses (Ader, Felten, & Cohen, 1991; Jemmott & Locke, 1984) and subsequent 
decrements in immune functioning (Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1988). The above 
experimental literature suggests that low self-esteem may lead to a) performance 
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deficits and the subsequent probability of frequent acute negative mood states, b) 
motivational deficits, with a reduction in the exercise of adaptive, task-oriented coping 
and the relatively infrequent opportunity to gain successes and bolster self-esteem and 
c) more chronic negative mood states due to overgeneralization following failure and 
the propensity to which negative self-evaluative thoughts can be primed. Hence, 
these processes may, in part, contribute to greater vulnerability and emotional, 
neuroendocrine and immunological difficulties in individuals with low self-esteem. 
The experimental self-esteem literature has been plagued with several 
important methodological issues that, to some extent, has limited the internal 
consistency of the purported effects of self-esteem. Many studies have not 
systematically assigned subjects to different performance conditions nor have they 
manipulated self-esteem. As noted by Kernis and colleagues (1989) the significant 
relationship observed between self-esteem and outcome (performance, motivation, 
affective) measures may reflect differences in baseline relationships between self- 
esteem and the outcome variables and not due to components of the situation. That 
is, both the correlational health studies conducted so far, as well as the discussed 
experimental literature has precluded any causal associations from being drawn. To 
demonstrate the temporal salience of self-esteem it would be necessary to a) 
manipulate self-esteem, b) expose subjects to a stressful event and then, c) measure 
experienced stress in order to assess whether subjects who experience high self- 
esteem are less responsive to stress. 
In this chapter three experimental studies are undertaken to test whether 
bolstering self-esteem leads to a comparative advantage when faced with laboratory 
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stress. The first study assesses subjectively reported stress while studies two and 
three also include psychophysiology measures of stress. In this way, the latter two 
studies provide an opportunity to examine the underlying physiological concomitants 
of self-esteem in stress reactivity that may, in part, explain the greater vulnerability for 
illness in those with low self-esteem. 
Stud( 1 
5.2 Manipulated Self-esteem and Subjective Distress and 
Cognitive Rumination During A Stressful Cognitive Task 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Study one was designed to test the hypothesis that increasing self-esteem will 
reduce stress responsivity in the face of a potential stress-inducing task (the Stroop 
Test). Consistent with an interactional model of personality and health, the study was 
cast into a2 (Self-Esteem: High/neutral) X2 (Stress Event: High/low) factorial design. 
It was hypothesized that subjects would be responsive to manipulated self-esteem, 
such that subjects in the high self-esteem group would a) report less experimental 
stress, b) make fewer errors on the task, and c) show less state cognitive rehearsal 
following the experimental exercise. With respect to the latter hypothesis, this study 
aimed to examine more systematically the potential causal role of self-esteem in 
cognitive ruminations. 
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5.2.2 Method 
5.2.2.1 Subjects and Procedure 
Subjects were 53 female first year undergraduate students at the University of York 
who had previously completed a series of personality scales. Eight subjects had not 
completed baseline measures and so they were discarded from the analyses thus 
leaving a sample of 45 for the analyses. Subjects were paid £3.00 for their 
participation. 
After completing a consent form, the experimenter explained that the subject's 
personality characteristics had been measured in a previous testing session and that 
an individual 'personality profile report' had been prepared. The personality feedback 
was sufficiently general to be plausible to all subjects and is well known as the 
'Barnum' effect in clinical report writing and this feedback constituted the self-esteem 
manipulation (see Appendix A6). Subjects were randomly assigned to either a neutral 
or positive personality report and given approximately two minutes to read and think 
about the report. It is important to note that the experimenter was unaware which 
report the subjects received. To prevent positive or negative expressions that may 
have insinuated which report was received, the experimenter asked the subject to sit 
quietly after he/she was finished reading the report and to save any comments or 
queries about the report until the study was over. Next subjects were given 
instructions on the Stroop Test and then shortly after, asked to start the test with the 
experimenter in the next room. The Stroop Test (Stroop, 1935) comprised a chart 
with names of various colours printed in an array of different colours (e. g., the word 
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'red' is printed in green ink). There was a total of 96 colour words printed (8 columns 
and 12 rows) in eight different colours of ink, and the subjects were to name the 
colour of ink used for each word. 
Finally, they were given post-experimental forms to complete including the 
dependent measure, reported level of experienced stress during the task. 
5.2.2.2 Stress conditions 
Half the subjects were told that their scores on the Stroop test would be dependent 
on both their speed and accuracy and that they would be ranked with fellow students. 
These simple instructions have been shown to intensify the inherent level of stress in 
the task (Roger & Jamieson, 1988), and provided the high stress condition. 
Conversely, in the low stress condition, subjects were given instructions on how to 
complete the task without heightening the stakes by imposing neither the time 
dimension nor the competitive elements. 
5.. 2.2.3 Conditions and Measures 
State Self-esteem Test (SSET) 
A newly created state measure of self-esteem (SSET: Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) 
was utilized in this experiment to assess momentary changes in state self-esteem. 
The SSET was constructed and validated based on state self-esteem ratings and is 
specifically designed for experimental work on state self-esteem and this is in 
contrast to the YSEI and the frequently used RSE, which are trait-based measures. 
This scale consists of 20 items tapping three dimensions of state self-esteem: 
173 
social evaluation, academic performance and appearance. Seven items comprise the 
social dimension with the highest loading 'I am worried about what other people think 
of me. ' Seven items comprise the performance dimension and the highest loading 
item is 'I feel confident about my abilities. ' Finally, the appearance dimension taps 
state satisfaction with body shape and appearance and the highest loading item is 'I 
feel satisfied with the way my body looks right now. ' The coefficient alpha for the total 
scale score (. 92) was found to be robust for both male and female subjects in the 
original study and in this study the alpha (. 91) was also found to be satisfactory. 
Stress measure 
Following the Stroop Test, subjects completed a purpose-designed feedback report 
indicating on a 7-point Likert scale how 1) stressful, 2) disturbing, 3) anxiety-arousing, 
4) anger provoking, 5) insecure, and 6) challenged they felt during the task. 
Additionally they rated how 7) meaningful they found the task to be as well as the 8) 
personal control they felt they had maintained (see Appendix A7). Hence, the scale 
comprised 8 items scored in the direction of greater distress (items 6 and 7 are 
reversed) with a theoretical range of 8-56.. The final dependent measure was the 
number of errors made on the task (out of 96 responses) and was operationalized as 
an additional index of experienced stress. 
ECQ State Rehearsal 
The study sought to examine the causal relationship between self-esteem and 
cognitive rehearsal. Subjects also completed a state version of the ECQ-R dimension 
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following the Stroop test. The scale was comprised of the original 12 items (Roger 
& Nesshoever, 1987) and six newly written items for a scale total of 18 items. The 
format of the questions remained the same although subjects were asked to complete 
the scale in light of how they were feeling at that particular moment. The scoring was 
on a 5-point Liked format with scores ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly 
agree' with a total scale score in the direction of greater rehearsal with a theoretical 
range of 18 to 90. The alpha coefficient for the total scale score was found to be 
satisfactory for this study (alpha=. 84). 
Baseline measures 
In addition to the specific measures constructed for this experiment the majority of 
subject's scores on trait self-esteem (YSEI) and emotion control patterns (ECQ) had 
been previously collected and were available for comparison with the above state 
measures. 
5.2.3 Results 
Manipulation Check 
First, to assess the success of the self-esteem manipulation an ANOVA was 
conducted with self-esteem group (high/low) as the independent variable and the total 
SSET score as the dependent variable. The results from the ANOVA for total SSE 
demonstrated that although subjects in the high (M=74.2) versus the low (M=69.5) 
self-esteem groups differed in their state levels of self-esteem this difference was not 
statistically significant (F(1,44)=1.92, p=. 17ns). Because the scale assesses three 
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separate dimensions of SSET one-way ANOVA's were computed for each of the 
dimensions individually. There were observed trends in the expected direction for the 
performance and social dimensions and the appearance score was found to be 
significantly higher in the high (M=21.4) versus the low (M=19.3) self-esteem group 
(F(1,52)=3.61, p=. 06). Hence, the results suggest that subjects who received the 
positive personality feedback reported higher self-esteem than did subjects in the 
neutral self-esteem condition and this difference was particularly relevant to the 
appearance domain. 
Stress Measure 
Examination of the 8-item stress measure reflected a large number of high magnitude 
inter-correlations. To reduce possible redundancy in the items a factor analysis with 
principal axis factoring and oblimin rotation was conducted. Using the scree test and 
Eigenvalue (>1) criteria, the results from the analysis demonstrated that a two-factor 
solution was the best fit to the data accounting for 54% of the variance. As seen in 
Table 5.1, factor 1 (Eigenvalue=3.79,47.4% of the variance explained) appears to 
reflect insecurity and distress with the highest loading being item 5 'felt insecure 
during the task. ' While factor 2 (6.6% of explained variance), with unique loadings on 
items 6 and 7, appeared to reflect 'involvement and commitment' with the highest 
loading on item 7 'found the task meaningful. ' (Note that while factor 2 fell slightly 
below eigenvalue 1 following rotation it was retained because it appeared to be a 
theoretically meaningful factor and its variance was greater than 5%). The correlation 
between the two factors (. 51) reflected a fair degree of inter-dependence. Further the 
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internal reliability estimates for the distress (Alpha=. 87) and commitment (Alpha=. 51) 
factors were satisfactory. In addition to the total scale score then, analyses were 
computed on the two factors separately. 
Table 5.1 
Item Loadings for The Post-experimental Distress Rating Scale (Oblimin) 
Item Factor Loadings 
F1 F2 
(1) Stress . 60 
(2) Disturbance . 46 
(3) Anxiety . 81 
(4) Anger . 42 
(5) Insecure . 90 
(6) Challenged . 55 
(7) Meaningfulness . 66 
(8) Perceived Control -. 52 
Self-esteem by Stress Condition 
The examination of trait by state self-esteem interactions with the dependent 
measures was precluded due to the significant relationship between trait (YSEI) and 
the SSET (r(45)=. 53, p<. 001). Because the interest in this study was on the effects 
of manipulated state self-esteem, the analyses were conducted while statistically 
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partialling for baseline self-esteem. 
Two-way Self-esteem (high/low) x Stressful Task (high/low)) ANCOVAs for the 
three stress indices were conducted. In these analyses baseline self-esteem score 
was the covariate. The mean reported experimental stress for each of the stress by 
self-esteem conditions (total scale score) can be seen in Table 5.2 and graphically 
represented in Figure 5.1. 
Table 5.2 
Mean Subjective Stress Scores for High and Neutral Self-esteem 
Groups By Stress Condition 
Stress Condition 
Self-Esteem High Low Total 
High 27.91 23.73 25.82 
Neutral 34.00 27.85 30.93 
Total 30.96 25.79 
As seen, there was a significant main effect for stress condition with subjects in the 
high stress condition reporting more subjective stress than subjects in the low stress 
condition (F(1,44)=7.19, p<. 01). There was also a significant main effect for self- 
esteem group (F(1,44) = 6.52 p<. 01) with subjects in the high self-esteem group 
reporting less experimental stress. The absence of an interaction effect between self- 
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esteem and stress condition (F(2,44)=. 38, p=. 54ns) suggests a moderating effect of 
self-esteem in high and low stress conditions. The pattern of findings for the stress 
and commitment factors, when assessed independently, demonstrated that the effect 
of self-esteem was less important in influencing commitment ratings (F(1,44)=2.36, 
p=. 11 ns) than in distress ratings (F(1,44)=6.75, p<. 01) while the main effects for stress 
condition were significant in both instances. No interaction effects were observed. 
Self-esteem and Task Completion 
Significant differences between subjects in the high versus the neutral self-esteem 
group were also observed with respect to the number of errors made on the 
experimental task. Subjects in the neutral group (M=12.71) tended to make nearly 
twice the number of mistakes made in the high self-esteem group (M=6.70) and this 
difference was statistically significant (F(1,43)=5.88, p<. 05). Moreover, no main effect 
was observed for stress condition nor were there any interaction effects. Hence, self- 
esteem appeared to be more relevant to successful task completion than stress level 
and the buffering effect for self-esteem was present in both high and low stress 
conditions. 
Self-esteem and State Rehearsal 
The results from the ANOVA with state rehearsal as the dependent measure 
suggested that stress condition did not influence the amount of reported post- 
experimental rehearsal while there was a trend in the differences for self-esteem 
group, with the high self-esteem group (M=48.36) showing less rehearsal than the 
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neutral self-esteem group (M=53.22) (F(1,44)=2.75, p<. 10). As before, no interaction 
effects were observed. 
5.2.4 Subsidiary Analyses 
A number of recent investigations have suggested that instability in self-esteem may 
be even more important than level of self-esteem per se in predicting performance and 
arousal in laboratory examination (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, Berry & Harlow, 1993). 
Because subjects in this study had completed a baseline measure of self-esteem, 
stability of self-esteem could be assessed in relation to reported state self-esteem at 
the time of the study. To assess self-esteem stability z-score transformations were 
first conducted on both baseline self-esteem (YSEI) and the SSET. Next, a difference 
score was created by subtracting the two z-scores and to eradicate negative integers 
the final resulting difference z-score was multiplied by itself. The resulting distribution 
reflected a normal curve with acceptable skewness and kurtosis (<1) and a median 
split was derived. The median split occurred roughly at the point of one half of a 
standard deviation. The lower median split represented those whose self-esteem was 
relatively stable and the upper median split represented relatively unstable self-esteem 
scores. Consistent with Kernis et al. 's (1993) study, it is the magnitude of the 
fluctuations in contextually based self-esteem, rather than their precise nature (i. e., 
direction, different types of instability) that is emphasized. 
The two-way stress (high/low) by self-esteem stability (high/low) ANOVAs were 
computed for each of the dependent measures again. All resulting F ratios were 
found to be non-significant (F<1) suggesting that instability in self-esteem was not a 
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good predictor of experienced subjective stress or task performance. However, while 
no main effect was found for state rehearsal, a strong trend was observed in the 
stress by self-esteem stability interaction (F(2,44)=3.53, p=. 067) as can be seen in 
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2. 
Table 5.3 
Men State Rehearsal Scores for Stable and Unstable Self-esteem 
Groups By Stress Condition 
Stress Condition 
Self-Esteem High Low Total 
Stable 54.45 46.92 50.69 
Unstable 49.00 53.00 51.00 
Total 51.73 49.96 
Post-hoc analyses suggested that while subjects stable in self-esteem tended to report 
greater rehearsal in the stressful condition, those subjects with unstable self-esteem 
were more likely to engage in rehearsal in low stress conditions although this result 
was just marginally non-significant (t(43)=1.96, p=. 057). 
5.2.5 Discussion: Study 1 
First, this study demonstrated that while self-esteem tends to be a relatively enduring 
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personality trait it is also sensitive and potentially malleable depending on situational 
factors. In this way, subjects who were read a bogus personality report subsequently 
reported experiencing higher self-esteem. Those subjects who were exposed to the 
high self-esteem manipulation tended to show superior performance and experience 
less personal threat during the task and this effect was true in low and high stress 
conditions. Hence, consistent with the results reported in chapters three and four, the 
moderating influence of self-esteem appears to occur across stressful conditions, not 
simply in high stress conditions as has been demonstrated for the related personality 
mechanisms of self-complexity (Linville, 1987) and hardiness (Kobasa, 1979). 
There was only an observed trend in the results between manipulated self- 
esteem and rehearsal although the direction was consistent with the hypothesis that 
individuals with high self-esteem tended to engage in cognitive rehearsal less 
frequently than individuals in the neutral self-esteem group. 
This study also demonstrates the personal relevance of an academic- 
achievement oriented task for female students. The preponderance of research 
examining the buffering influence of personality on stress in achievement settings 
have utilized male samples (e. g., Greenberg et al., 1992) including the majority of 
studies reported on the effects of the hardy personality. This study demonstrates that 
female subjects attach personal meaning to academic tasks and personality 
mechanisms play a mediating role in the experience of subjective stress during these 
exercises. 
While this study lends support to the causal role of self-esteem in stress it could 
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be argued that the self-esteem manipulation produced demand characteristics 
whereby subjects in the high self-esteem group were reluctant to express subjective 
distress so as not to appear inconsistent with the experimenter's 'personality report' 
that told them that they tend to'cope well with life's difficulties'. However, the superior 
performance on the cognitive task amongst subjects in the high self-esteem group 
does weaken this position to some extent. However, a more complete test of the 
moderating effect of self-esteem on stress would include an objective index of 
physiological reactivity. 
Study 2 
5.3 The Psychophysiological Correlates of Self-esteem During a 
Stressful Cognitive Task 
5.. 3.1 Introduction 
Study two examined the same hypothesis about the potential buffering effects of self- 
esteem in laboratory induced stress, but in addition to self-reported stress and 
observed errors, heart-rate was monitored to assess the physiological concomitants 
of self-esteem during the task. In addition to the hypotheses established in the first 
study, this study allowed for the direct assessment of stress reactivity during the 
testing period and the rate of change in physiological arousal during the post- 
experimental recovery period. In this way, the study also provided the arena for a re- 
examination of Roger and Jamieson's (1988) findings on the relationship between 
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cognitive rehearsal and prolonged activation in light of manipulated self-esteem. It 
was anticipated that subjects in the high self-esteem group would show less 
physiological activation during the testing period and a faster return to resting heart- 
rate following the task. 
5.3.2 e hod 
The procedure for the first study was replicated, except that between completing the 
self-esteem manipulation check and beginning the Stroop Test subjects were 
connected to a (heart-rate monitor) Seca Sportronic BHL 6000 and given time for 
heart-rate to achieve baseline. This monitor is attached by means of a belt and 
requires skin contact. 
5.3.2.1 Subjects 
Subjects were 41 first year male undergraduate students at the University of York who 
had previously completed at least one personality battery. Six students were 
excluded from the analyses due to incomplete or unreliable heart rate data thus 
leaving a subject pool of 35 for the analyses with 19 in the high self-esteem group and 
17 in the neutral self-esteem group. Subjects were paid £3.00 for their participation. 
5.3.2.2 Conditions 
As the first study pointed to fairly stable effects for self-esteem across high and low 
stress conditions only the high stress condition was replicated, with subjects being 
placed under time pressure and competition. 
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5.3.2.3 Measures 
The measures utilized in this study were just as they were in the first study and, as 
before, in addition to the specific measures constructed for this experiment subject's 
scores on trait self-esteem (YSEI) and emotion control patterns (ECQ) had been 
previously collected and were available for comparison with the above state measures. 
The reliability estimates for the state self-esteem measure (. 81) and the state 
rehearsal scale (. 72) were also satisfactory. The dependent measures included the 
8-item post-experimental distress scale, errors made on the task, and state rehearsal 
scores. In addition to these measures heart rate data were computed according to 
three time intervals: baseline period (2.5 minutes) test period (2.5 minutes) and 
recovery period (3 minutes). 
5.3.3 suits 
Manipulation Check 
The results from the ANOVA for the self-esteem manipulation check demonstrated 
that male subjects who received the positive personality feedback did not report higher 
self-esteem (although all of the means were slightly higher in the high self-esteem 
group); either on the total scale score or any of the three state dimensions. Hence, 
the personality feedback that to some extent manipulated self-esteem in Study one 
was unsuccessful in Study two. These results did not appear to be due to possible 
ceiling effects as the mean score on the YSEI was nearly identical to the standardized 
sample mean (M=107.25, SD=13.27). To further assess the possible role of a ceiling 
effect on self-esteem scores, analyses on state self-esteem were conducted again 
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whilst controlling for baseline self-esteem (YSEI) in an ANCOVA and the results 
confirmed that the lack of differences between the two self-esteem groups was not 
due to differences in baseline self-esteem. 
Despite this apparent failure to induce differing self-esteem states, analyses 
were conducted nonetheless because of previous evidence pointing to the particular 
likelihood that males will defend self-esteem (such as reporting inflated level of self- 
esteem) when it is under threat (Greenberg et aI., 1992). 
Stress measure 
Similar to the significant inter-relationship between the 8 items in the previous study, 
high-magnitude inter-correlations were also observed in this study. To reduce 
redundancy factor analysis with principal axis factoring and oblimin rotation was 
conducted using the scree test and eigenvalue criteria previously employed. The 
results demonstrated that a two-factor solution was the best fit to the data accounting 
for 58% of the variance. As seen in Table 5.4 factor I (Eigenvalue=2.70,33.7% of 
the variance explained) appears to reflect experimental 'distress' with the highest 
loading being item 5 'felt insecure during the task. ' This factor largely reflects the 
'distress' factor extracted in the previous study. The second factor (Eigenvalue=1.14, 
14.3% of explained variance), with unique loadings on items 1 and 7, appeared to 
reflect' challenge and commitment' with the highest loading on item 1 'found the task 
stressful. ' In contrast to the previous study where item 1 loaded on the distress factor 
in this study reported experimental 'stress' loaded on the second factor with perceived 
meaningfulness of the task. Finally, item 4 'was feeling angry during the task' did not 
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Table 5.4 
Item Loadings for The Post-experimental Distress Rating Scale (Oblimin) 
Item Factor Loadings 
F1 F2 
(1) Stress . 83 
(2) Disturbance . 56 
(3) Anxiety . 56 
(4) Anger 
(5) Insecure . 88 
(6) Challenged 
. 56 
(7) Meaningfulness . 52 
(8) Perceived Control -. 63 
load on either factor. Because anger may be particularly relevant for male subjects 
when under threat, it was retained for individual analysis. Hence, the two factors are 
essentially the same with factor 1 reflecting experimental distress and factor 2 
reflecting an indice of threat and commitment and the third item, anger, was assessed 
independently. The total score, two sub-factor scores and item 4 were then submitted 
to independent ANOVAs. 
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Self-report measures 
First, individual oneway ANOVAs were conducted for 4 measures of experimental 
stress with self-esteem group as the independent variable. In contrast to the previous 
study, no significant differences emerged in any of these analyses (F<1) with neutral 
and high self-esteem subjects reporting equivalent levels of stress and emotional 
upset during the experimental task. 
Task Performance 
Moreover, there was a trend for high self-esteem subjects to make fewer mistakes on 
the task (M=8.21) than neutral self-esteem subjects (M=1 4.00) although this difference 
was not statistically significant (F(1,34)=2.85, p=. 10). 
Rehearsal Scores 
A similar trend was observed in the post-experimental rehearsal scores, where the 
high self-esteem subjects tended to report less rehearsal (M=87.84) than the neutral 
self-esteem group (M=92.82) but this difference was not significant (F<1). 
Heart-rate Results 
First, the relationship between reported stress following the task and the physiological 
index of arousal during the testing period was in the expected direction but not robust 
(r(35)=. 23ns), thus suggesting only approximate convergence between the subjective 
and objective markers of experimental stress. A repeated measures analysis 
MANOVA with self-esteem group as the between-groups variable and testing period 
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(baseline, test, recovery) as the within-group repeated measure demonstrated no 
between subject effects for self-esteem group (F<1). Examining the within-group 
effects there was the expected effect for arousal period (F(2,24)=44.57 p<. 001) 
although there was no self-esteem group by arousal period interaction. These results 
pointed to the equivocal nature of heart-rate arousal between the two self-esteem 
groups across the different phases of the study. 
5.3.4 Subsidiary Analyses 
Consistent with the interest in examining the role of instability in self-esteem in relation 
to subjective and objective experimental stress and task performance, z-scores were 
created for both baseline and state measures of self-esteem just as they had in study 
one. A resulting normal distribution in change scores was subsequently divided into 
stable and unstable groups based on a median split which occurred at approximately 
one half a standard deviation point as was the case in the preceding sample. In the 
ANOVA tests on subjective stress, performance and state rehearsal no main effects 
were observed (F<1). Further, a repeated measures analysis with self-esteem stability 
(high/low) as the between groups variable and heart-rate arousal at baseline, test, and 
recovery as the within-subject repeated measure did not produce any significant 
between or within-group effects for self-esteem stability. These results further extend 
the results of study one insofar as self-esteem instability offered no explanatory power 
in relation to stress or performance. 
191 
5.3.4.1 Post-hoc Analyses 
While the self-esteem manipulation failed to produce differential levels of self-esteem, 
interest remained in examining the role of self-esteem in self-reported and 
physiological markers of stress. Upper and lower tertile groups were created to reflect 
high (N=10) and low (N=12) self-esteem groups and the ANOVAs were repeated. The 
results demonstrated that individuals with high self-esteem reported experiencing less 
experimental distress (Factor 1)(18.71 versus 21.73)(F(1,21)=4.33, p<. 05), less 
rehearsal (81.92 versus 97.00) (F(1,21)=7.09, p<. 01) and the margin for errors made 
on the task increased (HSE=11.33 versus 14.00) although this only remained a weak 
trend (F<1). Further, examination of the heart-rate data demonstrated the expected 
trends for test period (HSE=93.42 versus NSE=103.40 (F(1,21)=2.51 p=. 13) and 
recovery (HSE=80.00 versus NSE=82.90) (F(1,21)=2.34 p=. 16) although the trends 
failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance. None of the other 
dependent measures were significantly different by self-esteem group. 
Finally, the correlations between trait and state rehearsal did not replicate 
Roger and Jamieson's (1988) previous findings. The relationship between baseline 
rehearsal (ECQ-R) and the total recovery period was (r(35)=-. 07 ns) and the state 
rehearsal measure correlated only slightly better (r(35)=. 10 ns). Further, examination 
of three separate 1 minute intervals during the recovery period did not improve the 
findings (all is < . 12). 
5.3.4.2 Study 1- Study 2 Comparisons 
The pattern of results between the first and second studies appeared to differ 
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significantly despite the consistency in the experimental manipulation and completed 
measures. To better gauge the meaning of these differences the results from the 
current study were compared with the results from the high stress condition in the 
previous study. 
Trait and State Self-esteem 
Similar to study one, trait and state self-esteem were significantly correlated 
(r(30)=. 40, p<. 05). However, while trait self-esteem was found to be unrelated (all 
correlations near zero) to self-reported stress in the female sample, trait (YSEI) self- 
esteem was found to relate significantly to reported experimental distress (Factor 1) 
(r(30)=-. 36, p<. 05) in the male sample. The magnitude of this correlation was nearly 
identical to the correlation between state self-esteem and experimental distress thus 
suggesting that whereas male subjects may be less sensitive to situational attempts 
to manipulate self-esteem their typically maintained levels of self-esteem do influence 
performance and reactivity in potentially stressful situations. 
Dependent measures 
Finally, to gauge whether or not there were differences on the raw scores of self- 
report and task measures, male subjects (n=30) were compared against female 
subjects in the high stress condition from study one (n=21). Individual ANOVAs for 
state self-esteem level, experimental distress scores (total scale score), errors, and 
state rehearsal scores were all equivocal with no differences emerging based on 
subject sex. Hence, the significant pattern of findings between study one and study 
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two are not due to differences in distribution characteristics on any of the outcome 
measures but rather point to probable qualitative differences in the relationship 
between trait and state self-esteem and the outcome measures in the two study 
samples. 
5.3.5 Discussion: Study 2 
The findings from this study appear much more complicated than the results 
obtained in the first study. In contrast to the ability to successfully manipulate state 
self-esteem in females, this attempt appeared to fail with male subjects. Because the 
manipulation was an attempt to bolster self-esteem in the high self-esteem 
manipulation and not to threaten self-esteem in the neutral self-esteem manipulation 
the results between the two studies point more to the receptiveness of female subjects 
to positive information opposed to differences between the groups in their reactions 
to self-esteem threats. One tentative explanation for this difference emerges from the 
results obtained in the previous studies on the comparatively more important role of 
emotion-oriented coping in females. These studies and others (e. g., Endler & Parker, 
1990) point to the greater propensity of females to engage in emotion-oriented coping. 
It may be that females are more responsive to the emotional qualities of situations and 
in this way the valence of feedback. Consistent with this interpretation is the finding 
that women typically have more elevated physiological responses when under 
stressful conditions. 
Despite the failure of the self-esteem manipulation and subsequent differences 
in subjective or objective stress, post-hoc analyses pointed to the importance of self- 
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esteem in subjective distress and trends in physiological reactivity. When post he 
high and low self-esteem groups were created based on state self-esteem scores, tl 
expected differences between the groups emerged on reported experimental distre; 
and cognitive rumination following the task. However, the findings for heart-ra 
elevation during the test period and the recovery period remained only statistic 
trends. One limitation on these results, however, is the restriction on statistical pow 
due to the relatively small sample size. 
While the results from study one and study two do implicate self-esteem 
achievement-related stress, it would also be important to demonstrate the bufferin 
role of self-esteem in more socially-oriented contexts. 
Study 3 
5.4 The Psychophysiological Correlates of Self-esteem During 
A Stressful Social-Communication Task 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Consistent with the two previous studies the majority of studies that have examine 
the impact of failure feedback on self-esteem and subsequent performance, motivatiol 
and affect, has utilized a pre-experimental task that is clearly an academic-related 
achievement task and the feedback consists of bogus scores on this task. Typically 
the next task is also an academically-related cognitive task. The potential problerr 
with this limited contextual operationalization of stress is that a) only self-evaluative 
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components relevant to academic performance are primed and b) the differential effect 
between high and low self-esteem is only relevant to this limited domain. It has been 
argued previously (see chapter 2) and empirically demonstrated (see chapter 4) that 
sources of interpersonal or social stress are connected to self-related processes. 
Therefore, it would be relevant to demonstrate a causal role of self-esteem in 
stress reactivity in a more communication-oriented context. This final study sought 
to test the moderating influence manipulated state self-esteem in subjective and 
objective stress in a study focusing on confidence in social skills. 
5.. 4.2 Method 
5.4.2.1 Subjects 
Subjects were 29 female first year undergraduate students at the University of York. 
Some subjects were drawn from a first-year research panel while some other subjects 
were psychology students. Similar to studies one and two, after completing a consent 
form the experimenter explained that the subject's personality characteristics had been 
measured in a previous testing session and that an individual 'personality profile 
report' had been prepared (in this study not all subjects had completed the same 
baseline measures although all subjects had completed some previous questionnaires 
during the academic year). The personality feedback constituted the self-esteem 
manipulation. As before, subjects were randomly assigned to either a neutral or 
positive personality report and given approximately two minutes to read and think 
about the report and the experimenter was blind to the valence of the report. Three 
subjects were unable to produce reliable heart-rate data which left a total of 26 
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subjects for the analyses. Subjects were paid £3.00 for their participation. 
5.4.2.2 Procedure 
Subjects were told that the experiment was to determine the relationship between 
personality and social skills. Subjects were told that they would be asked to read a 
short passage from a novel and would be assessed according to several dimensions 
that measure social skills such as a) clarity of expression, and b) accurateness in 
depicting the story. In short, subjects were asked to read the passage to "reflect your 
ability to express yourself in a coherent and interesting fashion and the task is aimed 
at assessing your general social skills". 
Subjects were told that behind the one-way mirror were cameras and 
equipment to help the experimenter properly examine her performance and a bogus 
tape recorder was set-up to appear as if the performance was being taped. After 
these instructions subjects were given a consent form to complete and were then 
connected to the to the Seca Sportronic BHL 6000 heart monitor. 
Next the experimenter stated "I'm going to give you some time to get 
acquainted with the passage but first I would like to share with you some feedback on 
your questionnaire responses that you completed earlier in the year. At this point 
subjects were given a written report with their name on it that was either the neutral 
and high self-esteem manipulation and they had approximately two minutes to read 
the report. Next subjects were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
written passage for approximately one minute. Subjects were then told that they would 
shortly be asked to begin their performance but some final equipment preparation was 
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required. Here subjects sat quietly for roughly 2.5 minutes and this constituted the 
baseline period. Just before starting the experiment subjects were first asked to 
complete the RSE and this served as the manipulation check. 
Next the experimenter explained to the subject that she would be shortly 
beginning the task and that it would go as long as needed until the experimenter felt 
that he had sufficient information to examine her skills. She was told that she would 
be interrupted and to sit quietly after this as the experimenter would need several 
minutes to analyze the results. All subjects were interrupted 2.5 minutes into the 
passage and were then given three minutes and this served as the 'recovery' period. 
Finally, subjects removed the heart-rate measure and then completed the 
following post-experimental questionnaires: a) 8-item stress measure and the 19-item 
state rehearsal measure utilized in the previous studies. 
7.4.2.3 Conditions and Measures 
State Self-esteem 
In the two previous studies, despite the reports of subjects following the experiment 
that they were affected by the self-esteem report, and the largely supportive results, 
the manipulation check with the state self-esteem scale devised by Heatherton and 
Polivy (1991) appeared relatively insensitive to the state self-esteem changes. Part 
of the problem appeared to be due to the length of the scale and the possibility that 
the state effects were lost across a 20-item, three-dimensional scale. Further, the 
YSEI could not be used in its place to provide a more sensitive test of the 
hypothesized state changes because of its trait emphasis and broad scope (30 items). 
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It was decided that to better determine the differences in state self-esteem 
responsivity, subjects would complete the RSE (as the state self-esteem manipulation 
check). While it was argued that the Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory (Rosenberg, 
1965) is not a sensitive state measure (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) it was utilized in 
light of the problems discussed, and because of its quick and easy completion (10 
items). Hence, this final study provided a rather conservative test of the effectiveness 
of the self-esteem manipulation. 
Stress measure 
Subjects completed the same 8-item experimental stress report used in the earlier 
studies. Based on the factor analytic results from study one the total scale score was 
examined, and in addition the two factors 'distress' and 'commitment' were examined 
separately. The total scale comprised 8 items scored in the direction of greater 
distress (items 6 and 7 are reversed) with a theoretical range of 8-56. 
Physiological Measure 
In addition to the subjective index stress heart rate data were computed according to 
three time intervals: baseline period (2.5 minutes) test period (2.5 minutes) and 
recovery period (3 minutes). Finally, the recovery period was broken down into 3 one 
minute periods to examine the rate of change towards baseline and average heart 
was computed for each one minute interval separately. 
ECQ State Rehearsal 
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This was the same measure used in the previous studies. The scoring was on a 5- 
point likert format with scores ranging from 1 'strongly disagree' to 5 'strongly agree' 
with a total scale score in the direction of greater rehearsal and a theoretical range of 
18 to 90. 
5.4.3 Results 
Manipulation Check 
Subjects were evenly assigned to the neutral and high self-esteem groups. To assess 
the success of the self-esteem manipulation an ANOVA was conducted with self- 
esteem group (high/neutral) as the independent variable and the total RSE score as 
the dependent variable. Inspection of the distribution of RSE scores pointed to an 
outlier. The sample mean RSE score was 37.72 and the outlier's RSE score was 
13.00. This score was converted to a Z-score (Z=3.40) and with a criterion cut-off of 
3 (Marascuilo & Serlin, 1988, p. 73) this subject's RSE score was identified as a true 
outlier and discarded from the analyses. As such the high self-esteem group had one 
less subject. 
The results from the ANOVA for total RSE demonstrated that subjects in the 
high (M=41.36) versus the neutral (M=36.54) self-esteem groups differed in their state 
levels of self-esteem and this difference was statistically significant (F(1,24)=6.16, 
p<. 02). The results thus support the success of the self-esteem manipulation. 
Subjective Stress 
One-way ANOVAs for self-esteem (high/neutral) by reported stress on the 8-item 
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stress index were computed. As stated, in addition to the total scale score sub-scale 
scores were computed for the two factors previously derived from female scores in 
study one, tapping a) experimental distress and b) commitment and challenge. The 
results for the total scale score demonstrated that subjects in the neutral and high self- 
esteem groups did not differ overall in their reported level of stress (F<1). 
Examination of the sub-scale scores showed that while no differences emerged on the 
'distress' sub-dimension, the two groups differed on their level of commitment and 
challenge (F(1,25)=4.69, p<. 05) with subjects in the high self-esteem group reporting 
more commitment during the task. 
Physiological Arousal 
First, self-reported stress in this study correlated fairly weakly with heart-rate during 
the testing period (r=. 14) and the magnitude of the correlation was identical in both 
the high and neutral self-esteem groups. Because the experiment sought to generate 
social stress and not academic-evaluative stress it may have been the case that this 
study was not largely seen to be stressful and so therefore self-esteem differences did 
not emerge between the two groups. In support of this argument subjects reported 
less 'distress' in this experiment than they did in the first study (t(75)=2.01, p=. 025). 
However, physiological arousal would still indicate the degree to which subjects were 
challenged by the experiment. 
To examine the degree to which subjects in the neutral and high self-esteem 
groups differed in their heart-rate arousal before, during and following the social task, 
a repeated measures MANOVA was conducted with self-esteem as the between- 
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groups variable and baseline (2.5 minutes) test (2.5 minutes) and recovery (3 minutes) 
as the repeated within-group measure. Overall, no between group effect was 
observed although a within-group effect was found for Time (F(2,21)=14.35, p<. 001) 
and a trend was observed in the Self-esteem Group by Time within-group interaction 
(F(2,21)=2.60, p<. 09). While this latter effect was not significant, follow-up univariate 
analyses were conducted to unravel this statistical trend. 
As seen in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 while the groups were nearly equivalent 
at baseline a clear separation occurs during the testing period with the average heart 
rate in the neutral group (M=1 05.00) 1 exceeded the rate in the high self-esteem group 
(M=88.83) and this difference was statistically significant (F(1,22)=4.58, p<. 05). 
Finally, in contrast to the expected finding of elevated arousal at recovery period in the 
neutral self-esteem group, the average rate in the two groups is nearly equivalent. 
Looking at Table 5.6 Figure 5.4 the recovery period is separated into three one-minute 
intervals and the trend is for high self-esteem subjects to achieve a lower post- 
experimental heart-rate although these differences are not statistically significant and, 
moreover, appear largely dependent on the heart-rate differential at the beginning of 
the recovery phase. 
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Table 5.5 
Average Heart-rate Values Across Phases of The Experiment 
For High and Neutral Self-esteem Groups 
Phase of Study 
Self-Esteem Baseline Test Period Recovery Period 
High 84.17 88.83 78.83 
Neutral 90.97 105.00 80.73 
Table 5.6 
Averaae Heart-rate Values Across The Three Phases of The Recove 
Period For High and Neutral Self-esteem Subjects 
Recovery Phases 
Self-Esteem Ist Minute 2nd Minute 3rd Minute 
High 79.25 77.58 78.58 
Neutral 83.15 83.00 81.92 
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Self-esteem and State Rehearsal 
A one-way ANOVA was computed to determine whether or not there were reported 
differences in state rehearsal by self-esteem group. While the high self-esteem group 
tended to report lower state rehearsal (47.38) than the neutral group (50.67) these 
differences were not statistically significant (F<1). To further investigate the 
relationship between self-esteem and state rehearsal post-hoc correlation analyses 
were computed between RSE and state rehearsal and the finding reflected a trend in 
the expected direction (r(25)=. 21 ns) with subjects with high state self-esteem showing 
less state rehearsal. 
5.4.4 Discussion: Study 3 
First, this study successfully manipulated self-esteem, in a different experimental 
context, with a different state measure of self-esteem than was used in the first study. 
The results further demonstrate the state responsiveness of self-esteem to positive 
personality feedback. Second, the differences in subjective distress reported during 
the experiment did not differ by self-esteem group as was anticipated. This is in 
contrast to the first experiment that did successfully produce the expected buffering 
results. As suggested in the results section, the post-experimental questionnaire was 
initially constructed for the stressful experimental tasks of studies 1 and 2. Inspection 
of the raw scores between this study and study one suggested that subjects may have 
found this experiment challenging they did not perceive it as stressful. This may be 
consistent with non-achievement oriented tasks where the contextual heuristics of the 
task are more ambiguous, but nonetheless, influenced by personality processes. An 
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alternative explanation is that female subjects are less willing to report subjective 
stress in experimental conditions where they believe they are naturally competent. 
For instance, a growing literature on sex differences in interpersonal communication 
skills demonstrate that females are typically more confident in their skills and actually 
demonstrate superior communication skills (Feingold, 1994). This may be the exact 
opposite effect with males in achievement-oriented contexts. It would be useful to 
have a re-examination of this study comprising a male sample. However, subjects who 
were given the high self-esteem manipulation did report greater commitment and 
personal involvement during the exercise. This finding is consistent with the general 
findings of the hardiness construct, where subjects who personally involve themselves 
in life experiences tend to derive more satisfaction from their involvement. 
In contrast to the absence of significant results in reported subjective stress, the 
heart-rate arousal data does lend further support that the majority of subjects did 
experience heightened arousal during the social skills performance. Further, the 
expected buffering effect was found for self-esteem: subjects in the high self-esteem 
group showed significantly lower heart-rate arousal during the testing period. Even 
though subjects may not have labelled this arousal as 'negative arousal' the 
mechanisms of autonomic activation and their deleterious effects would still occur. 
Finally, while the self-esteem manipulation did not influence state rehearsal in this 
study the trends were in the expected direction. 
5.5 General Discussion 
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The series of studies reported in this chapter lend support to the moderating role of 
self-esteem in stress-induced arousal and, by implication, health-related mechanisms. 
The successful manipulation of self-esteem in study one produced the expected 
subjective ratings of greater distress during a stressful laboratory task. The successful 
manipulation of self-esteem in study 3 led to observed differences in experienced 
physiological arousal during the experimental task. Further, while study two failed to 
sufficiently bolster subject's self-esteem the post-hoc analyses demonstrated that 
subjects experiencing comparatively lower state self-esteem during the task were 
more likely to report subjective distress and show elevated heart-rate arousal. 
Collectively these results support the temporal saliency of self-esteem in stress-related 
arousal. A recent study by Greenberg and colleagues (Greenberg et al., 1992) which 
directly attempted to manipulate self-esteem similarly found that self-esteem buffered 
the individual from subjective and objective indices of experimental anxiety. They also 
observed that threats to self-esteem produced defensive reactions. Just as anxiety 
poses a threat to self-esteem, protecting oneself from threats to self-esteem also 
reduces experienced anxiety. This model could be similarly applied to the experience 
of stress. However, because this study aimed to enhance self-esteem rather than 
threatening self-esteem a more robust test of self-esteem effects in stress may, in the 
future, utilize a more threatening manipulation procedure. This would parallel the 
nature of actual feedback contingencies in various life situations, where it is negative 
feedback that typically generates the expected polarization of self-esteem differences. 
Notwithstanding, this research is perhaps the first demonstration that enhancing self- 
esteem creates the greater resilience to stress. The results of positive self-esteem 
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feedback are also consistent with the correlational patterns observed in chapter four 
and a number of recent studies that showed that positive life events were more 
predictive of health outcomes than negative life events. 
The relationship between self-esteem and emotion-control processes, namely 
cognitive rehearsal, and stress measures were less demonstrative than the previous 
relationships discussed although still suggestive of an important mechanism. In study 
one manipulation of self-esteem did produce the expected changes in state rehearsal 
with subjects in the high self-esteem manipulation tending to report less rehearsal. 
Further, the significant interaction between unstable self-esteem and rehearsal 
suggested that in addition to level of self-esteem, stability of self-esteem may relate 
to a greater tendency to rehearse. Further, study two demonstrated that subjects 
experiencing comparatively lower state self-esteem were also likely to engage in 
greater state rehearsal. However, this relationship was not established in the final 
study, although the statistical trend was in the expected direction. In short, this study 
suggests that manipulated self-esteem was causally related to the tendency to engage 
in state rumination. This further supports the idea that individuals with lower self- 
esteem are more 
The strength of the preceding studies rest on the direct manipulation of the 
independent variable under study, self-esteem, and the random assignment of 
subjects to different self-esteem groups. Psychological and physiological measures 
of stress allowed for the assessment of converging effects by self-esteem. Moreover, 
the control of the inherent stress level of the situation provided a further and more 
systematic test of the 'main effects' versus the 'interaction effects' or 'buffering' 
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hypothesis of the relationship between self-esteem and stress. The results are 
consistent with the previous findings in this thesis: self-esteem appears to have a 
moderating influence on the psychological and physiological aspects of stress in both 
high and low stress conditions. Low self-esteem maybe a chronic vulnerability factor 
and may precipitate negative health outcomes across time independent of situational 
feedback and life events. This was particularly borne out in the first study where self- 
esteem predicted distress scores over and above the effects of stress condition. 
This study provided a systematic test of the role of self-esteem in state 
cognitive rumination. The results were consistent, albeit varying in magnitude, where 
enhancement of self-esteem led to reduced situationally-based rumination over the 
task performance. These results support and extend the correlational pattern between 
self-esteem and rumination. However, examination of the physiological data during 
the recovery phases of the second and third studies did not replicate the previous 
relationship between prolonged activation following a stressful exercise and rehearsal 
scores. In this study neither state or disposition rumination tendencies correlated with 
physiological arousal. There may be an important methodological difference between 
Roger and Jamieson's (1988) study and the recovery interval employed in this 
research. They used 15 second average heart-rate intervals and found the strongest 
effects from the period just ending the testing period and beginning the recovery 
period. This rather small interval increased the sensitivity to the subtle differences. 
In this research, a one-minute interval was utilized and, as such, may have been too 
long an interval. 
The weakness of the current research is reflected in the relatively small sample 
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sizes. Many of the findings in this study appeared very robust but then failed to meet 
conventional levels statistical significance. Low power due to the small sample was 
undoubtedly a contributing factor. 
In this study only heart-rate was indexed to assess the physiological correlates 
of self-esteem under stress. In light of the relative independence of the subjective 
stress report and arousal in study 3, it would have been helpful to have multiple 
physiological measures. In short, this preliminary research needs replication with 
larger samples and multiple measures of stress to better assess the moderating 
influence of self-esteem in acute stress. 
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Chapter 6 
6 Self-esteem and Emotion Control in Anxiety 
And Depressive-Spectrum Disorders 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapters three and four self-esteem was associated with the experience of 
psychological distress. In the preceding chapter, subjects who were exposed to 
an artificial enhancement of their self-esteem experienced less experimental 
distress. This chapter attempts to extend these findings linking self-esteem to 
mental health in more serious distress, clinical depression and anxiety disorders. 
Self-esteem has long-been implicated in clinical depression. Freud (1917) 
first distinguished between the normal bereavement process and melancholy 
based on whether there was the presence of negative self-directed cognitions. 
Later psychoanalytic theorists placed vulnerable self-esteem at the core of 
depressive proneness (Rado, 1928). More contemporary psychoanalytic theories 
also focus on the self, where risk for depression is seen to increase as the 
individual tends to remain overly dependent upon a few, external sources of self- 
worth and is unable tolerate discrepancies between excessively high goals and 
actual performance (Roberts & Monroe, 1994). Negative self-evaluation has also 
been given central importance in cognitive models of depression (Beck, 1976; 
Segal, 1988). Clinical and experimental studies from the cognitive perspective 
demonstrate that individuals with unstable, uncertain and poor efficiency in 
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self-schemata are more likely to a) experience depression and b) experience a 
more severe and prolonged depressive episode than individuals who have more 
stable and certain sources of self-worth (Roberts and Monroe, 1994). A third 
prominent theory of depression that implicates self-esteem, is Brown and Harris's 
(1978) psychosocial model. In this model, individuals with low self-esteem are 
increasingly vulnerable to experience depression when faced with negative life 
events. In this way, the maintenance of low self-esteem is an ongoing 
vulnerability factor for depression. This model has been supported in a host of 
previous studies (Brown & Harris, 1978; Roberts and Monroe, 1992; Brown, 
Andrews, Bifulco, & Veiel, 1990) and best explains the previous findings between 
self-esteem and reported psychological distress in chapters three and four. The 
results demonstrated that after controlling for initial levels of psychological distress, 
self-esteem moderated the development of distress approximately 8 weeks later. 
In chapter four, self-esteem proved to be a relatively chronic vulnerability factor 
for distress and dysphoria across the academic year. In addition to supporting the 
moderating, main-effects model, that study demonstrated that individuals with high 
self-esteem were most likely to experience stress-buffering consequences from the 
experience of positive life events, thus pointing also to important interactive 
effects. 
In chapter three cognitive rumination (rehearsal) was also implicated in the 
experience of distress, particularly through its interactive effects with self-esteem, 
where individuals with low self-esteem and a greater propensity to ruminate 
over upsetting emotional experiences were most likely to experience negative 
outcomes. These findings are consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema and her 
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colleagues (1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993,1994) who have directly 
implicated rumination processes in depression. She has demonstrated that 
individuals who focus passively and ruminatively on negative emotions aroused 
by stressful events are at greater risk for severe and prolonged periods of distress. 
Moreover, in the examination of those who are already clinically depressed those 
who ruminate are more likely to remain depressed than those who do not tend to 
ruminate. Further, experimental studies with depressed subjects have shown that 
inducing rumination leads to: negative, and distorted interpretation of events; self- 
defeating attributions for negative events; and greater hopelessness than 
depressed subjects who are given a distracting activity ( Lyubomirsky & Nolen- 
Hoeksema, 1993; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, & Greenberg, 1989). 
Hence, there is converging evidence that self-esteem and rumination are 
two potential moderating variables in the development and course of depression 
and chapter three provided some preliminary support for their interactive effects 
on psychological distress. 
Self-esteem has been less directly implicated in anxiety disorders although 
there is a long history demonstrating a link between self-esteem and trait anxiety 
(e. g., Janis & Field, 1959) and between self-esteem and clinical anxiety disorders 
(Ingham, Kreitman, McMiller, Sashidhara, & Surtees, 1986). Anxiety is the over- 
estimation of danger and threat either in specific situations (phobias) or across a 
wide range of situations (e. g., generalized anxiety disorder). Consistent with the 
transactional model of stress (Lazarus, 1966) it is the perception of threat that 
creates the associated psychological (experienced upset, distress) and 
physiological (e. g., elevated heart rate; sweating, trembling) discomfort. Just as 
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self-esteem, it is being argued, moderates the perception of threat in potentially 
stressful circumstances, self-esteem may provide a similar moderating influence 
in more serious psychopathology such as anxiety disorders. In perhaps the first 
study to test the direct causal role of self-esteem in anxiety, Greenberg and 
colleagues (1992) manipulated self-esteem in student subjects and observed the 
expected buffering effects on the subsequent experience of anxiety across a 
series of anxiety-related conditions thus pointing to the direct role of self-esteem 
in state anxiety experiences. However, there is a need to assess the role of self- 
esteem in more enduring and incapacitating anxiety experiences. 
Similarly, while cognitive rumination has been conceptually and empirically 
developed in models of depression, there is a dearth of investigation into its 
possible role in anxiety disorders. Nolem-Hoeksema and colleagues (1994) have 
argued that ruminative coping reflects excessive worry about mood-related 
problems. Central to the diagnosis and clinical phenomenology of anxiety 
disorders is excessive worry (Brown, O'Leary, & Barlow, 1993). Conceptually, 
cognitive rumination is said to reflect passive, mental rehearsing of past upsetting 
events. In depression this takes the form and content of excessive brooding over 
negative thoughts about self, others, and their future, the well observed 'cognitive 
triad' (Beck, 1976). In anxiety, rumination may occur with respect to future 
expectations of self-relevant failure, loss and rejection. Hence, individuals who 
maintain low self-esteem and who ruminate over future threat may be most likely 
to experience anxiety related difficulties. To test the prediction of past versus 
future cognitive rehearsal in the current study, two new ECQ factors were created 
based on the existing rehearsal construct, with a retrospective factor including 
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existing items focused on the tendency to ruminate over past events, with several 
newly written items, and 12 new items reflecting rumination over future events and 
interpersonal situations. (see below for further discussion). 
This study sought to explore and contrast the nature of self-esteem in a 
group of patients diagnosed with a depressive-spectrum or anxiety-spectrum 
disorder. It was anticipated that both clinical groups would show deficits in self- 
esteem in comparison to the student standardization sample (chapter 1) although 
no hypotheses were made with respect to between group differences. Second, 
this study provided a more robust test of the role of emotion-control processes in 
individuals who, by definition, have difficulties managing affective experiences. It 
was hypothesized that both patient groups would show deficits when compared 
to student norms on rehearsal and emotion inhibition and in light of psychoanalytic 
formulations of anger in depression it was anticipated that the depressed group 
would show greater inhibition of aggressive tendencies. Third, this study provided 
pilot data on the directionality of ruminating content, either future or past. It was 
anticipated that the anxiety group would show elevations on prospective rehearsal 
whereas the depressed group would show greater elevation on retrospective 
rehearsal. Finally, while still related to the third hypothesis, this study provided the 
opportunity to examine the differential role of self-esteem and emotion control 
strategies, and particularly the moderating influence of self-esteem in 
retrospective and prospective rehearsal. It was anticipated that low self-esteem 
in anxiety patients would lead to comparatively more prospective rehearsal 
whereas low self-esteem would lead to retrospective rehearsal in depressed 
patients and this would be evidenced by differential correlation patterns between 
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self-esteem and rehearsal in the two groups. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Subjects 
Consecutive patients admitted to the adult section of a clinical psychology 
department who had a diagnosis (DSM-III-R criteria) of a mood disorder within the 
depression spectrum (major depression, dysthymia, cyclothymia) or a diagnosis 
of an anxiety disorder (panic disorder, social and simple phobia, obsessive 
compulsive disorder) were invited to participate in the study. The present sample 
consisted of 25 anxiety-disorder and 25 depressed patients. Seven of the 25 
depressed patients also had a secondary diagnosis within the anxiety spectrum. 
The data from these mixed patients were collapsed with 'pure' depressed sample 
because the primary diagnosis was depression. Overall there were 24 men (48%) 
and 26 women (52%) and their mean age was 35.6 years (sd=11.2, range 20- 
59yrs). 
6.2.2 Procedure 
All patients were referred to the Clinical Psychology Services for assessment and 
treatment of a psychological problem. Patients were approached upon their first 
visit to the department and asked to participate in the study. It was explained that 
the questionnaires would take approximately 20 minutes and that they would have 
time to complete them before their first appointment. While patients were told that 
some of the questions could be reviewed in subsequent clinical sessions (due to 
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the clinical nature of the forms), it was clarified that their decision to participate 
in the study would in no way influence their acceptance into, or the course of 
treatment. Each patient's symptom profile was assessed as part of the standard 
diagnostic and assessment phase of treatment. To cover the breadth of possible 
Axis I and Axis II disorders of the DSM-III-R, clinical interviews were loosely 
formatted on the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Clinical Disorders (SCID). 
The completed questionnaires were not examined until a reliable diagnosis had 
been made to assure that the diagnosis was made when blind to the patients 
questionnaire responses. 
6.2.3 Materials 
York Self-esteem Inventory (YSEI) 
The YSEI has been described in detail in chapter two. The YSEI used in this 
study compromises 30 items measuring global self-esteem. Items reflect various 
evaluative self-domains including: personal, interpersonal, familial, achievement, 
physical attractiveness and the degree of evaluative uncertainty across these 
domains. Preliminary psychometric examination of the scale has revealed strong 
internal reliability (Alpha . 86) and test- re-test reliability (. 83) over an 8-week ITI 
(see chapter two for psychometric properties of the YSEI). In part, this study also 
served to provide further concurrent validation for the newly created YSEI as its 
predictive validity could be examined in relation to psychopathology- 
Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ) 
The Emotion Control Questionnaire (ECQ: Roger & Nesshoever, 1987; Roger & 
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Najarian, 1989) comprises four scales labelled Rehearsal (R), Emotion Inhibition 
(El), Aggression Control (AC) and Benign Control (BC). R examines the degree 
to which a person broods over past threats and failure. For example an item from 
this factor is I get "worked up' just thinking about things that have upset me in 
the past". El measures the willingness of subjects to express emotion; "When 
someone upsets me, I try to hide my feelings". AC is a measure of the degree 
to which aggression is controlled; OR someone were to hit me, I would hit back". 
Finally, BC has been shown to be a measure of impulsivity; "I often do or say 
things I later regret. Previous examination of this scale has shown the factors to 
be relatively independent, particularly R and El, and the individual factors have 
also been shown to possess satisfactory internal and test-retest reliability (Roger 
& Najarian, 1989). 
In addition, new rehearsal items were written to reflect rumination over the 
occurrence of past (12) or future (12) events; retrospective and prospective 
rehearsal, respectively (Roger & Najarian, 1995) (see extended ECQ scale in 
Appendix A8). The Cronbach Alpha Coefficients were found to be low to 
moderate for the retrospective (. 29) and the prospective (. 53) factors, respectively. 
Despite the low reliability estimates this study retained the two new rehearsal 
factors for pilot examination because the ECQ has yet to be tested in clinical 
populations. 
6.3 Results 
Descriptive 
The breakdown of demographic and clinical features for the total sample 
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Table 6.1 
Demographic Profile For the Total Clinical Population and The Anxiety and 
Depressed Groups Separately 
Clinical Groups 
Variable 
Age 
M 
SD 
Age of Onset 
M 
SD 
Duration of Illness 
M 
SD 
GAF+ 
M 
SD 
Sex (%) 
Men 
Women 
Marital Status (%) 
Single 
Married/Cohabit. 
Divorced 
Education (%) 
High School 
College 
University 
Professional 
Anxiety Depressed 
32.6 " 
9.8 
29.1 
9.5 
5.2 
5.4 
60.8 
13.2 
60 
36 
25 
63 
13 
56 
13 
19 
13 
38.6 
11.9 
32.0 
11.6 
7.9 
9.9 
49.8 
17.2 
40 
64 
25 
60 
15 
60 
5 
25 
10 
Table 6.1 Continued 
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Table 6.1 Continued 
Clinical Groups 
Variable Anxiety Depressed 
Number of Previous 
Referrals (%) 
None 75 55 
1 12 20 
2-5 7 25 
. Medication Use (%) Yes 38 50 
No 62 50 
`p=. 06, *General Assessment of Functioning Scale: Axis V, DSM-III-R 
and the two clinical groups can be seen in Table 6.1. For the entire sample there 
were roughly equivalent number of subjects male and female although the anxiety 
group tended to have more males (60%) and the depressed group more females 
(64%) although a Chi-square analysis only pointed to a trend in these differences 
(X2(1,50)=2.91, p=. 09). With respect to the demographic profile of the sample 
roughly two-thirds of the clinical subjects in this study were married or co- 
habitating with a smaller proportion of subjects who were either single (25%) or 
divorced (13-15%). Further, nearly two-thirds of the sample had some high school 
or finished high school, with the remaining one third having obtained a college or 
university education. There were no statistical differences between the groups in 
terms of marital status or education. Further, all but one subject in this study were 
white. 
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Turning to subject's clinical background the average age of onset for the 
entire sample was 30.82 yrs (SD=10.65) with the anxiety group having a slightly 
earlier age of onset (M=29.13 SD=9.54) then the depressed group (M=32.00 
SD=11.59) although this difference was not statistically significant. Duration of 
illness was calculated by subtracting current age from first diagnosable episode 
of their clinical disorder. Despite the slightly earlier average age of onset in the 
anxiety group, the depressed group tended to have a longer duration of illness 
(M=7.85 SD=9.92) than did subjects on average in the anxiety group (M=5.19 
SD=5.38). As seen by the large standard deviation terms there was considerable 
variation in the duration of illness, particularly in the depressed group. There were 
two outliers with a 30-year history of depressive illness and they skewed the 
results in this comparison. When these two subjects were removed from the 
analysis the mean duration was more nearly equivalent for the two groups. 
However, in neither analysis were there significant group differences for duration 
of illness. The trend for longer duration of illness in the depressed group appears 
to be better explained by the fact that individuals, on average, tended to be older 
in the depressed group (M=38.64 SD=1 1.88) than the anxiety group (M=32.64 
SD=9.81) although this trend was only marginally significant (I(48)=1.95, p=. 06). 
In terms of previous referrals to mental health professionals more than half 
of the clinical subjects had never been referred to a psychologist or other mental 
health professional. In the anxiety group roughly 75% of the subjects were being 
seen for the first time versus 55% of the depressed subjects although a Chi- 
square analysis (along with the proportion of subjects with either 1 previous visit 
or 2 to 5 previous visits) was not statistically significant. Further roughly equal 
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proportions in both groups were currently receiving anxiolytic or depressive 
medications respective to their diagnosis. 
Finally, subjects were assessed for severity of illness at time of assessment 
with the General Assessment of Functioning (GAF) Axis 5 measure from the DSM- 
III-R. This scale represents a barometer of overall impairment in social, 
occupational, and personal functioning with higher scores reflecting comparatively 
better adjustment. The mean GAF for the entire sample was 54.67 (SD=16.27) 
thus falling into the area of 'moderate symptoms' or moderate difficulty in social, 
and occupational (school) functioning. Whereas the anxious group scored at the 
top end of the moderate symptom indicator (M=60.75 SD=13.15) (or the very 
bottom end of the scale 'some mild symptoms') the depressed group reflected 
comparatively worse global functioning (M=49.80 SD=17.18) reflecting 'serious 
symptoms' and serious impairment in social and occupational functioning and this 
difference was significant (t(48)=1.95, p=. 06). 
Personality Measures 
The distribution for self-esteem and ECQ scores for the entire sample, and 
clinical groups separately can be seen in Table 6.2. 
Self-esteem 
The distribution characteristics of the YSEI demonstrated acceptable skewness 
and kurtosis (<1) on 27 of the 30 YSEI items, with those 3 items above 1 
remaining only marginally elevated (<1.20). The total mean score for the YSEI 
for the entire sample (M=85.16 SD=1 9.09) the anxiety group (M=92.21 SD=16.83) 
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and the depressed group (M=78.12 SD=12) all reflected nearly perfect normal 
Table 6.2 
Mean Scores on Personality measures for The Anxiety and Depressed 
Clinical Groups 
Clinical Groups 
Variable Anxiety Depressed 
YSEI 
M 92.20 78.12 
SD 16.83 18.90 
ECQ-Rehearsal(R) 
M 7.64 8.76 
SD 3.07 3.23 
ECQ-Emotion Inhb. 
M 7.04 7.84 
SD 3.18 2.95 
ECQ-Aggression 
M 7.12 8.04 
SD 2.26 3.12 
ECQ-Benign 
M 6.60 6.44 
SD 1.98 2.10 
ECQ-R-Prospective 
M 7.16 9.64 
SD 4.10 4.07 
ECQ-R-Retrospect. 
M 11.00 11.64 
SD 3.40 3.35 
*p<. 01 
224 
distributions with the mean, mode, and median being equivalent. That is, in 
contrast to the student standardization sample (M=107.1 SD=14.5 N=183) which 
was skewed in the positive direction, the results from YSEI in both the anxiety and 
depressed populations reflected evenly distributed variance about the mean. 
Further, comparison of mean scores on the YSEI between the student 
standardization sample (n=183) (M=107.1 SD=14.5) and the two clinical groups 
demonstrated significantly lower scores for the anxiety group (t=4.73, p<. 005) and 
even greater differences with the depressed group (j=7.29, p<. 005). These results 
reflect a priori hypotheses that self-esteem is significantly impaired in anxiety and 
depressive disorders and provides additional evidence for the validation of the 
YSEI as previous studies with the RSE have shown decrements in level of self- 
esteem in these clinical groups (Silverstone, 1992). 
Emotion-Control 
The distribution scores for ECQ-rehearsal, emotion-inhibition, aggression control 
and benign control are seen in Table 6.2. First, the distribution of the 56 ECQ 
items reflected approximate normality with all but 2 items meeting the 85-15% 
split. The sub-factor scores all demonstrated characteristics of the normal curve. 
In contrast to the two previous studies that examined ECQ dimensions on likert 
scales, this scale utilized a bi-polar, true-false scoring key and so scores in this 
study were examined in relation to data collected and previously reported (Roger 
& Najarian, 1989) on 61 students with the bi-polar scoring key to better gauge the 
nature of emotion control strategies in those with a clinical disorder versus a 
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'normal' student population. In this study the values were reported separately for 
males and females and so the average scores were taken for comparison. The 
mean scores and standard deviation values for the different ECQ dimensions in 
the student population were: rehearsal (M=7.28 SD=2.82), emotion inhibition 
(M=6.19 SD=3.01), benign control (M=8.19 SD=2.54) and aggression control 
(M=7.06 SD=2.68) and can be examined against the values for the anxiety and 
depressed subject groups as seen in Table 6.2. Multiple t-tests were performed 
to test whether or not there were significant differences between the student 
standardization sample and the two clinical samples for any of the ECQ 
dimensions. With respect to rehearsal scores while no differences were observed 
between the student group and anxiety group (t<1) a significant difference 
between the student and depressed group emerged (t(84)=2.03, p<. 05) with 
depressed patients reporting a greater tendency to ruminate or mentally rehearse 
past emotionally upsetting events. Similarly no differences on emotion-inhibition 
scores were found between the student and anxiety group while the student and 
depressed group significantly differed (t(84)=2.34, p<. 05) with depressed patients 
reporting a greater tendency to inhibit emotions. No differences were found with 
respect to aggression control but the student group was found to differ significantly 
with the anxiety group (t(84)=3.10, p<. 005) and the depressed group (t(84)=3.30, 
p<. 005) on benign control scores, with both clinical groups reporting more 
impulsivity. 
Anxiety and Depressed Group Differences 
There were two central hypotheses to be tested in this study. First, between- 
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group differences were anticipated on self-esteem with depressed patients tending 
to show greater deficits on both indices. Second, the newly piloted retrospective 
and prospective rehearsal factors were anticipated to differentiate the depressed 
and anxiety group, respectively. Third, this study sought to examine the 
correlation patterns between self-esteem and the directionality of emotion-control 
patterns. It was anticipated that correlations between self-esteem and rehearsal 
would be higher in the depressed group than in the anxiety group. Fourth, 
correlations between self-esteem and prospective rehearsal were expected to be 
higher in the anxiety group than the correlation between self-esteem and 
retrospective rehearsal. Conversely, in the depressed group it was hypothesized 
that self-esteem would correlate more highly with retrospective rehearsal than with 
prospective rehearsal. 
Returning to Table 6.2 the mean scores for the YSEI and the sub-factor 
scores for the ECQ and the newly created retrospective and prospective rehearsal 
items. To test the first hypothesis a one-way ANOVA was conducted with groups 
as the between variable and the total YSEI score as the dependent variable. The 
results indicated a significant group difference (F(1,48)=7.74, p<. 01) with the 
depressed group reporting lower self-esteem. 
To test whether differences existed between the anxiety and depressed 
group on rehearsal or the new prospective and retrospective rehearsal factors, 
individual t-tests were computed. The observed results pointed to the absence of 
group differences on ECQ-rehearsal (t(48)=1.26, p=. 22 ns) or the retrospective 
rehearsal factor (t(48)=. 67, p=. 51 ns), although a significant difference was 
observed between the two clinical groups to the degree to which they engaged in 
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prospective rehearsal (t(48)=2.15, p<. 05). Finally, no significant differences were 
found between the groups on any of the remaining ECQ factors. 
To test the differential between-group correlational patterns for self-esteem 
and emotion-control processes, zero-order correlations were computed for the 
anxiety and depressed group separately. The correlation results for the anxiety 
and depressed groups can be seen in Table 6.3. In the anxiety group self-esteem 
Table 6.3 
Zero-order Correlations between Self-esteem and Emotion- 
Control factors by Clinical Group 
Variable Anxiety Depressed 
ECQ-Rehearse(R) -. 60*** -. 34` 
ECQ-Emot. Inhb. -. 62*"` -. 23 
ECQ-Aggression -. 22 -. 23 
ECQ-Benign . 38* . 29 
ECQ-R-Prospective -. 74*** -. 50** 
ECQ-R-Retrospect. -. 50** -. 23 
*p<. 05 **p<. 01 ""p<. 001 
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was found to correlate inversely with ECQ rehearsal (r(25)=-. 60, p<. 001), emotion 
inhibition (r(25)=-. 62, p<. 001) and positively with benign control (r(25)=. 38, p<. 05). 
Robust correlations were also observed between self-esteem and prospective 
rehearsal (r(25)-. 74, p<. 001) and retrospective rehearsal (r(25)=-. 50, p<. 01). In 
contrast, the results from the depressed group reflected fewer significant 
correlations and lower magnitudes, as self-esteem was found to related with 
rehearsal (r(25)=-. 34, p<. 05) and none other ECQ factors. Self-esteem was, 
however, also found to relate to prospective rehearsal (r(25)=-. 50, p<. 01) although 
not retrospective rehearsal. To test whether or not the correlation patterns were 
significantly different, Fisher Z transformations were conducted on the pairs of 
correlations and submitted to Z tests. 
The results reflected consistent trends in the observed Z values (Z>1) in the 
differential correlation patterns between self-esteem and rehearsal and emotion, 
inhibition, and finally between self-esteem and both prospective and retrospective 
rehearsal in the anxiety group. Note, however, that due to the small sample size 
read, 
the Z values did not, statistical significance. In short, while there was a trend to 
support the expected correlation between self-esteem and prospective rehearsal 
in anxiety patients, the opposite effect, of a greater relationship between self- 
esteem and retrospective rehearsal in depressed patients, was not found. 
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6.4 Discussion 
The results in this study support, in part, the outlined hypotheses regarding the 
important, differential role of self-esteem in anxiety and depressive disorders. 
First, as anticipated the level of self-esteem was found to be significantly lower in 
both clinical groups when contrasted with student norms thus suggesting that self- 
esteem is a) adversely affected in both disorders and b) a central personality 
mechanism influencing the process of the disorder. That is, while patient 
demographics, clinical background and emotion-control strategies failed to 
differentiate the two symptomatic groups, self-esteem did so, with the depressed 
group showing greater impairment. This is consistent with a previous report 
(Silverstone, 1991) that found self-esteem to be lower in depressed patients than 
in patients with an anxiety disorder where the latter did not even differ from 
student controls. It may be, however, that patients with depressive disorders 
suffer greater functional impairment than individuals suffering from anxiety and it 
is the greater severity of illness that leads to greater reductions in self-esteem 
rather than it being pathognomic to the disorder itself. Supporting this perspective, 
the depressed group were found to be more impaired on the global assessment 
index. However, several studies have reported that even after depressed patients 
have recovered symptomatically and have regained important life roles and 
commitments, there self-esteem remains impaired (Ingham, Kreitman, McMiller, 
Sashidharan, & Surtees, 1986; Pardoen, Bauwens, Martin & Mendlewicz, 1993). 
This suggests that while self-esteem may be sensitive to worsening within the 
clinical condition it is not merely a symptom of the disorder itself. This line of 
reasoning is still further supported by Brown and Harris's (1978) finding from a 
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prospective study that found that individuals with low self-esteem were at greater 
risk to go on to have a first depressive episode. Collectively, these results 
suggest that self-esteem is lower before, during, and following a depressive 
episode and represents a persistent vulnerability factor for future episodes and 
potential relapse. 
The hypotheses regarding the role of emotion control processes were only 
partially supported in this study. The greater tendency for depressed patients to 
mentally rehearse and inhibit emotional expression when contrasted with student 
controls was borne out, however, the same pattern was not established for the 
anxiety group. That is, patients with anxiety were no more likely to rehearse or 
inhibit emotion than 'normal' controls which may suggest that these emotion 
control mechanisms are relatively independent of anxiety symptomatology. 
Further, both clinical groups differed from the student norms on benign control 
suggesting that both patient groups were more likely to be impulsive. While 
impulsivity is not recognized as a symptom of either disorder, consistent with 
psychoanalytic theory, impulsivity may be the consequence of weakened ego 
strength. 
Despite the differential levels of emotion control in the clinical groups when 
compared with student norms, the results did not point to significant differences 
between the two clinical groups on the four emotion-control dimensions. Further, 
just as retrospective rehearsal was not found to be higher in the depressed group, 
as was hypothesized, just the opposite effect was found with prospective rehearsal 
scores, with depressed patients scoring higher. The trend in retrospective 
rehearsal scores was, however, in the expected direction, and in light of the 
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significant difference on prospective rehearsal scores, it suggests that depressed 
patients are more likely to engage in rumination over past and future, imagined life 
events. The former may be represented in content as loss and rejection whereas 
the latter may reflect the hopeless outlook customarily seen in this clinical 
population. These results may suggest in clinical depression not only is the 
content of the depressive's future forecast bleak there is a future-oriented 
cognitive process that holds this negative perspective constantly in view. 
The relationship between self-esteem and mental rehearsal and between 
self-esteem and emotion-inhibition were comparatively stronger in the anxiety 
group than in the depressed group. It may be that deficits in self-esteem and 
affective regulation are relatively (robust) independent vulnerability factors in 
depression whereas only patients suffering from anxiety disorders who also have 
low self-esteem are particularly likely to routinely engage in these strategies. This 
pattern appeared especially true for the relationship between self-esteem and 
prospective rehearsal. Collectively, these findings suggest that emotion-control 
processes are impaired in depression and anxiety disorders particularly amongst 
those subjects with low self-esteem. 
The strength of this study lies in its application of the inter-relationship 
between self-esteem and emotion-control processes in two well-diagnosed clinical 
groups. The cross-sectional design of this study, however, does limit the 
understanding of the process of self-esteem and rumination in these groups. That 
is, this study does not provide information regarding the causal pathway of self- 
esteem and rumination in these disorders. To unravel process variables, it 
would be best to obtain multiple assessments of self-esteem and emotion-control 
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processes over the course of treatment, and then again at outcome and follow-up. 
Further, by examining baseline self-esteem at one point in time assumes that 
self-esteem is stable over time in these clinical populations and relates to clinical 
symptoms in a relatively linear way. Kernis (Kernis et al., 1989) has demonstrated 
that level of self-esteem relates more strongly to subsequent depression for 
individuals only with stable self-esteem. Treatment aimed at preventing 
rumination, may also shed light on the flex of self-esteem over the course of 
treatment. In light of the low reliability estimates for the two new rehearsal 
factors, particularly the retrospective factor, as well as the absence of this latter 
factor to discriminate between groups, a replication of these findings with better 
validated retrospective and prospective measures may point to important existing 
differences that were potentially understated in this study. 
Finally, this study provides suggestions for future research in depression 
and anxiety research. The two clinical syndromes have often been difficult to 
distinguish in research, both with student samples (Gotlib, 1984) and in clinical 
samples (Luteeijn & Bouman, 1988) with traditional, clinical psychometrics. The 
research reported here suggests that cognitive-affective variables (i. e., self- 
esteem, rumination) may better distinguish between the clinical disorders above 
and beyond overlapping symptomatology and provide clues to successful 
treatment. 
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Chapter 7 
7.1 General Discussion and Conclusions 
Following the construction and validation of a new instrument for the assessment 
of self-esteem, the research compiled in this project was concerned with the testing 
of the inter-relationship between self-esteem and selected personality processes 
previously implicated in the stress-illness relationship, and the direct and indirect 
effect of self-esteem on stress reactivity, physical, and mental health. The results 
will be reconsidered in light of their implications- for clinical treatment and future 
research. 
7.2. The Construction and Validation of -a new 
Self-esteem Scale 
The number of studies testing developmental, motivational, and behaviour 
concomitants of self-esteem is exceedingly large. Despite the proliferation of 
interest in self-esteem, the vast majority of published reports have operationalized 
self-esteem with the use of a single self-esteem instrument, namely the Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Inventory (RSE). As outlined in chapter two, the RSE has several 
important limitations that threaten its validity including its constricted breadth, 
detachment from relevant self-domains related to global self-esteem, and 
insensitivity to state fluctuations due to positive and negative experiences (although 
this was not the case in chapter five). 
Likewise, the clinical utility of the RSE is questionable as it fails to adequately 
isolate etiological components relevant to low global self-esteem or provide a basis 
for broaching dimensions relevant to negative self-evaluations. For instance, 
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learning that an individual responds 'extremely true' to the question 'I am not a 
valued member of my family' (item 23 on the YSEI) may provide greater insight for 
the source of low self-esteem than a negative response to the question Nall in all 
I am a person of worth. " While the RSE has been shown to anchor to many 
internal and external experiences it is difficult to determine the clinical 
meaningfulness of these relationships. At the present time, the continued 
dependence on the RSE in self-esteem research would appear to perpetuate the 
chasm between statistical and clinical significance. 
Moreover, the prevalent multi-factorial self-esteem measures currently in use 
also suffer from the operationalization of global self-esteem with too few self- 
evaluative domains (see chapter two for elaboration) and the recent advancement 
made in assessing specific self-esteem domains is not commensurate with the 
emphasis on global self-esteem in the literature or the desire for valid and 
informative global measures in clinical-health settings. 
The first phase of the research was aimed towards the construction and 
validation of a new measure for the assessment of self-reported phenomenological 
self-esteem. The scale named, the York Self-esteem Inventory (YSEI), consists of 
30 items that pertain to demonstrably important self-evaluative domains: personal, 
social, family, achievement, perceived physical attractiveness, and ambiguity in 
self-evaluations across these dimensions. The YSEI was shown to be 
approximately normally distributed across different student populations 
(standardization and replication samples in chapter two) as well as more 
dysfunctional populations (chapter six), and there were no observed effects for age 
or gender for the total scale score across different studies. There was, however, 
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some suggestion that family-related self-evaluations were less relevant for global 
self-esteem in males than in females (see section 7.2.6.1 for further discussion 
regarding these differences). In both the initial standardization sample, and the 
replication sample, the factor structure of the YSEI was shown to be unidimensional 
and to possess satisfactory psychometric properties. The items drawn from the 
various self-evaluative domains that contribute to the YSEI total, have been shown 
in the literature to contribute to global self-esteem and, importantly, each self- 
evaluative domain has been shown to constitute a potential source of threat and 
stress (see chapter two for discussion). Further, the collective results from the 
dissertation research demonstrate the predictive validity of the YSEI in somatic 
health, psychological distress, and more serious psychopathology. In summary, 'the 
broader construct of global self-esteem as assessed by the YSEI, as well as its 
demonstrated reliability and validity, make it an appropriate scale for use in clinical- 
health research and practice, with potential advantages over existing measures 
although standardization on populations other than 'normal' adolescent and young 
adults is still required. 
7.3 Self-Esteem. Coping and Emotion Control 
Self-esteem and Coping 
The explicitly adopted model of stress in this research, as outlined, was premised 
on the interactional model of stress (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). As defined, stress 
refers to "any event in which environmental demands, internal demands, or both tax 
or exceed the adaptive resource of an individual, social system, or tissue system" 
(Monat and Lazarus, 1991, p. 3). In accordance with this definition of stress, coping 
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is seen to be the changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage external 
and internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of 
the person (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). As reviewed in chapter one, the two most 
consistently identified and tested coping patterns in health research (Endler & 
Parker, 1990) are instrumental, task-oriented coping behaviours, referring to direct 
action to change aspects of the situation, and second, emotion-oriented coping, 
which refers to intrapsychic efforts to manage negative, upsetting emotions. The 
preponderance of the literature has shown only the deleterious effects of emotion- 
oriented strategies on health and mental well-being and a range of living variables, 
while instrumental coping strategies have typically failed to produce a positive 
moderating influence (main effects) or 'buffering effect' (interaction effects). More 
recent and methodologically advanced research (Kohn et al., 1994) continues to 
demonstrate this pattern. The results observed in chapters three and four, 
however, point to important findings for coping research and clinical practice; 
particularly as a function of self-esteem. 
First, in both the first study (chapter three) and the second study (chapter 
four), self-esteem was significantly related to both rational (instrumental) and 
emotion-oriented (intrapsychic) dispositional coping patterns. As anticipated, self- 
esteem was positively anchored to instrumental efforts to manage stress, and 
inversely with negative, palliative approaches to reduce upset. Further, self-esteem 
was found to relate positively with the newly identified coping dimension, 
detachment. There was less relation between self-esteem and avoidant coping, 
where in the first study they were found to be unrelated and in the second study, 
only weakly, inversely related. These patterns were also replicated between self- 
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esteem and more situationally-dependent coping behaviours over time. Hence, 
self-esteem and coping strategies appear to influence each other in a reciprocal, 
cyclical fashion. For instance, it may be that low self-esteem leads to reduced 
efforts at control and mastery over the environment and subsequent negative 
feedback and frustration lead to the reliance on palliative coping, which in turn 
lowers self-esteem and instrumental coping efforts. Further, the observed 
relationship between self-esteem and detached coping suggests that individuals 
with high self-esteem may have a comparative advantage in being able to stand 
back and to positively re-frame when faced with challenging life circumstances. 
This may draw on research findings that have shown that individuals with high self- 
esteem have both a comparative advantage in maximizing positive experiences and 
derogating, ignoring or overcoming negative experiences. The absence of a 
significant relationship between self-esteem and avoidant coping challenges the 
model proposed by Bednar et at. (1989) linking the etiology and maintenance of low 
self-esteem to avoidant coping strategies. 
Second, the relationship between self-esteem and coping had interactive 
effects on somatic health and well-being; results that support and challenge the 
accumulated findings: Similar to most published reports on the role of emotion- 
oriented coping on well-being, the results in this research pointed to a direct 
moderating influence of emotion-oriented coping. In each analysis in both studies, 
when the outcome variable was either the frequency or severity of somatic 
complaints or psychological distress, emotion-oriented coping was found to be a 
significant (and sometimes, sole) predictor of health status and/or level of 
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psychological distress. This was also demonstrated in chapter four after accounting 
for the importance of negative (and positive) life events. The absence of a direct, 
positive moderating influence of problem-focused coping on health is also 
consistent with the other reports (Aldwin & Revenson, 1987; Kohn et al, 1994). 
However, the results from chapter three showed a positive, moderating influence 
of an adaptive coping style, detachment, in the interaction with self-esteem. These 
results suggest that one reason why adaptive coping mechanisms fail to predict 
function outcomes is that their effects are embedded within other person-related 
variables. Further, the influence of detached coping on health is still more 
important as it relates the positive effects of an intrapsychic coping mechanism for 
positive health whereas past research has only pointed to negative effects of 
intrapsychic coping (i. e., emotion-oriented). 
Third, when the approach to studying coping practices was changed from a 
trait to a state, more situation-dependent examination (chapter four), the influence 
of coping on health outcomes increased substantially, not just for emotion-oriented 
coping, but for rational and detached strategies as well. The correlation patterns 
between state detached coping strategies and somatic illness and distress were 
nearly as large as the patterns witnessed between emotion-oriented coping 
strategies and these outcomes in the first half of the study. These results support 
Roger et al's (1993) contention that detachment is a unique and significant coping 
process in health. 
These results also suggest that the positive benefits of adaptive coping on 
health may be understated by the trait coping approach. Further, the improved 
results from assessing more state-dependent coping strategies provides more fuel 
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to the interactional model, which emphasizes the importance of the environment- 
person fit over time. Even more supportive of the important role of coping in 
relation to health and psychological well-being was the absence of effects for social 
and academic adjustment. While it could by hypothesized that if self-esteem and 
coping processes reflect fairly stable personality processes they should be shown 
to influence a range of living variables, the results from this study point to the 
discrimination and specific role of coping behaviours for health outcomes. 
In summary, knowing an individuals level of self-esteem provides a basis for 
predicting how that person is likely to cope with stress above and beyond the 
occurrence and nature of stressful life events themselves (as was demonstrated in 
chapter four). Because the covariation in the prospective studies does not imply 
causation, presumably this relationship operates in the opposite direction: so that 
by knowing how someone is coping with life difficulties provides a clue as to how 
they think and feel about themselves. The identification and focus on the inter- 
relationship between negative self-evaluations and maladaptive coping practices 
may provide a basis for clinical assessment and therapeutic treatment for stress 
disorders. For instance, Epstein's (1992; Epstein & Katz, 1992) model of stress 
management follows these lines. This model has drawn attention to the 
relationship between constructive thinking as a coping mechanism and self- 
produced stress where part of the constructive thinking construct is the tendency 
to hold negative self-evaluations and to overgeneralize to negative feedback. His 
treatment model aims toward providing insight to the person regarding their 
tendency to cope as founded upon their tendency to evoke unrealistic and 
negativistic thinking patterns. In a study offering support for the model, Epstein 
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(1992) found that poor constructive thinking best predicted accumulated life stress 
and moreover, demonstrated that most of the variance of the total stress measure 
was accounted for by self-generated stress following poor constructive thinking. 
Self-esteem and Emotion Control 
A central aim of the research was to replicate and extend Roger's (Roger, 1988, 
1995; Roger & Najarian, 1989) model of emotion control and stress. As elaborated 
throughout the work, the model comprises four discriminable scales entitled 
rehearsal, emotion inhibition, aggression control, and benign control. While 
rehearsal refers to the tendency (process) of ruminating on past emotional upset, 
emotion inhibition relates to the holding back or inhibiting the expression of emotion. 
Aggression control relates to managing feelings of anger as well as the ability to 
inhibit the expression of hostility, and benign control has been shown to relate to 
measures of impulsivity (Roger & Najarian, 1989). Because the focus in this 
research was on the inter-relationship between self-esteem and cognitive rehearsal, 
the results associating self-esteem with the other dimensions of emotion control will 
be discussed first and the latter part of this section will focus on the patterns with 
rehearsal. 
Empirical research has suggested that emotion inhibitors (or suppressors) 
are likely to experience heightened, and prolonged physiological activation following 
challenging experiences that may place them at greater risk for disease (Notarius 
& Levenson, 1979). The results emanating from the studies in chapters three and 
four, however, do not replicate the previously documented role of inhibiting 
emotions and physical health nor does it appear important to experienced 
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psychological distress. These results are in accordance with Roger's (Roger, 1988; 
Roger & Jamieson, 1988) findings where emotion inhibition was found to be 
unrelated to prolonged physiological arousal; the candidate mechanism by which 
inhibition could lead to poorer health. 
Despite the failure of emotion inhibition to predict health outcomes, it 
was shown to relate to self-esteem in chapter three and then replicated again in 
chapter four, with individuals with low self-esteem being more likely to inhibit the 
expression of emotion, and this relationship was especially significant in individuals 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (chapter five). Fear of embarrassment and 
losing control by expressing pent-up emotions are cardinal symptoms in the anxiety 
spectrum. Taken together, the results seem to suggest that self-esteem relates to 
the ability to express emotion and for individuals with anxiety disturbances, 
threatened self-esteem may particularly lead to difficulties in self-expression. 
Aggression control was also found to be associated with self-esteem 
with individuals low in trait self-esteem being less able to regulate feelings of anger 
and the expression of hostility. These results bear relation to published reports on 
anger-regulation difficulties and hypertension and CHD (MacDougall et al., 1985; 
Dembroski & Costa, 1987). While Aggression control did not effect health status 
directly, it could be that greater psychological distress and poorer social adjustment, 
as influenced by aggression control (chapter four, time two), reflect vulnerability 
factors for additional stress-related experiences, which, in turn, increase 
susceptibility for illness. The inter-relationship between self-esteem and 
aggression control and their cumulative effects on distress and adjustment may also 
inform the current Zeitgeist in Type A research (Price, 1982; Strube et al., 1987; 
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Yuen & Kuipers, 1992) that is increasingly focused on the role of negative self- 
evaluations and anger as the "toxic° components in the Type A construct. 
Self-esteem was found to be associated with impulsivity, with people low in 
self-esteem tending to be more impulsive. While benign-control has been 
conceptualized as a dimension of emotion regulation, Lazarus (1981) has 
suggested that the ability to inhibit action or resist taking action when such action 
would increase the likelihood of harm, danger or conflict, is a fundamental coping 
mechanism. While impulsivity was not shown to influence health outcomes in this 
research it may relate to other dimensions of stress-related behaviour. For 
instance, Epstein and katz (1992) found that self-produced stress led to significantly 
more injurious accidents and it may, in turn, be that impulsive actions lead to 
misadventure which creates additional stress albeit indirectly. Moreover, the 
positive relationship observed between low impulsivity and detached coping 
(chapter three) suggests that impulsivity is inimical to calm, positive re-framing 
when faced with life stress. 
Cognitive Rehearsal 
A central aim of this research was to re-examine individual differences in cognitive 
rumination in relation to trait and state self-esteem and to test again, the 
effect of cognitive rehearsal on prolonged physiological arousal following an 
emotionally engaging experience (Roger, 1988; Roger & Jamieson, 1988). These 
findings led Roger to suggest that the tendency to ruminate may reflect an 
important moderating variable in the stress-illness relationship. It was hypothesized 
that individuals with low self-esteem may be particularly prone to ruminate over 
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perceived personal inadequacy (and the incipient interpersonal failures) and it was 
anticipated that this relationship would have interactive effects on somatic health. 
Chapters three and four allowed for the testing of these hypotheses, and chapter 
five provided the context to test the causal sequence between self-esteem and 
rumination. Finally, chapter 6 provided the context to assess the association in 
more serious psychopathology. 
In chapters three and four self-esteem was shown to be significantly 
associated with the tendency to rehearse, and in chapter three, while both self- 
esteem and rehearsal produced main effects in relation to the frequency and 
severity of somatic complaints and psychological distress, at both time one and 
again at time two, after controlling for the law of initial values, the best predictor of 
somatic health was the interaction term between self-esteem and rehearsal. 
Hence, as predicted, individuals with low self-esteem as well as a greater 
disposition to ruminate had the worst health status across the study period. While 
the relationship between self-esteem and rehearsal was once again shown in 
chapter four, and while both personality variables showed main effects on health 
status depending on the phase of study, the interactive effects were not replicated. 
Self-esteem and rumination may be independent vulnerability markers for the 
development of somatic illness, and may produce multiplicative effects on health 
depending on the corresponding environmental conditions. 
The clinical study conducted in chapter six is the first attempt to place 
cognitive rehearsal in psychopathology. It was shown that rumination tended to be 
more common in both anxious and depressed clinical groups when compared with 
student controls, and depressed patients were particularly prone to rumination. 
244 
The most interesting finding that emerge in this study was the degree to which 
rumination was elevated in the depressed patient group yet independent of (low) 
self-esteem. Conversely, in the anxious group it was only those subjects with low 
self-esteem who were especially likely to ruminate. As discussed in chapter six 
these results may demonstrate separate roles for rumination depending on the 
disorder, where it is an important symptom of depression although relatively 
independent of clinical anxiety, but yet constituting a concurrent vulnerability if self- 
esteem is threatened. These results linking cognitive rumination to depression are 
also consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema's research (1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1993,1994) which has not only shown rumination to be prevalent in depressive 
disorders, - but also to be an important mediating variable in response to treatment, 
prolongation and worsening of the disorder, and propensity for relapse following 
successful recovery. 
The results in chapters three, four, and five which demonstrate a significant 
relationship between self-esteem and the cognitive rumination do not, however, 
imply a causal relationship. The three studies in chapter five did offer some 
evidence, albeit mostly in the form of statistical trends, that self-esteem elicits 
rumination. This tendency was especially borne out in study two when subject's 
state self-esteem level was shown to relate significantly to the tendency to ruminate 
following the stressful laboratory task. Further, the trend in the interaction in study 
one between unstable self-esteem and rumination is in need of replication. 
Finally, the laboratory studies in chapter five provided a re-assessment of 
Roger and Jamieson's (1988) findings linking rehearsal to prolonged physiological 
activation following a stressful task. The results observed in this research did not 
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replicate Roger and Jamieson's findings linking rehearsal scores to prolonged 
activation although the differences may have been due to methodological variation 
in the assessment of the heart-rate measure and/or differences in sample size. 
Before discussing the treatment implications resulting from the research on 
self-esteem and rehearsal, issues related to self-esteem, independent of other 
personality processes examined will be considered. 
7.4 Self-esteem. Somatic Health. and Well-Being 
The influence of self-esteem on health and adjustment has already been introduced 
via its tendency to influence health outcomes interactively with coping and emotion- 
control strategies. The results across the two prospective studies, chapters three 
and four, demonstrated a consistent main effect for self-esteem on the frequency 
and severity of somatic health; on the frequency and severity of psychological 
distress, and in chapter four, social and academically-related adjustment. 
The two principal hypotheses in this research were that self-esteem would 
demonstrate a moderating influence in health and well-being and this influence 
would be shown to exceed that of other personality variables and secondly, that this 
moderating influence of self-esteem would be mediated by coping and emotion- 
control processes. As seen, there was support for these hypotheses in the two 
prospective studies, although while self-esteem always generated a main effect on 
health outcomes, it did not always exceed the impact of other moderators. 
The interactive effects in these studies appeared to be due more to joint 
stable personality processes than to aspects of the situation. That is, in chapter 4 
where life events were assessed, there was no suggestion that negative life events 
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triggered the moderating influence of self-esteem on health and well-being nor was 
there any suggestion that negative life events triggered interactions between self- 
esteem and coping or emotion-control processes. The results contrast with the 
majority of 'buffering' effect models such as the hardiness model (Kobasa, 1979; 
Williams, 1992), the optimism-pessimism construct (Scheier & Carver, 1987), self- 
complexity theory (Linville, 1987), self-discrepancy models (Cantor et al., 1987) and 
psychosocial models of depression (Brown & Harris, 1978) where it is argued, and 
typically been empirically demonstrated, that personality only plays an influence 
under periods of high stress (following significant negative life events). Further, the 
first laboratory study in chapter five provided the direct assessment of the main 
effects versus the buffering effects models insofar as the stress level in the situation 
was under direct manipulation. Here again the results pointed to a moderating 
influence of self-esteem in both high and low stress conditions. In contrast, the 
only suggestion across the different studies for an interactive relationship with life 
events was for an additional 'buffer' in light of the occurrence of positive life events. 
In contrast to Brown and McGill (1989) who found negative consequences for 
positive life events with individuals with low self-esteem, positive events were not 
found to create greater distress or health-related difficulties with those with low self- 
esteem but rather offered a 'buffering' advantage to those with high self-esteem. 
This is a novel finding and it may reinforce the findings from experimental analysis 
on self-esteem and self-regulation which have shown that individuals with high self- 
esteem are superior at capitalizing on positive life experiences and minimizing the 
impact of negative life experiences. 
Possessing high self-esteem was shown to relate to better health status, 
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lower psychological distress, and better academic and social adjustment for 
adolescent student populations. Also, consistent with models linking self-esteem 
to poor mental health (Brown & Harris, 1978; Kohut, 1979; Segal, 1988; Roberts & 
Monroe, 1994), self-esteem was shown to be more debilitated in depressive and 
anxiety disorders, although especially in the former. Finally, the laboratory studies 
pointed to two important aspects regarding the role of self-esteem in health. It is 
hypothesized that self-esteem may influence health by direct and indirect 
mechanisms. The direct mechanism reflects the influence of self-esteem on the 
primary appraisal process, the degree to which life events are customarily 
construed as positive challenges for growth, or negative threats. To the degree to 
which the latter is invoked may implicate underlying autonomic arousal, which if 
prolonged, may lead to greater taxing of body organs and subsequent illness. 
Chapters three and four successfully demonstrated an association between self- 
esteem and health status and subjective well-being reports, but the underlying 
mechanism of this relationship, the implicated influence of self-esteem on stress- 
appraisal was only inferred. However, the lab studies provided some tentative 
support for the causal role of self-esteem in the stress-appraisal process and 
subsequent autonomic arousal. For those subjects who were exposed to the high 
self-esteem manipulation they appeared comparatively inoculated to stress; as 
evidenced in subjective reports and physiological indices. The results also extend 
the recent findings of Greenberg et al. (1992) and Strauman et al. (1993) who have 
found a causal role for self-processes in induced laboratory stress. 
The second, indirect, route by which self-esteem was hypothesized to 
influence health in this research was via secondary stress appraisal; or the chosen 
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coping mechanisms to deal with challenges or threats once they had been 
identified. As discussed, this research points to the inter-relationship between self- 
esteem and coping patterns typically employed to deal with stress. As also 
reviewed, the inter-relationship did show anchoring to health status, thus pointing 
to the expected mediating effects of coping on health via self-esteem. The findings 
reach beyond those models espoused by Linville (1987), DeLongis et al. (1988), 
Brown and McGill (1989), which suggest that high self-esteem (or high self- 
complexity in the case of Linville) leads to the belief that one can cope when faced 
with life adversity. This research shows that individuals with high trait self-esteem 
actually employ more adaptive coping measures. One caveat related to this point, 
however, is the assumption that using rational (problem-focused, task-oriented) 
coping or detached coping means that they are inherently effective across different 
stressors. This research (chapters three and four) did not explicitly test the 
effectiveness of coping nor the goodness-of-fit between particular coping responses 
and the nature of the specific stressors. A more micro approach to assessing self- 
esteem and coping adjustments to specific stressors would contribute to a greater 
understanding of the self-esteem-coping process. 
7.5 Self-esteem and Well-being: A model 
One possible model that may adequately draw together the seemingly 
disparate findings in this research can be seen in Figure 7.1 This model takes as 
its basis the model proposed by Lazarus and Folkman (1984) where the biological 
model of stress is extended from an stimulus-response model to a stimulus- 
organism-response model where the organism variables are primary and secondary 
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- Figure 7.1 : 
- Self-Esteem and Health Taxonomy 
Self-Esteem 
Life Events 
+ 
Challenge Threat Primary 
Appraisal 
Rational/ Emotional/ Secondary 
Detached Avoidant Appraisal 
Stress High Cognitive 
Outcome 
Rumination One 
Psychological Illness Outcome 
Distress Two 
Depression Outcome 
Three 
Illness Outcome 
Four 
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cognitive appraisal. As seen, the model may be extended to account for the 
moderating influence of self-esteem in the perception, judgment and subsequent 
ascribed meaning to events. As shown in this research (chapter five) and other 
reports (Greenberg et al., 1992; Strauman et al., 1993), individuals with threatened 
self-esteem are more likely to perceive events as threatening whilst individuals with 
high self-esteem are more likely to perceive events as a challenge for self- 
enhancement. Note that the arrows linking self-esteem to the primary appraisal 
process are joined via the experience of life events but also independent of life 
events. Low self-esteem reflects an intrapsychic process that, in and of itself, may 
impact on the perception of threat in the world independent of major life events. 
To some extent this application was supported in chapter four where it was shown 
that self-esteem influenced subsequent health and distress relatively independent 
of life events. 
Next, the secondary appraisal process, where particular coping strategies are 
employed, is influenced by the valence of self-esteem. In this way, individuals with 
low self-esteem may have a dispositional tendency to employ palliative efforts to 
manage stress whilst individuals with high self-esteem utilize assertive, adaptive 
efforts to change aspects of the environment and/or detach and positively reframe 
to overcome negative emotion associated with noxious stimuli as was demonstrated 
in chapters three and four. While individuals are likely to use a wide range of 
coping strategies across different situations, these patterns may reflect modal 
tendencies. Following the arrows down from the secondary appraisal process, the 
degree to which chosen coping patterns meet the needs of the situation may result 
in relative success (e. g., goal obtainment), positive feedback and subsequent 
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support for self-esteem, or it may result in failure and impinge negatively on self- 
esteem. Second, it is at this juncture that cognitive rumination may be provoked 
as a response to perceived failure and inadequacy to cope with life's challenges 
and as indicated by the arrow, this may function to lower self-esteem by keeping 
perceived inadequacies in mind. As indicated by the arrows moving from coping 
outcomes back to trait self-esteem, and in keeping with the interactionist model of 
stress, this model can be seen as transactional and cyclical where organismic 
variables are constantly in interaction with the environment and providing the basis 
for future responses. 
The evolving effects of this pattern can also be seen in the self-esteem and 
health taxonomy. First, the cumulative effects of stress can become represented 
in terms of physical illness (as a result of chronic autonomic arousal) and/or 
psychological disturbance (where increasingly stress becomes prolonged 
psychological distress). Research on the effects of stress have provided some 
tentative support for this notion that some individuals somatize their distress, while 
others experience greater psychological disturbance (e. g., Conger, Lorenz, Elder, 
Simons, & Ge, 1993). 
As indicated by the arrows, heightened psychological distress may be a 
precipitant for actual clinical depression. Psychosocial models of depression such 
as Brown and Harris's (1978) which has shown that the combination of low self- 
esteem as well as increasing number of negative life events is a good predictor of 
first onset clinical depression. The research in chapters three and four suggested 
that self-esteem was the best predictor of psychological distress, and in chapter 
five, the results suggested that self-esteem was most impaired amongst the 
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depressed patients. Finally, the light arrow linking depression to greater illness was 
not tested in this research but increasing evidence suggests that clinical depression 
impedes on immune functioning and may increase susceptibility to illness and even 
premature mortality (Herbert & Cohen, 1993). Following this strain of thought, self- 
esteem may represent a vulnerability marker for illness via depression. 
This model outlines an idealized path by which self-esteem differences 
emerge and influence health and well-being, but it is not being suggested that 
individuals with high self-esteem are free from health problems, distress or poor 
adjustment across time. Notwithstanding, future research on self-esteem and 
health may be best served by examination of multiple paths that join moderator 
variables to health and mental health disturbance. This proviso offers multiple 
points of entry to preventing health disturbance and offering relative inoculation 
against the pernicious effects of stress. 
7.6 Implications for Clinical Treatment 
Typical approaches to stress management focus on such techniques as massage, 
exercise, nutrition, progressive relaxation, medication, and biofeedback. All of these 
approaches have in common a stress-response model of stress. The relationship 
between self-esteem, coping and cognitive rumination and their influence on health 
and psychological distress point to support for clinical approaches that focus on the 
role of conscious, cognitive mechanisms in the etiology and continuance of 
stress. These would include well-established cognitive-behavioural models that 
emphasize change in unrealistic (Beck, 1976) and irrational (Ellis & Dryden, 1987) 
cognitive processes founded upon negative self-evaluations. Consistent with the 
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construction of self-esteem as a cognitive-affective variable, therapeutic approaches 
that also focus on the emotional aspects of self-evaluations, such as those that 
focus on developmental aspects of self-esteem (e. g, Kohut, 1979) and self- 
acceptance (e. g, Rogers, 1951) are also in keeping with the results. However, it 
is the view here, that self-esteem is first and foremost a cognitive variable and so 
treatments that deal explicitly with cognitive sources of self-evaluation and related 
aspects that concern the valence of self-evaluations may be most helpful in 
managing stress. This emphasis in treating stress by directly focusing on the 
cognitive foundations of self-esteem is to juxtaposed with Seligman's (1994) recent 
argument that self-esteem is merely an epiphenomenon of other cognitive functions. 
The experimental studies in this research and other recent findings (Greenberg et 
al., 1992; Strauman et al., 1993) refute Seligman's recent arguments, where self- 
esteem has been shown to possess, a causal, moderating influence in stress 
reactivity. 
Second, the results are consistent with cognitive-behavioural approaches 
(Epstein, 1992; Epstein & Katz, 1992; Meichenbaum, 1985; Roskies & Lazarus, 
1980) that emphasize the development of coping skills to deal with a variety of life 
demands. Emphasis on, instrumental approaches to coping, such as information 
gathering, problem-solving, communication and social skills training are well 
developed. The importance of detachment coping suggests that the emphasis in 
cognitive-behavioural efforts (e. g. ABC charts, diary keeping) to help clients 
positively re-frame upsetting experiences and establish a meta-cognitive position 
vis-a-vis their involvement in challenging situations is supported by the beneficial 
effects of detached coping. Linking coping skills training to cognitive tendencies to 
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over perceive threat, as a result of unrealistically negative self-perception, may be 
most helpful. 
Third, the importance of emotion control, particularly cognitive rehearsal in 
stress management has been developed by Roger and colleagues (Roger, 1988; 
Roger & Nash, 1994) over the past decade. Roger and colleagues have developed 
a stress management programme for occupational contexts that emphasizes 
attention control; that is, teaching clients how to 'let go' of stress and prevent 
rumination over negative life events, hassles, and perceived personal inadequacies. 
This research suggests that associated with the tendency to ruminate are 
underlying feelings and thoughts associated with perceived inadequacy and Roger 
(1995) has recently acknowledge this component in his updated approach to stress 
management in the work force. 
In summary, the role of self-esteem, coping, and emotion-control in stress 
and well-being points to the important psychological component in stress. In 
contrast to the majority of stress programmes that emphasize non-direct cognitive 
mediational factors in their approaches, this research suggests that an important 
component in identifying vulnerability to stress and ways of alleviating stress, would 
be enhanced by attending to the stable personality processes that influence stress 
appraisal and cognitive and behavioural coping efforts. 
7.7 Remaining Issues 
7.7.1 Gender (Sex) Differences 
Differences between male and female subjects emerged across the different studies 
in this project. Collectively, the results point to probable differences 
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in the structure of self-esteem, between coping efforts typically evoked to deal with 
stressful situations, emotion-control patterns, and in the reporting of health based 
on gender. 
First, in the construction and validation of the YSEI responses by females to 
family-based self-esteem items contributed to global self-esteem in both the initial 
standardization sample as well as in the replication sample, whilst male responses 
on some family-based items failed to make a consistent contribution to the total 
scale variance. As the valence of self-esteem may be a vulnerability factor for 
stress, the domains for which self-evaluations are made may also constitute the 
domains particularly likely to contribute life stress. For instance, if self-evaluations 
in the family domain are more relevant to global self-esteem for females, then the 
family may also constitute a greater source of stress for females when there is 
conflict and related difficulties within the family. This pattern has actually been 
demonstrated by Billings and Moos (1984) who found that while stress in men tends 
to be more related to work and finance, stress in women tends to be more due to 
issues associated with the family. Further, Kessler and McLeod (1984) found that 
women were more sensitive to social network events whilst men were more 
sensitive to income loss. Again, Conger et at. (1993) found that financial-work 
related strains were the greatest source of stress for men while events within the 
extended family were the greatest source of strain for women. This latter study 
also demonstrated differential outcomes despite approximately equivalent levels of 
stress; where events tended to predict depression scores in men and physical 
symptoms in women. In short, these studies suggest that gender regulates 
outcomes to stressors. 
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The different structure of self-esteem and the incipient vulnerabilities related 
to these domains would appear to be a most relevant arena for future research as 
recently proposed models of depression (Beck, 1983; Blatt & Zuroff, 1992) see 
clinical depression as resulting from either achievement failures (and related self- 
criticism) or related to failures in relationships. The logic of the potential association 
between self-esteem structure (men=work achievement; women=successful 
relationships); associated differential stress (men=work achievement; 
women=successful relationships) and differential depressions (achievement-related 
vs. relationship-based) suggests a possible model for assessing the role of gender 
differences in self-esteem and vulnerability to specific forms of depression. 
Second, a consistent finding in this research, and one that reflects the 
preponderance of published reports on coping, is that females tend to utilize more 
emotion-oriented coping (Endler & Parker, 1990; Billing & Moos, 1984; Ptacek, 
Smith & Dodge, 1994; Ptacek, Smith, & Zanas, 1992). Inherent in these 
differences, it has been argued, are the different stressors that male and females 
have to deal with. For instance, if males report greater stress at work the 
alleviation of such stress may be dependent on problem-focused coping efforts, 
whereas if females are reporting more stress due to disruption in the family 
process, the most effective coping effort may necessitative palliative approaches or 
the seeking of social support (Billing and Moos, 1984). That is, the argument has 
been that the differences in coping are not due to individual differences between 
male and females in their tendency to cope in a particular way but rather, the 
differences are due to the needs of the situation itself, that male and females 
differentially construct. However, a most recent study by Ptacek and colleagues 
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(Ptacek et al., 1994) demonstrated that situational appraisal could not account for 
the observed greater tendency of females to engage in emotion-oriented coping. 
Male and Female subjects were asked to offer their appraisals of a stressful 
situation, in this case the delivery of a lecture. They found that while both groups 
tended to appraise the situation in very similar ways; rate the inherent stressfulness 
of the situation in identical ways; and show the same level of physiological arousal, 
the first coping efforts by women were emotion-oriented strategies whilst males 
were problem-focused efforts. This greater tendency for females to cope with 
emotion-oriented approaches may reflect wider cultural norms, where females learn 
earlier and are provided more support for venting or expressing emotions and 
turning to others for emotional support (Billing and Moos, 1984). Further, males 
may utilize emotion-oriented coping efforts but do so in ways which are not 
interpersonally directed for instance, turning to alcohol or drugs to reduce stress 
(Carver et al., 1989; Pearlin, 1989). 
Relatedly, emotion-oriented coping was seen to be a consistent predictor of 
well-being. Just as females in this research were more likely to report greater use 
of emotion-oriented coping and less detached coping, these coping styles related 
to worsening and improvement in health status, respectively. And it was female 
subjects who tended to report poorer health status (chapter four). The tendency 
for females to report poorer health and well-being is consistent with large reviews 
of the literature (Gove & Tudor, 1973; Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, Gould, Link et al, 
1980; Newmann, 1984). In over fifty studies reviewed, females never appear in 
better health. Again a number of socialization variables have been put forth to 
account for these differences including the greater likelihood in childhood of young 
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girls to a) adopt health behaviours, b) be more aware of health prevention, c) 
perceive greater vulnerability to illness, d) and be more willing to adopt the sick role 
(Tousignant, Brosseau, & Tremblay, 1987). In accounting for the variance in 
greater symptom reporting in female adults, there is little suggestion that women 
have a greater tendency'to over-report minor symptoms. Rather, it would appear 
that women may be a) more attentive to internal states and b) based on early 
socialization, hold a higher ideal of good health. However, these explanatory 
principles have not received consistent empirical support as Pennebaker (1982) did 
not find that women were more accurate in their assessment of internal sensations. 
Hence, the etiological basis in women's greater health complaints is not well 
understood and necessitates additional investigation. 
7.7.2 Methodological Issues 
The connection of emotion-oriented coping styles to health is based on 
subjectively reported coping behaviours. Consistent with the need to assess health 
status objectively to overcome subjective reporting biases, is the need to use peer 
reports and observation ratings of coping behaviours. To date, the correspondence 
between reporting coping preferences and approaches to specific stressors and 
actual coping behaviours is unknown. 
When considering the findings in this study in relation to the literature it may 
be that the associations between the various psychological measures, self-esteem, 
coping, and emotion-control and health are merely the effect of a reporting artefact. 
While this possibility is present in any study that utilizes subjective health reports, 
there are several considerations from this research that limit the plausibility of this 
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confound. First, one could posit that the initial baseline ratings of self-esteem, 
coping and emotion-control styles were adversely affected due to the presence of 
physical symptoms or psychological distress at the beginning of the study and 
therefore lower ratings on these measures reflect outcomes rather than precipitants 
to poor health. However, in both chapters three and four the effects of self-esteem 
and prior symptoms at time one were removed when the relation between self- 
esteem and health and distress were examined at time two. Second, another 
potential confound could be that individuals with low self-esteem are simply more 
likely maintain a negative response set. The results in chapter four, however, 
suggested that individuals with low self-esteem were no more likely than individuals 
with high self-esteem to report experiencing negative life events just as individuals 
with high self-esteem were no more likely to report experiencing positive life events 
than individuals with low self-esteem thus limiting the argument that individuals with 
high self-esteem have a positive response set. Further, the distribution of health 
complaints was in the bottom range of the distribution for the entire sample in those 
prospective studies. This was even more true in symptom severity ratings. There 
did not appear, then, to be multiple global complaints suggestive of a tendency to 
endorse sick items. In chapter three the greatest number of complaints by any one 
subject did not exceed half the total number of items on the scale. Indeed, the low 
baseline rate of illness reported, and the relative stability in health complaints 
across time in both prospective studies, would appear to have offered a 
conservative test of the moderating influence of self-esteem. Furthermore, the 
results from chapter four suggested near equivalence in the magnitude of the 
relationship between self-esteem and the health ratings from two different scales, 
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despite their differing conceptual and methodological outlay, thus reducing the 
possibility that the observed relations were due to method variance in the design 
of the health measures. Finally, while self-esteem differences reported in the 
laboratory studies could be said to be'due to demand characteristics on subjective 
stress reports, the differing results on task performance and physiological arousal 
are suggestive of meaningful differences based on the self-esteem manipulation. 
Notwithstanding, the results linking self-esteem and health, distress, and 
psychopathology in this study are dependent on subjective reports as are all 
published reports linking self-esteem and self-processes to health. Some results 
have shown that self-reported health status shows good concordance with 
objectively verified illness, although it is very difficult to obtain potentially 
uncontaminated health information as personality processes have also been shown 
to relate to health-seeking behaviour such as number of visits to medical doctors, 
as well as rates of induced illness (e. g., Cohen et al., 1995). The future reliability 
and validity of research on personality and health might be improved upon by using 
multiple sources of personality and health status, for example, subject reports, peer 
reports, family reports, as well as expert reports. 
7.7.3. Analyses Considered But Not Completed 
It could be argued that a more sophisticated analysis of the data in chapter four 
would have been acheived with the use of structural equation modelling (SEM). 
This analysis provides a simultaneous analysis of multiple variables, both latent and 
observed, and allows for the examination of longitudinal trends. SEM and related 
trend analyses are, however, only appropriate when there is a theoretical model 
being tested (to account for the inter-relationships between variables and the 
potential time trends). Without a theoretical model faulty conclusions are likely to 
be drawn from simple empirical observations and the findings are not likely to be 
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replicated (Endler et at., 1993). In chapter four no explicit theoretical model was put 
forth to predict (potential) changes betweeen self-esteem, coping, and emotion- 
control and outcomes over time. Further, in the absence of systematic description 
and assessment of the situation, and the relative stability of the personality 
measures over time (i. e, coping), a true process-oriented analysis was not 
appropriate. However, future research aimed at testing the hypothetical paths 
presented in the model in this chapter (Figure 7.1) would be best acheived with a 
trend analysis. 
7.8 Final Comments 
This research was aimed to test the relationship between self-esteem, health and 
psychological well-being. While the theoretical model underlying the research on 
self-esteem is trait-oriented, the findings from the laboratory research also point to 
the situational responsiveness of self-esteem. Just as this research found that high 
self-esteem offers some advantage in reducing perception of threat and utilizing 
adaptive coping strategies to confront challenge, it may be the same situationally- 
based cognitive-motivational processes employed to protect and enhance self- 
esteem that are also related to better health and well-being. For instance, in 
addition to influencing primary and secondary appraisal, the demonstrated ability 
of individuals with high self-esteem to capitalize on positive events and derogate the 
significance of negative events (Brown & Monkowski, 1993); their ability to utilize 
compensatory self-enhancement when given the opportunity (inflating other parts 
of self when a part is under threat (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989) as well as 
self-protection when under threat, such as utilizing selective consensus (assuming 
that more share your limitations (Campbell, 1986)) may offer some insight regarding 
common mechanisms in self-esteem regulation and health. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX Al 
YSEI 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
1. I am not happy with my appearance. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am popular 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 have good ideas. 1 2 3 4 5 
" 4. I am an important member of my family. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I give up easily. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. I am uncertain of my goals. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. I am successful. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I like being the way I am. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. I feel left out of things. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I feel like quitting . 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I wish I were different. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I feel that I have a place in this world. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I am a failure. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. It is hard for me to make friends. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I am good at most things. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. I am uncertain of how I appear to others. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. My family is disappointed in me. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. I have a pleasant face. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I feel that I can achieve just about anything. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I am uncertain of my intelligence. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. I am at peace with myself. 1 2 3 4 5 
, 
22. I am easy to get along with. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. I have an attractive body. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. I am a good person. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. Other people feel relaxed when in my presence. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. I am lacking in self-confidence. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. I do not get as much out of life as I ought to. 1 2 3 4 5 
28. I feel uncertain about my future. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. I am comfortable with myself. 1 2 3 4 5 
30.1 get along well with most of my family. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix A2 
SCREE TEST OF THE SELF-ESTEEM QUESTIONNAIRE (YSEI) 
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Appendix A3 
SCREE TEST OF THE SELF-ESTEEM QUESTIONNAIRE (YSEI)-- 
REPLICATION STUDY 
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Appendix A4 
The Rosenberg Self-esteem Inventory (RSE) 
strongly strongly 
disagree agree 
01. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an 
equal plain with others. 
02. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
03. I feel that I have number of good qualities. 
04. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
05. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
06. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
07. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
08. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
09. I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix A5 
Name: 
HCO-1 
Age: Sex: 
Instructions: This questionnaire lists a variety of health problems or 
difficulties. Each item is followed by a three-point rating scale in 
which 1=better than usual for you, 2=no change, 3=worse than usual for 
you, and 4=don't or haven't suffered from it. 
Please indicate whether each problem has been better, worse, unchanged 
or not present during the last 3 weeks (i. e., since you arrived at 
campus) by circling one number opposite each item. 
Rating Scale: Better=1 Unchanged=2 Worse=3 4= Don't Have/Suffer From 
1. Arthritis 1 2 3 4 15. Diarrhoea 1 2 3 4 
2. More/less appetite 1 2 3 4 16. Eye infections 1 2 3 4 
3. Throat infection 1 2 3 4 17. Fibrositis 1 2 3 4 
4. Dizziness/fainting 1 2 3 4 18. Sinusitis 1 2 3 4 
5. Cold/'flu 1 2 3 4 19. Ear infection 1 2 3 4 
6. Glandular fever 1 2 3 4 20. Acne 1 2 3 4 
7. Eczema 1 2 3 4 21. Asthma 1 2 3 4 
8. Constipation 1 2 3 4 22. Anxiety 1 2 3 4 
9. Lethargy/tiredness 1 2 3 4 23. Dandruff 1 2 3 4 
10. Headache/migraine 1 2 3 4 24. Hypertension 1 2 3 4 
11. Depression 1 2 3 4 25. Cold sores 1 2 3 4 
12. Chest infections 1 2 3 4 26. Shingles 1 2 3 4 
13. Allergies 1 2 3 4 27. Post-viral 
syndrome (ME) 1 2 3 4 
14. Upset stomach/ 
vomiting 1 2 3 4 28. Insomnia 1 2 3 4 
Women only 
29. Menstrual problems 1 23 4 
30. Cystitis/vaginal infec tions 1 23 4 
Thank you for your help 
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Appendix A6 
Self-esteem Manipulation Report 
Personality Profile Report 
Name: Year: 1 
The following report is based upon your completed responses to questionnaires over 
the first 2 terms. If your report is not as favourable as you had hoped there will be time 
to discuss it later. 
Abilities: Above average in mental alertness. Also above average in accuracy--rather 
painstaking at times. Deserves a reputation for diligence--dislikes turning out sloppy 
work. Has initiative; that is, ability to make suggestions and to get new ideas, open- 
mindedness. People like to spend time with you because you are a good listener as 
well as a good friend. In general, while you may have some personal weaknesses, 
fundamentally your personality is quite strong. 
Ambitions: You are quite ambitious, and deserve credit for wanting to be well thought 
of by your family, fellow students and friends. These ambitions come out most strongly 
in your tendency to indulge in daydreams but this does not mean that you fail to get into 
the game of life actively. Most of your aspirations are realistic. 
Emotions: You have a tendency to worry at times but not to excess. You do get 
depressed at times but you couldn't be called moody because you are generally 
cheerful and rather optimistic. You have a good disposition although earlier in life you 
have had a struggle with yourself to control your impulses and temper. You are not a 
very sickly person and typically maintain good health by coping well with life's demands. 
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Appendix A7 
Experiment Feedback Form 
Not at all Very Much 
Did you find the experimental task stressful.. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Did you find the experimental task disturbing. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Were you feeling anxious during the task ...... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Were you feeling angry during the task ........ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Were you feeling insecure during the task ..... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Did you find the task Challenging ............. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Did you find the task meaningful .............. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Did you have a sense of personal control 
during the task .. ............................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Appendix A8 
Names Sex: Age 
Instructions : Please indicate how you feel about each item by circling either "TRUE" or 
"FALSE". If you feel that an item is neither entirely true nor false, please choose the 
alternative that is most like you. If you haven't been in the situation described, please say 
how you feel you would behave in that situation. 
1. When someone upsets me, I try to hide my feelings. 
2. If someone pushed me, I would push back. 
3. I remember things that upset me or make me angry for a long time 
afterwards. 
4.1 seldom feel irritable. 
5.1 often take chances crossing the road. 
6. People find it difficult to tell whether I'm excited about something or not. 
7. I often do or say things I later regret. 
8.1 find it difficult to comfort people who have been upset. 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
9. I generally don't bear a grudge - when something is over, it's over, and I TRUE FALSE 
don't think about it again. 
10. No-one gets one over on me -I don't take things lying down. TRUE FALSE 
11. When something upsets me I prefer to talk to someone about it than to TRUE FALSE 
bottle it up. 
12. I've been involved in many fights or arguments. 
13. I get "worked up" just thinking about things that have upset me in the 
past. 
14. I'm not easily distracted. 
15. If I'm badly served in a shop or restaurant I don't usually make a fuss. 
16. If I receive bad news in front of others I usually try to hide how I feel. 
17. I frequently change my mind about things. 
18. If a passing car splashes me, I shout at the driver. 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
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19. If someone were to hit me, I would hit back. TRUE FALSE 
20.1 seldom show how I feel about things. TRUE FALSE 
21.1 often say things without thinking whether I might upset others. TRUE FALSE 
22. I often find myself thinking over and over about things that have made TRUE FALSE 
me angry. 
23. If I'm pleasantly surprised, I show immediately how pleased I am. TRUE FALSE 
24.1 tend to snap at people. TRUE FALSE 
25. If I get angry or upset I usually say how I feel. TRUE FALSE 
26. If someone says something stupid, I tell them so. TRUE FALSE 
27. If I see someone pushing into a queue ahead of me I usually just TRUE FALSE 
ignore it. 
28. I can usually settle things quickly and be friendly again after an TRUE FALSE 
argument. 
29. My interests tend to change quickly. TRUE FALSE 
30.1 don't feel embarrassed about expressing my feelings. TRUE FALSE 
31. If I see or hear about an accident, I find myself thinking about TRUE FALSE 
something similar happening to me or to people close to me. 
32. I think about ways of getting back at people who have made me angry TRUE FALSE 
long after the event has happened. 
33. I'd rather concede an issue than get into an argument. TRUE FALSE 
34. I never forget people making me angry or upset, even about small TRUE FALSE 
things. 
35.1 seldom "put my foot in it". TRUE FALSE 
36.1 lose my temper quickly. TRUE FALSE 
37.1 think people show their feelings too easily. TRUE FALSE 
38. I find it hard to get thoughts about things that have upset me out of my TRUE FALSE 
mind. 
39. Almost everything I do is carefully thought out. TRUE FALSE 
40.1 don't think I could ever "turn the other cheek". TRUE FALSE 
41. I often daydream about situations where I'm getting my own back at TRUE FALSE 
people. 
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42. I find long journeys boring - all I want is to get there as quickly as TRUE FALSE 
possible. 
43. Expressing my feelings makes me feel very vulnerable and anxious. TRUE FALSE 
44. If a friend borrows something and returns it dirty or damaged, I usually TRUE FALSE 
just keep quiet about it. 
45.1 can't stand having to wait for anything. TRUE FALSE 
46. If I see something that frightens or upsets me, the image of it stays in TRUE FALSE 
my mind for a long time afterwards. 
47.1 hate being stuck behind a slow driver. TRUE FALSE 
48. If someone insults me I try to remain as calm as possible. TRUE FALSE 
49. Thinking about upsetting things just seems to keep them going, so I try TRUE FALSE 
to put them out of my mind. 
50. I usually manage to remain outwardly calm, even though I may be TRUE FALSE 
churned up inside. 
51. If I lose out on something, I get over it quickly. TRUE FALSE 
52.1 can't help showing how I feel, even when it isn't appropriate to do so. TRUE FALSE 
53. If I have to confront someone, I try not to think too much about it TRUE FALSE 
beforehand. 
54.1 like planning ahead rather than just seeing how things turn out. TRUE FALSE 
55.1 sometimes just come out with things that embarrass people I'm with. TRUE FALSE 
56. Sometimes I just can't control my feelings. 
57. My failures give me a persistent feeling of remorse. 
58. Even though I try to forget about things that have upset me, they keep 
coming back into my mind. 
59. The less I think afterwards about things that have upset me, the less 
important they seem to be. 
60. I seem to remember things that have upset me much less vividly than 
other people. 
61. For me, the future seems to be full of troubles and problems. 
62.1 often feel as if I'm just waiting for something bad to happen. 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
308 
63. When I am reminded of my past failures, I feel as if they are happening TRUE FALSE 
all over again. 
64. Upsetting things quickly lose their power to affect me. TRUE FALSE 
65. I am seldom preoccupied with thoughts about events which may TRUE FALSE 
happen in the future. 
66. Sometimes I have to force myself to concentrate on something else to TRUE FALSE 
keep unpleasant thoughts out of my mind. 
67.1 tend to get over upsets more quickly than most people. TRUE FALSE 
68. Intrusive thoughts about my earlier unpleasant experiences make it TRUE FALSE 
diff icult for me to keep my mind on a task. 
69.1 don't let a lot of unimportant things irritate me. TRUE FALSE 
70. Any reminder about a past failure brings back emotions related to it. TRUE FALSE 
71. I wish I could banish from my mind the memories of past failures. TRUE FALSE 
72. Sometimes I get so involved thinking about things that have upset me I TRUE FALSE 
am unable to adopt a positive attitude towards anything. 
73.1 worry less about the future more than most people I know. 
74. It takes me an unusually long time to get over unpleasant events. 
75. I never worry about my past failures. 
76. If someone has treated me unfairly, I don't let it annoy me. 
© D. Roger & B. Najarian (1990) 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
TRUE FALSE 
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APPENDIX A9 
Table 3.5-FULL REGRESSION MODEL 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 1 Health and Distress Scores 
Health Distress 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Sex 10.46" . 06 . 25* 1.4 . 01 . 09 
2. CSQ-Main Effects 5.55** . 12 12.4** . 12 
Emotion-CSQ . 20* . 37** 
Rational-CSQ -. 20` 
Detached-CSQ . 10 
3 ECQ-Main Effects 4.72** 
Rehearse-ECQ . 13 . 11 
Aggression-ECQ . 08 
4 YSEI-Self-esteem 4.23** . 14 -. 12 
5 Two-way Interact 
8.69** . 17 
. 17* 
. 19* 
12.16** . 27 -. 37* 
Main Effects 3.19** . 19 
YSEI X Rehearse -1.52` 
YSEI X Detached -2.41 
Non Significant Interaction Terms 
YSEI X CSQ-EMCOP . 20 . 73 
YSEI X CSQ-RATCOP 
. 86 1.50 
YSEI X SEX -. 18 . 48 
YSEI X ECQ-AGGRESS . 18 -1.30 
SEX X CSQ-EMCOP -. 13 . 63 
SEX X CSQ-RATCOP . 52 -. 04 
SEX X DETCOP -. 24 -. 12 
ECQ-REH X CSQ-RATCOP . 14 . 42 
ECQ-REH X CSQ-DETCOP -. 12 -. 18 
ECQ-AGGR X CSQ-EMCOP -1.31 -1.05 
ECQ-AGGR X CSQ-DETCOP -. 92 . 41 
ECQ-AGGR X CSQ-DETCOP 
. 20 -. 62 
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APPENDIX A10 
Table 3.8-FULL REGRESSION MODEL 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predictin 
Time 2 Health and Distress Scores 
Health Distress 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Time 1 Health 74.70** . 50 . 71 `* 
Time 1 Distress 50.30** . 28 . 53** 
2 CSQ-Main Effects 42.39** . 54 
15.72** 
. 33 
Emotio - SQ . 19 . 
11 
Rational-CSQ -. 06 
Detached-CSQ -. 11 
3 ECQ-Main Effects 28.66** . 54 
Rehearse-ECQ . 17 
Aggression-ECQ 
. 19 
4 YSEI-Self-esteem 24.56** . 58 -. 23* 15.14** . 38 -. 29* 
5 Two-way Interact 
Main Effects 17.08** . 60 
YSEI X Rehearse 
Non Significant Interaction Terms 
YSEI X CSQ-EMCOP 
YSEI X CSQ-RATCOP 
YSEI X ECQ-AGGRESS 
YSEI X CSQ-DETCOP 
ECQ-REH X CSQ-RATCOP 
ECQ-REH X CSQ-DETCOP 
ECQ-AGGR X CSQ-EMCOP 
ECQ-AGGR X CSQ-DETCOP 
-. 57* 
1.47 
-. 19 
. 18 
. 98 
-. 66 
. 25 
1.32 
. 44 
-. 21 
. 77 
1.30 
1.39 
-. 51 
-. 14 
. 65 
-1.16 
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APPENDIX Al l 
Table 4.4-FULL REGRESSION MODEL 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predictin 
Time 
_2 
Health Scores 
Step Predictor 
Health Scores 
Somatic Illness Distress 
F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Time 1 Health 21.74*** . 14 . 37*** 14.20*** . 09 . 31 
*** 
2. Life Events 
Main Effects 9.89*** . 18 3.38* . 18 
Negative . 16* . 26** 
Positive -. 19* -. 24** 
3. Subject Sex 7.67*** . 19 -. 09 
8.54*** . 20 -. 18* 
4. CSQ-Trait 
Main Effects 6.98*** . 21 7.94*** . 23 
CSQ-Emotion . 17* . 19* 
5. CSQ-State 
Main Effects 5.46*** . 25 10.27*** . 39 
CSQ-Emotion . 19* . 33** 
CSQ-Rational -. 04 -. 06 
CSQ-Detached -. 10 -. 23* 
6 ECQ-Main Effects 4.62*** . 27 8.73*** . 41 
Rehearse . 11 . 05 
Aggression . 10 . 14* 
7 YSEI-Self-esteem 4.19*** . 27 -. 03 7.96*** . 41 -. 06 
APPENDIX All CONTINUED 
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T -I 
APPENDIX 411 CONTINUED 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 2 Health Scores 
Health Scores 
Somatic Illness Distress 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
8. Two-way Interact. 
Main Effects 3.14** . 34 
YSEI X Pos. Events 
Non-significant Interaction Terms 
YSEI X CSQ-RAT1 
YSEI X CSQ-DET1 
YSEI X CSQ-EMOT1 
YSEI X CSQ-AVOID1 
YSEI X ECQ-R 
YSEI X ECQ-EI 
YSEI X ECQ-BC 
YSEI X ECQ-AC 
YSEI X CSQ-RAT2 
YSEI X CSQ-DET2 
YSEI X CSQ-EMOT2 
YSEI X CSQ-AVOID2 
YSEI X EVENTS-NEG 
YSEI X EVENTS-POS 
-. 61 `** 
-1.99 
1.88 
. 79 
-1.01 
-. 06 
1.11 
-. 67 
. 94 
-. 25 
. 01 
. 27 
-. 14 
-. 23 
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4.87*** . 44 
-. 64 
1.08 
. 40 
-. 41 
1.32 
1.90 
-. 32 
. 20 
-. 28 
-. 15 
. 52 
-. 10 
-. 04 
-. 15 
APPENDIX All CONTINUED 
Table 4.5-FULL REGRESSION MODEL 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 2 Adjustment Scores 
Adjustment Scores 
Social Academic 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
1 Time 1 Health 9.34*** . 06 . 25*** 2.86* . 
02 -. 14 
2. Life Events 
Main Effects 
Negative 
Positive 
3. Subject Sex 
4. CSQ-State 
Main Effects 
CSQ-Emotion 
4.71 *** . 09 
-. 12 
. 17* 
. 11 -. 13 4.06** 
3.41 ** . 11 
5 ECQ-Main Effects 4.03** . 16 
Rehearse 
Aggression 
4 YSEI-Self-esteem 6.97*** . 27 
. 08 
-. 10 
-. 21 "* 
3.38* . 07 
23 
. 15 
2.86* . 08 -. 10 
2.70* . 09 
-. 13 
2.23* . 09 
. 06 
. 01 
. 39*** 2.54* . 
12 . 19* 
APPENDIX All CONTINUED 
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APPENDIX All CONTINUED 
Results from Hierarchial Regression Analyses Predicting 
Time 2 Adjustment Scores 
Adjustment Scores 
Social Academic 
Step Predictor F R2 Beta F R2 Beta 
5 Two-way Interact. 
Main Effects 3.14** . 36 
YSEI X Pos. Events 1.27*** 
Non-significant Interaction Terms 
YSEI X CSQ-RATZ -. 20 -. 41 
YSEI X CSQ-DET1 -. 22 -. 08 
YSEI X CSQ-EMOT1 . 36 . 20 
YSEI X CSQ-AVOID1 -. 28 . 10 
YSEI X CSQ-R . 01 . 
47 
YSEI X ECQ-EI -. 44 -. 07 
YSEI X ECQ-BC -. 07 -. 05 
YSEI X ECQ-AC -. 42 . 14 
YSEI X CSQ-RAT2 . 03 . 02 
YSEI X CSQ-DET2 -. 02 -. 01 
YSEI X CSQ-EMOT2 . 00 -. 09 
YSEI X CSQ-AVOID2 . 02 -. 02 
YSEI X EVENTS-NEG -. 44 . 10 
YSEI X EVENTS-POS -- . 01 
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